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Eleven years ago, a man held an ice pick to my throat and said: "Push
over, shut up, or I'll kill you." I did what he said, but I couldn't stop
crying. A hundred years later, I jumped out of my car as he drove away.
I ended up in the back seat of a police car. I told the two officers I had
been raped by a man who came up to the car door as I was getting out in
my own parking lot (and trying to balance two bags of groceries and kick
the car door open). He took the car, too.
They asked me if he was a crow. That was their first question. A crow,
I learned that day, meant to them someone who is black.
They asked me if I knew him. That was their second question. They
believed me when I said I didn't. Because, as one of them put it, how
would a nice (white) girl like me know a crow?
Now they were on my side. They asked me if he took any money. He
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did; but while I remember virtually every detail of that day and night, I
can't remember how much. But I remember their answer. He did take
money; that made it an armed robbery. Much better than a rape. They
got right on the radio with that.
We went to the police station first, not the hospital, so I could repeat
my story (and then what did he do?) to four more policemen. When we
got there, I borrowed a dime to call my father. They all liked that.
By the time we went to the hospital, they were really on my team. I
could've been one of their kids. Now there was something they'd better
tell me. Did I realize what prosecuting a rape complaint was all about?
They tried to tell me that "the law" was against me. But they didn't
explain exactly how. And I didn't understand why. I believed in "the
law," not knowing what it was.
Late that night, I sat in the Police Headquarters looking at mug shots.
I was the one who insisted on going back that night. My memory was
fresh. I was ready. They had four or five to "really show" me; being
"really shown" a mug shot means exactly what defense attorneys are
afraid it means. But it wasn't any one of them. After that, they couldn't
help me very much. One shot looked close until my father realized that
the man had been the right age ten years before. It was late. I didn't have
a great description of identifying marks, or the like: No one had ever told
me that if you're raped, you should not shut your eyes and cry for fear
that this really is happening. You should keep your eyes open focusing on
this man who is raping you so you can identify him when you survive.
After an hour of looking, I left the police station. They told me they'd be
back in touch. They weren't.
A clerk called me one day to tell me that my car had been found minus
tires and I should come sign a release and have it towed-no small matter
if you don't have a car to get there and are slightly afraid of your shadow.
The women from the rape crisis center called me every day, then every
other day, then every week. The police detectives never called at all.
I learned, much later, that I had "really" been raped. Unlike, say, the
woman who claimed she'd been raped by a man she actually knew, and
was with voluntarily. Unlike, say, women who are "asking for it," and get
what they deserve. I would listen as seemingly intelligent people ex-
plained these distinctions to me, and marvel; later I read about them in
books, court opinions, and empirical studies. It is bad enough to be a
"real" rape victim. How terrible to be-what to call it-a "not real" rape
victim.
Even the real rape victim must bear the heavy weight of the silence that
surrounds this crime. At first, it is something you simply don't talk about.
Then it occurs to you that people whose houses are broken into or who
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are mugged in Central Park talk about it all the time. Rape is a much
more serious crime. If it isn't my fault, why am I supposed to be
ashamed? If I shouldn't be ashamed, if it wasn't "personal," why look
askance when I mention it?
As this introduction makes clear, I talk about it. I do so very con-
sciously. Sometimes, I have been harassed as a result. More often, it leads
women I know to tell me that they too are victims, and I try to help them.
I cannot imagine anyone writing an article on prosecutorial discretion
without disclosing that he or she had been a prosecutor. I cannot imagine
myself writing on rape without disclosing how I learned my first lessons
or why I care so much.
The rapes that I examine in this Article are, like my own, the rapes of
adult, competent women by men.1 I have simply excluded from my con-
sideration the additional problems presented when young girls or uncon-
scious women are raped; it is enough for me to try to understand the
application of the law to women who are not special or different in these
ways. I have put almost as far to one side. the issue of race as a dominant
theme. The history of rape, as the law has been enforced in this country,
is a history of both racism and sexism.2 One could write an article of this
length dealing only with the racism. I address it in places-for its influ-
ence is pervasive-but I cannot do justice to both. My focus is sexism.3
1. By adult, I mean above the age defining statutory rape. While my focus is the rape of women, I
do not mean to suggest that men are not raped. The apparent invisibility of the problem of male rape,
at least outside the prison context, may well reflect the intensity of the stigma attached to the crime
and the homophobic reactions against its gay victims. In some respects, the situation facing male rape
victims today is not so different from that which faced female victims, say, two centuries ago.
2. The death penalty for rape in this country, now unconstitutional under Coker v. Georgia, 433
U.S. 584 (1977), was traditionally reserved for black men who raped white women. Between 1930
and 1967, 89% of the men executed for rape in this country were black. That figure includes 36% of
the black men who were convicted of raping a white woman; only 2% of the defendants convicted of
rape involving any other racial combination were executed. Professor Wolfgang, after a systematic
analysis of 1,238 rape convictions between 1945 and 1965, concluded that race was the only factor
that accounted for the disparities in the imposition of the death penalty. See Wolfgang, Racial Dis-
crimination in the Death Sentence for Rape, in ExEcUTIONs IN AMERICA 110-20 (W. Bowers ed.
1974); see also M. MELTSNER, CRUEL AND UNUSUAL 73-105 (1973); Mann & Seva, The Sexualiza-
tion of Racism: The Black as Rapist and White Justice, 3 J. BLcC STUDIES 168 (1979); Wolfgang
& Reidel, Race, Judicial Discretion, and the Death Penalty, 407 ANNALS 120 (1973). Although thedeath penalty for rape is now prohibited, at least one study has found that black men convicted of
raping white women continue to receive the harshest penalties. See LaFree, The Effect of Sexual
Stratification by Race on Official Reactions to Rape, 45 AM. Soc. REv. 842, 852 (1980). See gener-
ally Wriggins, Rape, Racism, and the Law, 6 HARV. WOMEN'S L.J. 103 (1983).
3. 1 am certain that some will say that I have not devoted enough attention to class either. I do not
doubt that upper-class women fare better in the system when they are raped by lower-class men. I
would suspect that class differences between victim and defendant may be more important than class
itself in predicting disposition, although I have not seen any study of rape itself which confirms this.
Beyond that, it seems to me that sex and sexism, not class, is far more useful as a focus in understand-
ing the law of rape, certainly in theory but also in practice. Or, as some of my (upper-class male)
friends put it to those who occasionally forget: "You may think you have it made, but you're still a
woman."
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In recent years, rape has emerged as a topic of increasing research and
attention among feminists, in both popular and scholarly journals." But
much of the feminist writing is not focused on an analysis of the law of
rape, and some that is so focused is not very firmly grounded in the crimi-
nal law. At the same time, much of the writing about rape in the more
traditional criminal law literature, with the exception of some recent arti-
cles (primarily student notes), 5 does little more than mirror the condescen-
sion and misunderstanding, if not outright hostility to women, that have
made rape a central part of the feminist agenda.'
This Article examines rape within the criminal law tradition in order
to expose and understand that tradition's attitude toward women. It is,
first and foremost, a study of rape law as an illustration of sexism in the
criminal law. A second purpose is to examine the connections between the
law as written by legislators, as understood by courts, as acted upon by
victims, and as enforced by prosecutors. Finally, this Article is an argu-
ment for an expanded understanding of rape in the law.
To examine rape within the criminal law tradition is to expose fully
the sexism of the law. Much that is striking about the crime of rape-and
revealing of the sexism of the system-emerges only when rape is ex-
amined relative to other crimes, which the feminist literature by and large
does not do. For example, rape is most assuredly not the only crime in
which consent is a defense; but it is the only crime that has required the
victim to resist physically in order to establish nonconsent. Nor is rape the
4. See, e.g., S. BROWNMILLER, AGAINST OUR WILL: MEN, WOMEN AND RAPE (1975); N.
GAGER & C. SCHURR, SEXUAL ASSAULT: CONFRONTING RAPE IN AMERICA (1976); A. MEDEA &
K. THOMPSON, AGAINST RAPE (1974); D. RUSSELL, THE PoLrrICs OF RAPE: THE VICTIM'S PER-
SPECTIVE (1975); Griffin, Rape: The All American Crime, RAMPARTS, Sept. 1971, at 26-36; MacK-
innon, Feminism, Marxism, Method, and the State, 8 SIGNS 635 (1983).
5. See, e.g., Berger, Man's Trial, Woman's Tribulation: Rape Cases in the Courtroom, 77
COLUM. L. REv. 1 (1977); Note, Recent Statutory Developments in the Definition of Forcible Rape,
61 VA. L. REV. 1500 (1975) [hereinafter cited as Note, Recent Statutory Developments]; Note, The
Rape Corroboration Requirement: Repeal not Reform, 81 YALE L.J. 1365 (1972) [hereinafter cited
as Note, Rape Corroboration]; Comment, Towards a Consent Standard in the Law of Rape, 43 U.
CHI. L. REv. 613 (1976) [hereinafter cited as Comment, Towards a Consent Standard].
6. For instance, "major" articles in the late nineteenth and early twentieth century discussed the
problems of consent in the law of rape. But these articles are not concerned with the consent of adult,
competent women: Rather, what fascinated Professors Beale and Puttkammer, the leading authors,
was whether there is "consent" when a snake oil salesman convinces a woman that he is really her
husband and that sex is really a physical examination of her wooden leg. I am kidding, but just a very
little. See Beale, Consent in the Criminal Law, 8 HARv. L. REv. 317 (1895); Puttkammer, Consent
in Rape, 19 ILL. L. REV. 410 (1925). Freud has exercised a major influence as well; although he did
not invent the fear of lying women complainants, he gave the fear a solid foundation and an aura of
reasoned elaboration that is evidenced in the law review writings of the 1950's and 1960's. See, e.g.,
Note, Corroborating Charges of Rape, 67 COLUM. L. REv. 1137 (1967) [hereinafter cited as Note,
Corroborating Charges]; Note, The Resistance Standard in Rape Legislation, 18 STAN. L. REv. 680
(1966) [hereinafter cited as Note, Resistance Standard]; Note, Forcible and Statutory Rape: An
Exploration of the Operation and Objectives of the Consent Standard, 62 YALE L.J. 55 (1952)
[hereinafter cited as Note, Forcible and Statutory Rape].
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only crime where prior relationship is taken into account by prosecutors
in screening cases; yet we have not asked whether considering prior rela-
tionship in rape cases is different, and less justifiable, than considering it
in cases of assault.
Sexism in the law of rape is no matter of mere historical interest; it
endures, even where some of the most blatant testaments to that sexism
have disappeared. Corroboration requirements unique to rape may have
been repealed, but they continue to be enforced as a matter of practice in
many jurisdictions. The victim of rape may not be required to resist to the
utmost as a matter of statutory law in any jurisdiction, but the definitions
accorded to force and consent may render "reasonable" resistance both a
practical and a legal necessity. In the law of rape, supposedly dead horses
continue to run.
The study of rape as an illustration of sexism in the criminal law also
raises broader questions about the way conceptions of gender and the dif-
ferent backgrounds and perspectives of men and women should be encom-
passed within the criminal law.' In one of his most celebrated essays, Oli-
ver Wendell Holmes explained that the law does not exist to tell the good
man what to do, but to tell the bad man what not to do.8 Holmes was
interested in the distinction between the good and bad man; I cannot help
noticing that both are men. Most of the time, a criminal law that reflects
male views and male standards imposes its judgment on men who have
injured other men. It is "boys' rules" applied to a boys' fight.9 In rape,
the male standard defines a crime committed against women, and male
standards are used not only to judge men, but also to judge the conduct of
women victims. Moreover, because the crime involves sex itself, the law of
rape inevitably treads on the explosive ground of sex roles, of male aggres-
sion and female passivity, of our understandings of sexuality-areas
where differences between a male and a female perspective may be most
pronounced.
The criminal law defines rape in at least three places. The way most of
us teach "law" is by focusing on the common law tradition: cases from
7. Similar questions may be raised, for example, when a woman is prosecuted for killing the
husband who battered her, see, e.g., Ibn-Tamas v. United States, 407 A.2d 626 (D.C. 1979), or a
man suspected of sexually molesting her children, see, e.g., State v. Wanrow, 88 Wash. 2d 221, 559
P.2d 548 (1977). The law must define the standard of "reasonableness" against which the woman's
conduct must be judged for purposes of self-defense or provocation. Is the question what a "reasonable
person" would have done in such a situation, or what a "reasonable woman" would have done? Is
there such a thing, in life or in law, as reasonable people, or only men and women, with all their
differences?
8. Holmes, The Path of the Law, 10 HARV. L. REv. 457, 459 (1897).
9. In referring to "male" standards and "boys' rules," I do not mean to suggest that every man
adheres to them. A "male view" is nonetheless distinct from a "female view" not only by the gender of
most of those who adhere to it, but also by the character of the life experiences and socialization which
tend to produce it.
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appellate courts and leading commentary. That is what I do in Part II of
this Article.10 In Part III, I look at the law of statutes by examining two
very different and very influential statutory schemes which were intended,
and which have served, as models of "reform." Finally, in Part IV of this
Article, my focus is on how the criminal justice system defines and under-
stands rape.
In considering each area, my questions are essentially the same: How
have the limits on the crime of rape been formulated? What do those
limits signify? What makes it rape, as opposed to sex? In what ways is
rape defined differently from other crimes? What do those differences tell
us about the law's attitudes towards women, men, sex, and sexuality?
The answers I have found are strikingly consistent in each area of the
"law." At one end of the spectrum is the "real" rape, what I will call the
traditional rape: A stranger puts a gun to the head of his victim, threatens
to kill her or beats her, and then engages in intercourse. In that case, the
law-judges, statutes, prosecutors and all-generally acknowledge that a
serious crime has been committed. But most cases deviate in one or many
respects from this clear picture, making interpretation far more complex.
Where less force is used or no other physical injury is inflicted, where
threats are inarticulate, where the two know each other, where the setting
is not an alley but a bedroom, where the initial contact was not a kidnap-
ping but a date, where the woman says no but does not fight, the under-
standing is different. In such cases, the law, as reflected in the opinions of
the courts, the interpretation, if not the words, of the statutes, and the
decisions of those within the criminal justice system, often tell us that no
crime has taken place and that fault, if any is to be recognized, belongs
with the woman. In concluding that such acts-what I call, for lack of a
better title, "non-traditional" rapes-are not criminal, and worse, that the
woman must bear any guilt, the law has reflected, legitimized, and en-
forced a view of sex and women which celebrates male aggressiveness and
punishes female passivity. And that vision, while under attack in recent
years, continues to be a dominant force in our society and in the law of
rape.
10. The cases I have chosen to examine date primarily from the last decade; they state rules which
continue to have force. While I am far more interested in slaying real dragons than straw men, these
cases are admittedly unrepresentative in the same way that all appellate cases are unrepresentative of
the criminal justice system. The overwhelming majority of all rape cases-and certainly most of the
closest and most difficult among them-never reach the appellate courts or result in written opinions.
They are dismissed or plea bargained. In looking for cases to discuss in this Article, as in looking for
cases to teach my students, I have avoided three-paragraph affirmances on sufficiency of the evidence.
Instead, I have looked for cases where there are majorities and dissents, for cases where there are
opinions in both the intermediate and the highest courts of appeal, in short, for cases where the courts
are struggling with what they see as difficult questions. Those are the questions I want to struggle
with too.
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Finally, this Article is an argument that the law can make a differ-
ence-and that it should. But the answer is not to write the perfect stat-
ute. While some statutes invite a more restrictive application than others,
there is no "model statute" solution to rape law, because the problem has
never been the words of the statutes as much as our interpretation of
them. A typical statute of the 1890's-punishing a man who engages in
sexual intercourse "by force" and "against the will and without the con-
sent" of the woman-may not be all that different from the "model" stat-
ute we will enforce in the 1990's.11 The difference must come in our un-
derstanding of "consent" and "will" and "force."
Some of those who have written about rape from a feminist perspective
intimate that nothing short of political revolution can redress the failings
of the traditional approach to rape, that most of what passes for "sex" in
our capitalist society is coerced, and that no lines can or should be drawn
between rape and what happens in tens of millions of bedrooms across
America. 2
So understood, this particular feminist vision of rape shares one thing
with the most traditional sexist vision: the view that non-traditional rape
is not fundamentally different from what happens in tens of millions of
bedrooms across America. According to the radical feminist, all of it is
rape; according to the traditionalist, it is all permissible sex and seduction.
In policy terms, neither is willing to draw lines between rape and permis-
sible sex. As a result, the two visions, contradictory in every other respect,
point to the same practical policy implications.
My own view is different from both of these. I recognize that both men
and women in our society have long accepted norms of male aggressive-
ness and female passivity which lead to a restricted understanding of rape.
And I do not propose, nor do I think it feasible, to punish all of the acts of
sexual intercourse that could be termed coerced. But lines can be drawn
between these two alternatives. The law should be understood to prohibit
claims and threats to secure sex that would be prohibited by extortion law
and fraud or false pretenses law as a means to secure money. The law
should evaluate the conduct of "reasonable" men, not according to a Play-
boy-macho philosophy that says "no means yes," but by according respect
to a woman's words. If in 1986 silence does not negate consent, at least
crying and saying "no" should.
Traditionally, the law has done more than reflect the restrictive and
sexist views of our society; it has legitimized and contributed to them. In
11. The statutes of the 1990's will no doubt include degrees of rape based on weapons, injuries, orintent, but unless there are dramatic changes in the next ten years, they will continue to rely on some
combination of "force" and "consent" in defining the offense. See infra Part V.
12. See, e.g., MacKinnon, supra note 4, at 635; see also D. RussELL, supra note 4, at 276.
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the same way, a law that rejected those views and respected female auton-
omy might do more than reflect the changes in our society; it might even
push them forward a bit.
II. THE DEFINITION OF RAPE: THE COMMON LAW TRADITION
The traditional way of defining a crime is by describing the prohibited
act (aictus reus) committed by the defendant and the prohibited mental
state (mens rea) with which he must have done it. We ask: What did the
defendant do? What did he know or intend when he did it?
The definition of rape stands in striking contrast to this tradition, be-
cause courts, in defining the crime, have focused almost incidentally on the
defendant-and almost entirely on the victim. It has often been noted that,
traditionally at least, the rules associated with the proof of a rape
charge-the corroboration requirement, the requirement of cautionary in-
structions, and the fresh complaint rule-as well as the evidentiary rules
relating to prior sexual conduct by the victim,"3 placed the victim as much
on trial as the defendant.1 4 Such a reversal also occurs in the course of
defining the elements of the crime. Mens rea, where it might matter, is all
but eliminated; prohibited force tends to be defined according to the re-
sponse of the victim; and nonconsent-the sine qua non of the of-
fense-turns entirely on the victim's response.
But while the focus is on the female victim, the judgment of her actions
is entirely male. If the issue were what the defendant knew, thought, or
intended as to key elements of the offense, this perspective might be un-
derstandable; yet the issue has instead been the appropriateness of the
woman's behavior, according to male standards of appropriate female
behavior.
To some extent, this evaluation is but a modern response to the long-
standing suspicion of rape victims. As Matthew Hale put it three centu-
ries ago: "Rape is ...an accusation easily to be made and hard to be
13. The corroboration, cautionary instruction, and fresh complaint rules will be discussed in Part
III, infra, in connection with the Model Penal Code, which retains and defends them all. A full
analysis of the application and constitutionality of the various forms of evidentiary shield statutes
which have been enacted in recent years is beyond the scope of this Article and the subject of extensive
review by others. See, e.g., Berger, supra note 5; Tanford & Bocchino, Rape Victim Shield Laws and
the Sixth Amendment, 128 U. PA. L. REv. 544 (1980). My attention to the evidentiary questions is
limited to certain points of intersection with the substantive criminal law, e.g., how we define the issue
as to which prior sexual conduct might be relevant, and whether that is the proper way to frame the
question, see infra Section II(A) (mens rea), and the distinction drawn in the application of the
nonconsent/resistance requirement between chaste and sexually experienced victims, see infra Section
II(C) (consent).
14. See, e.g., Berger, supra note 5, at 6-11; S. KArZ & M. MAZUR, UNDERSTAND ING THE RAPE
VICTIM 199 (1979); Note, The Victim in a Forcible Rape Case: A Feminist View, 11 AM. CRIM. L.
REv. 335 (1973).
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proved, and harder to be defended by the party accused, tho never so
innocent." 15
But the problem is more fundamental than that. Apart from the wo-
man's conduct, the law provides no clear, working definition of rape. This
rather conspicuous gap in the law of rape presents substantial questions of
fair warning for men, which the law not so handily resolves by imposing
the burden of warning them on women.
At its simplest, the dilemma lies in this: If nonconsent is essential to
rape (and no amount of force or physical struggle is inherently inconsis-
tent with lawful sex), and if no sometimes means yes, and if men are
supposed to be aggressive in any event, how is a man to know when he
has crossed the line? And how are we to avoid unjust convictions?
This dilemma is hardly inevitable. Partly, it is a product of the way
society (or at least a powerful part of it) views sex. Partly, it is a product
of the lengths to which the law has gone to enforce and legitimize those
views. We could prohibit the use of force and threats and coercion in sex,
regardless of "consent." We could define consent in a way that respected
the autonomy of women. Having chosen neither course, however, we have
created a problem of fair warning, and force and consent have been de-
fined in an effort to resolve this problem.
Usually, any discussion of rape begins (and ends) with consent. I begin
instead with mens rea, because if unjust punishment of the blameless man
is our fear (as it was Hale's), then mens rea would seem an appropriate
place to start addressing it. At least a requirement of mens rea would
avoid unjust convictions without adjudicating the "guilt" of the victim. It
could also be the first step in expanding liability beyond the most tradi-
tional rape.
Without mens rea, the fair warning problem turns solely on the under-
standing of force and consent. To the extent that force is defined apart
from a woman's reaction, it has been defined narrowly, in the most
schoolboyish terms. But most of the time, force has been defined according
to the woman's will to resist, judged as if she could and should fight like a
man. Thus defined, force serves to limit our understanding of rape even in
cases where a court might be willing to say that this woman did not
consent.
Rape is not a unique crime in requiring nonconsent. But it is unique in
the definition given to nonconsent. As it has been understood, the consent
standard denies female autonomy; indeed, it even denies that women are
capable of making decisions about sex, let alone articulating them. Yet
15. I M. HALE, THE HISTORY OF THE PLEAS OF THE CROwN 635 (1778). This statement is the
usual basis for the "cautionary" instructions traditionally given in rape cases.
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consent, properly understood, has the potential to give women greater
power in sexual relations and to expand our understanding of the crime of
rape. That is, perhaps, why so many efforts have been made to cabin the
concept.
A. Mens Rea
It is difficult to imagine any man engaging in intercourse accidentally
or mistakenly. It is just as difficult to imagine an accidental or mistaken
use of force, at least as force is conventionally defined. But it is not at all
difficult to imagine cases in which a man might claim that he did not
realize that the woman was not consenting to sex. He may have been
mistaken in assuming that no meant yes. He may not have bothered to
inquire. He may have ignored signs that would have told him that the
woman did not welcome his forceful penetration.
In doctrinal terms, such a man could argue that his mistake of fact
should exculpate him because he lacked the requisite intent or mens rea
as to the woman's required nonconsent. 16 American courts have altogether
eschewed the mens rea or mistake inquiry as to consent, opting instead for
a definition of the crime of rape that is so limited that it leaves little room
for men to be mistaken, reasonably or unreasonably, as to consent. The
House of Lords, by contrast, has confronted the question explicitly and, in
its leading case, has formally restricted the crime of rape to men who act
recklessly, a state of mind defined to allow even the unreasonably mis-
taken man to avoid conviction.
This Section argues that the American courts' refusal to confront the
mens rea problem works to the detriment of the victim. In order to protect
men from unfair convictions, American courts end up defining rape with
16. Mistakes of fact which are unrelated to elements of the offense are irrelevant to guilt or
innocence; those which exculpate do so precisely because they negate the required mens rea as to an
element of the offense. Thus, it matters not at all if the defendant believed-reasonably or unreasona-
bly-that his victim was a professional model (the example is suggested by one case in which the
defendant's stated intent was to have intercourse with a model; the victim was a clerical employee of a
modeling agency); it should matter if he believes she is consenting, however, because nonconsent is an
element of the crime. In order for the prohibited act to be criminal, it should not be significant, for
these purposes, whether nonconsent is considered to be part of the definition of the actus reua prohib-
ited by rape law, or a required "circumstance." In either case, the prosecution should be held to prove
that the defendant in fact had the requisite mental state, whether it is, in Model Penal Code terms,
purpose, knowledge, recklessness or even negligence, as to nonconsent. See G. WILLIAMS, CRIMINAL
LAW 137 (1953) ("It is impossible to assert that a crime requiring intention or recklessness can be
committed although the accused labored under a mistake that negatived the requisite intention or
recklessness. Such an assertion carries its own refutation.") The Model Penal Code has a separate
provision as to mistakes of fact, but one which seeks to make clear that mistakes exculpate because,
and only because, they negative the required mental state as to one or more elements of the offense.
Section 2.04(1)(a) provides a mistake of fact defense if "the ignorance or mistake negatives the pur-
pose, knowledge, belief, recklessness or negligence required to establish a material element of the
offense." MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.04(1)(a) (1985).
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undue restrictiveness. The English approach, while doctrinally clearer,
also tends toward an unduly restricted definition of the crime of rape.
While the defendant's attitude toward consent may be considered either
an issue of mens rea or a mistake of fact, the key question remains the
same. In mens rea terms, the question is whether negligence suffices, that
is, whether the defendant should be convicted who claims that he thought
the woman was consenting, or didn't think about it, in situations where a
"reasonable man" would have known that there was not consent. In mis-
take of fact terms, the question is whether a mistake as to consent must be
reasonable in order to exculpate the defendant."'
In defining the crime of rape, most American courts have omitted mens
rea altogether. In Maine, for example, the Supreme Judicial Court has
held that there is no mens rea requirement at all for rape."8 In Pennsylva-
nia, the Superior Court held in 1982 that even a reasonable belief *as to
the victim's consent would not exculpate a defendant charged with rape."9
In 1982 the Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts left open the ques-
tion whether it would recognize a defense of reasonable mistake of fact as
to consent, but it rejected the defendant's suggestion that any mistake, rea-
sonable or unreasonable, would be sufficient to negate the required intent
to rape; such a claim was treated by the court as bordering on the ridicu-
lous.2" The following year the court went on to hold that a specific intent
that intercourse be without consent was not an element of the crime of
17. Arguably, viewing such situations as cases of a mistake "defense" rather than as cases where
the required mens rea cannot be established invites a court or legislature to impose the burden of
coming forward and of proving the defense on the defendant. But as long as nonconsent is spelled out
as an affirmative element of the crime, such a shift at least in the burden of persuasion would raise
serious constitutional questions. See Patterson v. New York, 432 U.S. 197 (1977) (New York law
requiring defendant to prove affirmative defense not violative of due process clause because defense
bears no direct relationship to elements of crime). Still, some states have managed to destroy the
symmetry: Pennsylvania, for example, follows the Model Penal Code approach to the point of provid-
ing a mistake of fact defense when it negatives the "intent, knowledge, belief, recklessness, or negli-
gence required," but only if the mistake is one "for which there is a reasonable explanation or ex-
cuse." 18 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. tit. 18, § 304 (Purdon 1983). In other words, for some crimes
requiring at least recklessness, negligence as to some elements (those conceived of in mistake terms) is
sufficient to convict.
18. "The legislature, by carefully defining the sex offenses in the criminal code, and by making no
reference to a culpable state of mind for rape, clearly indicated that rape compelled by force or threat
requires no culpable state of mind." State v. Reed, 479 A.2d 1291, 1296 (Me. 1984).
19.
[Diefendant contends that the court should have instructed the jury that if the defendant rea-
sonably believed that the prosecutrix had consented to his sexual advances that this would
constitute a defense to the rape and involuntary deviate sexual intercourse charge. . . . The
charge requested by the defendant is not now and has never been the law of Pennsylva-
nia. . . . If the element of the defendant's belief as to the victim's state of mind is to be
established as a defense to the crime of rape then it should be done by our legislature which
has the power to define crimes and offenses. We refuse to create such a defense.
Commonwealth v. Williams, 294 Pa. Super. 93, 99-100, 439 A.2d 765, 769 (1982).
20. Commonwealth v. Sherry, 437 N.E.2d 224, 386 Mass. 682 (1982).
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rape;2' that decision has since been construed to mean that there is no
intent requirement at all as to consent in rape cases.
To treat what the defendant intended or knew or even should have
known about the victim's consent as irrelevant to his liability sounds like a
result favorable to both prosecution and women as victims. But experience
makes all too clear that it is not. To refuse to inquire into mens rea leaves
two possibilities: turning rape into a strict liability offense where, in the
absence of consent, the man is guilty of rape regardless of whether he (or
anyone) would have recognized nonconsent in the circumstances; or defin-
ing the crime of rape in a fashion that is so limited that it would be
virtually impossible for any man to be convicted where he was truly una-
ware or mistaken as to nonconsent. In fact, it is the latter approach which
has characterized all of the older, and many of the newer, American cases.
In practice, abandoning mens rea produces the worst of all possible
worlds: The trial emerges not as an inquiry into the guilt of the defendant
(is he a rapist?) but of the victim (was she really raped? did she con-
sent?). The perspective that governs is therefore not that of the woman,
nor even of the particular man, but of a judicial system intent upon pro-
tecting against unjust conviction, regardless of the dangers of injustice to
the woman in the particular case.
The requirement that sexual intercourse be accompanied by force or
21. Commonwealth v. Grant, 391 Mass. 645, 464 N.E.2d 33 (1984).
22. In Commonwealth v. Lefkowitz, 20 Mass. App. Ct. 513, 481 N.E.2d 227, 230, review denied,
396 Mass. 1103, 485 N.E.2d 224 (1985), the Massachusetts Appeals Court termed an argument that
some intent requirement ought to apply to every element of the offense, including consent, a request
for an instruction on specific intent and rejected it out of hand. The trial judge in that case thought
the defendants' attitudes toward consent to be irrelevant: In rejecting their proffered instruction, he
explained that the jury should "not look at [the case] from the point of view of the defendant's percep-
tions. . . I don't think that's the law." Id. at 518-19, 481 N.E.2d at 230. His decision was upheld by
the Appeals Court on the ground that "specific intent"-a term they never defined-was not re-
quired. It seems quite clear that, as used by the Massachusetts court, "specific intent" does not mean
a mens rea of "purpose" as it has been traditionally understood; rather, it means any mens rea at all.
Cf MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.02(1) (1985) (mens rea required as to each element of offense); S.
KADISH, S. SCHULHOFER & M. PAULSEN, CRIMINAL LAW 277 (1983) ("The term specific intent has
been productive of untold confusion, partly because courts have not been consistent in their use of it
and partly for the more fundamental reason that it is often quite difficult to determine whether a
statute should be interpreted to require specific intent-that is, the [Model Penal] Code concept of a
true 'purpose.' ") (emphasis in original).
And in South Dakota, the state supreme court has held that "evidence of other alleged rapes cannot
be deemed to be admissible because it shows intent for the reason that intent is simply not one of the
elements of the crime charged." State v. Houghton, 272 N.W.2d 788, 791 (S.D. 1978). See also State
v. Cantrell, 234 Kan. 426, 434, 673 P.2d 1147, 1153-54 (1983), cert. denied, 105 S. Ct. 84 (1984);
People v. Hammack, 63 Mich. App. 87, 91, 234 N.W.2d 415, 417 (1975); Brown v. State, 59 Wis. 2d
200, 213-14, 207 N.W.2d 602, 609 (1973). Two notable exceptions to this pattern among American
courts are Alaska and California. See Reynolds v. State, 664 P.2d 621 (Alaska Ct. App. 1983); People
v. Mayberry, 15 Cal. 3d 143, 542 P.2d 1337, 125 Cal. Rptr. 745 (1975). In Mayberry, the California
court held that the state must prove that a defendant intentionally engaged in intercourse and was at
least negligent regarding consent. In Reynolds, the Alaska court held that the state must prove that
the defendant knowingly engaged in sexual intercourse and recklessly disregarded his victim's lack of
consent.
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threat of force to constitute rape provides a man with some protection
against mistakes as to consent. A man who uses a gun or knife against his
victim is not likely to be in serious doubt as to her lack of consent, and the
more narrowly force is defined, the more implausible the claim that he
was unaware of nonconsent.
But the law's protection of men is not limited to a requirement of force.
Rather than inquire whether the man believed (reasonably or unreasona-
bly) that his victim was consenting, the courts have demanded that the
victim demonstrate her nonconsent by engaging in resistance that will
leave no doubt as to nonconsent. The definition of nonconsent as resis-
tance-in the older cases, as utmost resistance, "3 while in some more re-
cent ones, as "reasonable" physical resistance24-functions as a substitute
for mens rea to ensure that the man has notice of the woman's
nonconsent.
The choice between focusing on the man's intent or focusing on the
woman's is not simply a doctrinal flip of the coin.
First, the inquiry into the victim's nonconsent puts the woman, not the
man, on trial. Her intent, not his, is disputed; and because her state of
mind is key, her sexual history may be considered relevant (even though
utterly unknown to the man).2" Considering consent from his perspective,
23. See, e.g., King v. State, 210 Tenn. 150, 158, 357 S.W.2d 42, 45 (1962); Moss v. State, 208
Miss. 531, 536, 45 So. 2d 125, 126 (1950); Brown v. State, 127 Wis. 193, 199, 106 N.W. 536, 538(1906); People v. Dohring, 59 N.Y. 374, 386 (1874). See generally Note, Recent Statutory Devilop-
ments, supra note 5, at 1503-07 (1975).
24. See, e.g., Satterwhite v. Commonwealth, 201 Va. 478, 482, 111 S.E.2d 820, 823 (1960);
Goldberg v. State, 41 Md. App. 58, 68, 395 A.2d 1213, 1218-19 (1979); State v. Lima, 64 Hawaii
470, 476-77, 643 P.2d 536, 540 (1982).
25. See, e.g., Government of the Virgin Islands v. John, 447 F.2d 69 (3d Cir. 1971) (holding
victim's reputation for chastity relevant to consent); Packineau v. United States, 202 F.2d 681, 687
(8th Cir. 1953); Wynne v. Commonwealth, 216 Va. 355, 356, 218 S.E.2d 445, 446 (1975). Even if
such evidence is viewed, as I think it should be, as irrelevant to a woman's credibility as a witness, it
may be of some minimal "relevance" to the disputed issue of her state of mind. Prior "similar" acts
are generally considered relevant in determining a party's state of mind. While the fact that a woman
has sometime previously consented to sex does not mean she is consenting here, if it makes consent
any more likely, then it does have some relevance. That it may be not only painful for the woman
victim to discuss, but prejudicial to the prosecution's case, is clear; studies have found a woman's prior
sexual history to be critical in respondents' evaluations of the seriousness of a claim of rape. See
L'Armand & Pepitone, Judgments of Rape: A Study of Victim-Rapist Relationship and Victim Sex-
ual History, 8 PERSONALITY AND SoC. PSYCHOLOGY BuLI.. 134, 136 (1982); Borgida & White,
Social Perceptions of Rape Victims, 2 LAw & HuM. BEHAv. 339 (1978). The unfairness can go both
ways; while sexual history has often been used against sexually experienced women, it can also be
used against men with the misfortune to have had sex with a virgin. One might still conclude that
such evidence should be excluded on public policy grounds, but when that is done to a defendant's
disadvantage, it at least arguably raises constitutional questions as to the denial of his right to a fair
trial and to produce exculpatory evidence. See generally Berger, supra note 5; Tanford & Bocchino,
supra note 13. Most statutes grant the judge discretion to decide whether the circumstances of the
particular case demand that evidence of prior conduct or reputation be admitted. See Bienen, Rape
ll-National Developments in Rape Reform Legislation, 6 WOMEN'S RTS. L. RE!'. 171, 201
(1980).
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by contrast, substantially undermines the relevance of the woman's sexual
history where it was unknown to the man.2"
Second, the issue for determination shifts from whether the man is a
rapist to whether the woman was raped. A verdict of acquittal thus does
more than signal that the prosecution has failed to prove the defendant
guilty beyond a reasonable doubt; it signals that the prosecution has failed
to prove the woman's sexual violation-her innocence-beyond a reasona-
ble doubt. Thus, as one dissenter put it in disagreeing with the affirmance
of a conviction of rape: "The majority today. . declares the innocence of
an at best distraught young woman."2 Presumably, the dissenter thought
the young woman guilty.
Third, the resistance requirement is not only ill-conceived as a defini-
tion of nonconsent,2" but is an overbroad substitute for mens rea in any
event. Both the resistance requirement and the mens rea requirement can
be used to enforce a male perspective on the crime, but while mens rea
might be justified as protecting the individual defendant who has not
made a blameworthy choice, the resistance standard requires women to
risk injury to themselves in cases where there may be no doubt as to the
man's intent or blameworthiness. The application of the resistance re-
quirement has not been limited to cases in which there was uncertainty as
to what the man thought, knew or intended; it has been fully applied in
cases where there can be no question that the man knew that intercourse
was without consent.29 Indeed, most of the cases that have dismissed
claims that mens rea ought to be required have been cases where both
force and resistance were present, and where there was no danger of any
unfairness.
Finally, by ignoring mens rea, American courts and legislators have
imposed limits on the fair expansion of our understanding of rape. As
26. A defendant enjoys no constitutional right to present irrelevant evidence; to the extent that the
legal issue is framed in terms of his intent, rather than hers, facts about her reputation and history
which were unknown to him are far less probative and far more prejudicial, especially in view of the
strong public policy grounds favoring exclusion of such evidence. Cf. Berger, supra note 5 (model
statute includes distinction based on defendant's knowledge).
Explicitly recognizing the mens rea issue would, of course, allow defendants in states with shield
laws to argue that their inability to present evidence of sexual history which they claim was known to
them denied them their constitutional right to present exculpatory evidence. Certainly it would be
reasonable to require such defendants to present persuasive evidence of the fact of their knowledge in
the hearing provided for by most shield statutes. It is not clear why framing the issue in terms of the
fact of consent-rather than the defendant's knowledge or intent with respect to consent-could con-
stitutionally provide a woman victim with any more protection of her sexual history; to the extent that
the key issue is her intent, a defendant would have an equally strong Sixth Amendment claim as to
his right to present all evidence (whether known to him or not) that might be relevant to the fact of
consent.
27. State v. Rusk, 289 Md. 230, 256, 424 A.2d 720, 733 (1981) (Cole, J., dissenting).
28. See infra text accompanying notes 100-33.
29. See, e.g., Goldberg v. State, 41 Md. App. 58, 68, 395 A.2d 1213 (1979); see also State v.
Lima, 64 Hawaii 470, 643 P.2d 536 (1982).
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long as the law holds that mens rea is not required, and that no instruc-
tions on intent need be given, pressure will exist to retain some form of
resistance requirement and to insist on force as conventionally defined in
order to protect men against conviction for "sex." Using resistance as a
substitute for mens rea unnecessarily and unfairly immunizes those men
whose victims are afraid enough, or intimidated enough, or, frankly, smart
enough, not to take the risk of resisting physically. In doing so, the resis-
tance test may declare the blameworthy man innocent and the raped
woman guilty.
While American courts have unwisely ignored the entire issue of mens
rea or mistake of fact, the British courts may have gone too far in the
other direction. To their credit, they have squarely confronted the issue,
but their resolution suggests a highly restrictive understanding of criminal
intent in cases of sexual assault. The focal point of the debate in Great
Britain and the Commonwealth countries was the House of Lords' deci-
sion in Director of Public Prosecutions v. Morgan,30 in which the certi-
fied question was: "Whether in rape the defendant can properly be con-
victed, notwithstanding that he in fact believed that the woman consented,
if such belief was not based on reasonable grounds." 1 The majority of the
House of Lords answered the question in the negative.3 2
The Heilbron Committee was created to review the controversial Mor-
gan decision.33 The Committee's recommendation, ultimately enacted in
1976, retained the Morgan approach in requiring that at the time of in-
30. Director of Pub. Prosecutions v. Morgan, 1976 A.C. 182, 2 All E.R. 347, [1975] 2 W.L.R.
913 (H.L.).
31. Id. at 205, [1975] 2 All E.R. at 354.
32. Mr. Morgan and his three co-defendants had been convicted of the rape of Mr. Morgan's
wife. The four men had been drinking together and when they failed in their efforts to "find some
women," Mr. Morgan invited the three home to have intercourse with his wife. According to the three
co-defendants, Morgan told them not to be surprised if his wife struggled, since she was "kinky" and
this was the only way she could get "turned on." All four were convicted, Mr. Morgan for aiding and
abetting, and their convictions had been affirmed by the Court of Appeals. Id. at 182, 206, [1975] 2
All E.R. at 347, 355. According to Lord Hailsham:
Once one has accepted, what seems to me abundantly clear, that the prohibited act in rape is
non-consensual sexual intercourse, and that the guilty state of mind is an intention to commit
it, it seems to me to follow as a matter of inexorable logic that there is no room either for a
"defence" of honest belief or mistake, or of a defence of honest and reasonable belief and
mistake. Either the prosecution proves that the accused had the requisite intent, or it does not.
In the former case it succeeds, and in the latter it fails. Since honest belief clearly negatives
intent, the reasonableness or otherwise of that belief can only be evidence for or against the
view that the belief and therefore the intent was actually held ....
Id. at 214, [1975] 2 All E.R. at 361.
33. The Times of London attacked Morgan as "unduly legalistic" and not in accord with "com-
mon sense," The Times (London), May 5, 1975, at 15, col. 1, while the academic community sprang
to the defense of the House of Lords decision as, in Professor J.C. Smith's view, "a victory for com-
mon sense so far as intention in the criminal law is concerned." The Times (London), May 7, 1975,
at 17, col. 4; see also The Times (London), May 8, 1975, at 15, col. 6 (letter of Professor Glanville
Williams). But see The Times (London) May 12, 1975, at 15, col. 5 (letter of Jack Ashley, M.P.).
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tercourse the man knew or at least was aware of the risk of nonconsent,
but provided that the reasonableness of the man's belief could be consid-
ered by the jury in determining what he in fact knew. 4 In situations
where a "reasonable man" would have known that the woman was not
consenting, most defendants will face great difficulty in arguing that they
were honestly mistaken or inadvertent as to consent. Thus, in Morgan
itself, the House of Lords, although holding that negligence was not suffi-
cient to establish liability for rape, upheld the convictions on the ground
that no properly instructed jury, in the circumstances of that case, could
have concluded that the defendants honestly believed that their victim was
consenting. Still, in an English case decided shortly after Morgan, on facts
substantially similar (a husband procuring a buddy to engage in sex with
his crying wife), an English jury concluded that the defendant had been
negligent in believing, honestly but unreasonably, in the wife's consent.
On the authority of Morgan, the court held that the defendant therefore
deserved acquittal. 5
My view is that such a "negligent rapist" should be punished, al-
beit-as in murder-less severely than the man who acts with purpose or
knowledge, or even knowledge of the risk." First, he is sufficiently blame-
34. The Sexual Offences (Amendment) Act, § 1(1976). See generally Smith, The Heilbron Re-
port, 1976 CRIM. L. REv. 97, 98-105. But if the question appeared settled in 1976, the House of
Lords decision in Regina v. Caldwell, 1982 A.C. 341, [1981] 1 All E.R. 961, [1981] 2 W.L.R. 509
(H.L.) once again opened doubts. In that case, which did not involve a sexual offense, Lord Diplock
seemed to redefine recklessness to allow conviction where the accused unreasonably and foolishly was
not aware of the risks created by his conduct. According to Lord Diplock, a person is reckless if: "(1)
he does an act which in fact creates an obvious risk that property will be destroyed or damaged and
(2) when he does the act he either has not given any thought to the possibility of there being any such
risk or has recognized that there was some risk involved and has nonetheless gone on to do it." Id. at
354, [1981] 1 All E.R. at 967. In dissenting from Lord Diplock's approach in Caldwell, Lord Ed-
mund-Davies expressed his concern that the new formulation would now be applied to all crimes
requiring at least recklessness as mens rea. Id. at 359, [1981] 1 All E.R. at 970. And, indeed, in the
1983 Court of Appeal decision in Regina v. Pigg, [1982] 2 All E.R. 591, [1982] 1 W.L.R. 762 (C.A.),
that was the apparent result for the crime of rape. In that case, the court invoked Caldwell in holding
that recklessness as to consent might be established by proving either that the accused was aware that
the woman might not be consenting and nonetheless proceeded (the Morgan approach) or that he was
indifferent and gave no thought to the possibility that the woman might not be consenting (the Cald-
well approach). Pigg, 2 All E.R. at 596-98 [1982] 1 W.L.R. at 769-71; cf. Regina v. Lawrence, 1982
A.C. 510, 526-27, [1981] 1 All E.R. 974, 982, [19811 2 W.L.R. 524 (H.L.) (applying similar ap-
proach to "reckless" driving).
35. The most striking difference between that case, Regina v. Cogan, 2 All E.R. 1059, [1975] 3
W.L.R. 316 (C.A.), and Morgan is the number of "buddies" involved. In the law of rape, numbers
often assume major significance in a court's approach to the facts. See infra note 84.
36. I use the terms here in the sense they are used by the Model Penal Code, which distinguishes
between recklessness and negligence not on the basis of the substantiality of the risk involved, but on
the defendant's awareness of it. The notions of "advertence" and "foresight," which are the basis of
the Code distinction, however, may not be wholly accurate as descriptions of the way people really
act. See Hughes, Criminal Responsibility, 16 STAN. L. REV. 470, 472-73 (1964). Thus, Lord
Diplock has warned "against adopting the simplistic approach of treating all problems of criminal
liability as soluble by classifying the test of liability as either 'subjective' or 'objective.'" Regina v.
Lawrence, 1982 A.C. 510, 526, [1981] 1 All E.R. 974, 982 (H.L.) (citing Regina v. Caldwell, [1982]
A.C. 341, [1981] 1 All E.R. 961, [1981] 2 W.L.R. 509 (H.L.)). That distinction, however, remains
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worthy for it to be just to punish him. Second, the injury he inflicts is
sufficiently grave to deserve the law's prohibition.37
The traditional argument against negligence liability is that punishment
should be limited to cases of choice, because to punish a man for his stu-
pidity is unjust and, in deterrence terms, ineffective. Under this view, a
man should only be held responsible for what he does knowingly or pur-
posely, or at least while aware of the risks involved. As one of Morgan's
most respected defenders put it:
To convict the stupid man would be to convict him for what lawyers
call inadvertent negligence-honest conduct which may be the best
that this man can do but that does not come up to the standard of the
so-called reasonable man. People ought not to be punished for negli-
gence except in some minor offences established by statute. Rape
carries a possible sentence of imprisonment for life, and it would be
wrong to have a law of negligent rape.38
If inaccuracy or indifference to consent is "the best that this man can
do" because he lacks the capacity to act reasonably, then it might well be
unjust and ineffective to punish him for it. 9 But such men will be rare,
and there was no evidence that the men in Morgan were among them, at
least as long as voluntary drunkenness is not equated with inherent lack
of capacity. More common is the case of the man who could have done
better but didn't; could have paid attention, but didn't; heard her say no,
or saw her tears, but decided to ignore them. Neither justice nor deter-
rence argues against punishing this man.
Certainly, if the "reasonable" attitude to which a male defendant is
held is defined according to a "no means yes" philosophy that celebrates
critical as a threshold for liability in those jurisdictions which, following the Code approach, provide
that unless stated specifically (as in the case of murder), recklessness (defined as conscious disregard of
risk) as to each material element of the offense is required to establish culpability: "This accepts as
the basic norm what usually is regarded as the common law position." MOD.L PENAL CODE §
2.02(3) comment at 127 (Tent. Draft 1956).
37. Professor Fletcher argues that negligent rape should be punished by framing the inquiry in
mistake-of-fact terms, concluding that an unreasonable mistake of fact as to consent should not excul-
pate. Under his analysis, negligent rapes would not be distinguished, on mens rea grounds at least,
from those committed purposely, knowingly or recklessly. See G. FLETcaHER, RETHINKING CRIMINAL
LAW 698-707 (1978); see also Pickard, Culpable Mistakes and Rape: Relating Mens Rea to the
Crime, 30 U. TORONTO L.J. 75 (1980) (another approach to same conclusion, focusing primarily on
Canadian cases).
38. Professor Glanville Williams in a letter to THE TIMES (London), May 8, 1975, at 15, col. 6.
See also G. WILLIAMS, supra note 16, at 120-25.
39. See H.L.A. HART, PUNISHMENT AND RESPONSIBILITY 152-54 (1968). Professor Hart argues
that what is critical to just punishment is not the defendant's awareness of the risks of his conduct, but
"that those whom we punish should have had, when they acted, the normal capacities, physical and
mental, for doing what the law requires and abstaining from what it forbids, and a fair opportunity to
exercise these capacities." Id. at 152.
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male aggressiveness and female passivity, there is little potential for un-
fairness in holding men who fall below that standard criminally liable.
Under such a low standard of reasonableness, only a very drunk man
could honestly be mistaken as to a woman's consent, and a man who vol-
untarily sheds his capacity to act and perceive reasonably should not be
heard to complain here-any more than with respect to other
crimes-that he is being punished in the absence of choice.40
But even if reasonableness is defined-as I argue it should
be-according to a rule that "no means no," it is not unfair to hold those
men who violate the rule criminally responsible, provided that there is fair
warning of the rule. I understand that some men in our society have hon-
estly believed in a different reality of sexual relations, and that many may
honestly view such situations differently than women. But, it is precisely
because men and women may perceive these situations differently, and
because the injury to women stemming from the different male perception
may be grave, that it is necessary and appropriate for the law to impose a
duty upon men to act with reason, and to punish them when they violate
that duty.41
In holding a man to such a standard of reasonableness, the law signifies
that it considers a woman's consent to sex to be significant enough to
merit a man's reasoned attention. In effect, the law imposes a duty on
men to open their eyes and use their heads before engaging in sex-not to
read a woman's mind, but to give her credit for knowing her own mind
when she speaks it. The man who has the inherent capacity to act reason-
ably, but fails to do so, has made the blameworthy choice to violate this
duty. While the injury caused by purposeful conduct may be greater than
40. Unreasonable aggressiveness in sexual relations is not such an unusual and unforeseen conse-
quence of male inebriation as to be beyond the limits of just punishment and deterrence. Moreover,
the Model Penal Code approach, for example, does not even require that the subsequent risk be a
foreseeable result of drinking; it is enough that inability to perceive and gauge risks is itself a well-
known risk of excessive drinking. The Code provides that:
When recklessness establishes an element of the offense, if the actor, due to self-induced intoxi-
cation, is unaware of a risk of which he would have been aware had he been sober, such
unawareness is immaterial.
MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.08(2) (1980). Thus, while the Code sides with the House of Lords' ap-
proach in Morgan in requiring at least recklessness as to consent, the practical impact of that rule is
somewhat limited by denying its benefits to those men whose unawareness of the risk of nonconsent
was due to their voluntary inebriation (as, apparently, was the case in Morgan itself).
41. Whether this duty is imposed in the name of "simple negligence" liability or "gross negli-
gence" liability does not matter as long as the duty is made clear. In some jurisdictions, negligence
liability for killings includes what is termed "simple negligence," see, e.g., State v. Williams, 4 Wash.
App. 908, 484 P.2d 1167 (1971), while in others "gross deviation," see, e.g., MODEL PENAL CODE §
2.02(2)(d) (1980), or even "wanton and wilful negligence," see, e.g., Commonwealth v. Welansky,
316 Mass. 383, 55 N.E.2d 902 (1944), is required. However one describes it, the fact remains that
"reasonable men," "unreasonable men" and even "grossly unreasonable men" are legal constructs and
that the law (and the jury) have at least some flexibility in creating them.
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that caused by negligent acts,"2 being negligently sexually penetrated
without one's consent remains a grave harm, and being treated like an
object whose words or actions are not even worthy of consideration adds
insult to injury. This dehumanization exacerbates the denial of dignity
and autonomy which is so much a part of the injury of rape, and it is
equally present in both the purposeful and negligent rape.
By holding out the prospect of punishment for negligence, the law pro-
vides an additional motive for men to "take care before acting, to use their
faculties and draw on their experience in gauging the potentialities of con-
templated conduct."'4 3 We may not yet have reached the point where men
are required to ask verbally. But if silence does not negate consent, at least
the word "no" should, and those who ignore such an explicit sign of non-
consent should be subject to criminal liability.
Securing the protection of the criminal law is not, however, simply a
matter of forcing courts or legislatures to focus on mens rea or mistake.
First, it would require acknowledging an understanding of consent quite
at odds with the "no means yes" philosophy which has characterized the
common law tradition. Such a shift would require an awareness of the
extent to which distrust of women has pervaded rape law. Second, crimi-
nal prohibition would require a move away from the traditionally narrow
understanding of the force required, in addition to nonconsent, to define
intercourse as rape. Those are the subjects of the next two subsections.
B. Force and Threats
This Section examines two views of force in human relations. The first
understands force as most schoolboys do on the playground: Force is when
he hits me; resistance is when I hit back. That is the definition of force
traditionally enforced in rape cases. A second understanding of force, not
acknowledged in the law of rape, recognizes that bodily integrity means
more than freedom from the force of fists, that power can be exercised
without violence, and that coercion is not limited to what boys do in
schoolyards.
Virtually every jurisdiction has traditionally made "force" or "threat of
force" an element of the crime of rape.44 Where a defendant threatens his
42. See H.L.A. HART, supra note 39.
43. MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.02 comment at 126-27 (Tent. Draft No. 4, 1955). The Model
Penal Code commentators thus recognized the deterrence rationale of negligence liability in justifying
its inclusion as a potential basis for criminal liability (albeit for a limited number of crimes, not
including rape).
44. Traditional rape statutes typically required both that the intercourse be accomplished "by
force" and that it be "against her will." In Wisconsin, for example, the carnal knowledge statute
enacted in 1895 and applicable until 1955 provided:
Any person who shall ravish and carnally know any female of the age of fourteen years or
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victim with a deadly weapon, beats her, or threatens to hurt her, and then
proceeds immediately to have sex, few courts have difficulty finding that
force is present. These facts fit the schoolboy definition of force. But when
some time elapses between the force and intercourse, when the force is
more of the variety considered "incidental" to sex, or when the situation is
threatening but no explicit threat of harm is communicated, "force" as
defined and required by the criminal law may not be present at all. In
such cases, the law fails to recognize, let alone protect, a woman's interest
in bodily integrity.
In Mills v. United States,4 5 in 1897, the defendant seized his victim at
gunpoint, told her he was a notorious train robber named "Henry Starr,"
threatened to kill her, and proceeded to have intercourse with her twice.
The trial court instructed the jury:
The fact is that all the force that need be exercised, if there is no
consent, is the force incident to the commission of the act. If there is
non-consent of the woman, the force, I say, incident to the commis-
sion of the crime is all the force that is required to make out this
element of the crime.46
The jury convicted, and the defendant appealed on the ground that this
instruction was in error as to the amount of force necessary to constitute
rape. The Supreme Court agreed, and reversed the conviction:
In this charge we think the court did not explain fully enough so
as to be understood by the jury what constitutes in law non-consent
on the part of the woman, and what is the force, necessary in all
cases of non-consent, to constitute the crime. . . . But the charge in
question . . . covered the case where no threats were made; where
no active resistance was overcome; where the woman was not uncon-
scious, but where there was simply non-consent on her part and no
real resistance whatever. . . . More force is necessary when that is
the character of non-consent than was stated by the court to be nec-
essary to make out that element of the crime. That kind of non-
more, by force and against her will, shall be punished by imprisonment in the state prison not
more than thirty years nor less than ten years ....
Law of May 2, 1895, ch. 370, § 2, 1895 Wis. LAws 753. In 1955, "sexual intercourse" replaced
"carnal knowledge" in the statute, but the requirements of "force" and "against her will" remained
unchanged. See Note, Recent Statutory Developments, supra note 5, at 1504. While force technically
appears in the traditional statutes-and in most of the reform statutes as well-in practice it tends to
be defined not so much by what the defendant does as by the reaction of the victim. Indeed, one
commentator has gone so far as to argue that "'force' is not truly speaking an element of the crime
itself, but if great force was not needed to accomplish the act the necessary lack of consent has been
disproved in other than exceptional situations." R. PERKiNs & R. BoycE, CRIMINAL LAW 211 (3d
ed. 1982).
45. 164 U.S. 644 (1897).
46. Id. at 647.
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consent is not enough, nor is the force spoken of then sufficient,
which is only incidental to the act itself.4
The requirement of force is not unique to the law of rape. But rape is
different in two critical respects. First, unlike theft, if "force" is not inher-
ent in noncriminal sex, at least physical contact is. Certainly, if a person
stripped his victim, flattened that victim on the floor, lay down on top,
and took the other person's wallet or jewelry, few would pause before the
conclusion of a forcible robbery. Second, rape does not involve "one per-
son" and "another person." It involves, in practice if not everywhere by
definition, a male person using "force" against a female person. The
question of whose definition of "force" should apply, whose understand-
ing should govern, is therefore critical.
The distinction between the "force" incidental to the act of intercourse
and the "force" required to convict a man of rape is one commonly drawn
by courts.48 Once drawn, however, the distinction would seem to require
the courts to define what additional acts are needed to constitute prohib-
ited rather than incidental force. This is where the problems arise. For
many courts and jursidictions, "force" triggers an inquiry identical to that
which informs the understanding of consent. Both serve as substitutes for
a mens rea requirement. Force is required to constitute rape, but
force-even force that goes far beyond the physical contact necessary to
accomplish penetration-is not itself prohibited. Rather, what is required,
and prohibited, is force used to overcome female nonconsent. The prohibi-
tion is defined in terms of a woman's resistance. Thus, "forcible compul-
sion" becomes the force necessary to overcome reasonable resistance."9
47. Id. at 647-48. The reader may be puzzled as to why I am devoting any attention to a deci-
sion, even a decision of the United States Supreme Court, which dates from. the 1890's. Were Mills
simply a historical curiosity, the reader would surely be right to question my priorities; it is far too
easy to attack 100-year-old cases. But when cases from the 1890's reflect an understanding of force
which survives into cases from the 1980's-and Mills does-it is no longer a matter of slaying straw
men. Mills is a living dragon.
48. See R. PERKINS & R. BOYCE, supra note 44.
49. Kentucky, for example, requires "forcible compulsion" as an element of the rape of a compe-
tent, adult woman. "Forcible compulsion" means:
physical force that overcomes earnest resistance or a threat, express or implied, that overcomes
earnest resistance by placing a person in fear of immediate death or physical injury to himself
or another person or in fear that he or another person will be immediately kidnapped.
Ky. REv. STAT. § 510.010(2) (1985). As stated, forcible compulsion is defined to require earnest
resistance; the prohibition may be formally applicable to the defendant, but the focus and judgment is
on the victim. Washington and Hawaii have modified this definition to the extent of not requiring
that the resistance be "earnest." WASH. REv. CODE § 9.79.140(5) (1977); HAWAII REV. STAT. §
707-700(11) (Supp. 1980). In Utah, sexual intercourse is prohibited where "the actor compels the
victim to submit or participate by force that overcomes such earnest resistance as might reasonably be
expected under the circumstances." UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-5-406(1) (1985). In other states, where
"force" is included in the statute but not specifically defined, courts have relied on the "judicially
determined meaning" of those elements of the common law crime of rape to the same effect. See, e.g.,
Goldberg v. State, 41 Md. App. 58, 395 A.2d 1213 (1979) (relying on Hazel v. State, 221 Md. 464,
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When the woman does not physically resist, the question becomes then
whether the force was sufficient to overcome a reasonable woman's will to
resist. Prohibited force turns on the judge's evaluation of a reasonable
woman's response.
In State v. Alston,5" Mr. Alston and the victim had been involved in a
"consensual" relationship for six months. That relationship admittedly in-
volved "some violence" by the defendant and some passivity by the victim.
The defendant would strike the victim when she refused to give him
money or refused to do what he wanted. As for sex, the court noted that
"she often had sex with the defendant just to accommodate him. On those
occasions, she would stand still and remain entirely passive while the de-
fendant undressed her and had intercourse with her.""1 This was their
"consensual" relationship. It ended when, after being struck by the de-
fendant, the victim left him and moved in with her mother.
A month later, the defendant came to the school which the victim at-
tended, blocked her path, demanded to know where she was living and,
when she refused to tell him, grabbed her arm and stated that she was
coming with him. The victim told the defendant she would walk with him
if he released her arm. They then walked around the school and talked
about their relationship. At one point, the defendant told the victim he
was going to "fix" her face; when told that their relationship was over,
the defendant stated that he had a "right" to have sex with her again. The
two went to the house of a friend. The defendant asked her if she was
"ready," and the victim told him she did not want to have sexual rela-
tions. The defendant pulled her up from the chair, undressed her, pushed
her legs apart, and penetrated her. She cried. 2
The defendant was convicted of rape, and his conviction was affirmed
by the intermediate court of appeals.53 On appeal, the North Carolina
Supreme Court agreed that the victim was not required to resist physi-
cally to establish nonconsent: The victim's testimony that she did not con-
sent was "unequivocal" and her testimony provided substantial evidence
that the act of sexual intercourse was against her will."
But the North Carolina Supreme Court nonetheless reversed on the
ground that, even viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the
157 A.2d 922 (1960)); see also ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 38, § 11.1 (1982) (requiring "force" and, in
comments, stating that definition should be taken from certain common law cases); Note, Recent Stat-
utory Developments, supra note 5, at 1512-14.
50. 310 N.C. 399, 312 S.E.2d 470 (1984).
51. Id. at 401, 312 S.E.2d at 471.
52. Id. at 401-03, 312 S.E.2d at 471-73.
53. State v. Alston, 61 N.C. App. 454, 300 S.E.2d 857 (1983), rev'd, 310 N.C. 399, 312 S.E.2d
470 (1984).
54. 310 N.C. at 408, 312 S.E. 2d at 475.
1108
Vol. 95: 1087, 1986
Rape
state, the element of force had not been established by substantial evi-
dence. The victim did not "resist"-physically, at least. And her failure to
resist, in the court's evaluation, was not a result of what the defendant did
before penetration. Therefore, there was no "force." '55
The force used outside the school, and the threats made on the walk,
"although they may have induced fear," were considered to be "unrelated
to the act of sexual intercourse.1 56 Indeed, the court emphasized that the
victim testified that it was not what the defendant said that day, but her
experience with him in the past, that made her afraid. Such past experi-
ence was deemed irrelevant.
Although [the victim's] general fear of the defendant may have beenjustified by his conduct on prior occasions, absent evidence that the
defendant used force or threats to overcome the will of the victim to
resist the sexual intercourse alleged to have been rape, such general
fear was not sufficient to show that the defendant used the force
required to support a conviction of rape.57
The undressing and the pushing of her legs apart-presumably the "inci-
dental" force-were not even mentioned as factors to be considered.
State v. Alston is not a unique case, but it is an unusual one. Rape
cases between individuals who have had what passes in the law for a
"consensual" sexual relationship are rare in the system. In some sense, the
supreme court here simply did what is usually done by the women (who
don't press charges), by the police (who unfound them), or by the prose-
cutors (who dismiss them). But it did so to greater legal effect.
Later in 1984, the North Carolina Court of Appeals applied Alston to
another case where the defendant and the victim knew each other and had
had previous sexual relations. In this case, however, the parties were not
"boyfriend" and "girlfriend." They were a father and his 15-year-old
daughter.
The defendant in State v. Lester58 was the father of three daughters
and a son. Prior to the parents' divorce, the defendant frequently beat the
children's mother in their presence. He also beat his girlfriend and his
son. He had a gun and on one occasion pointed it at his children. He
engaged in sexual activity with all three of his daughters. He first had
sexual relations with the daughter whose rape was at issue when she was
11 years old. Her mother found out and confronted the defendant. He
55. Id. at 408, 312 S.E.2d at 476.
56. Id.
57. Id. at 409, 312 S.E.2d at 476 (emphasis omitted).
58. State v. Lester, 70 N.C. App. 757, 321 S.E.2d 166 (1984), aff d, 313 N.C. 595, 330 S.E.2d
205 (1985).
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swore never to touch her again, and then threatened to kill both mother
and daughter if they told anyone of his actions. On both of the occasions
in question, the victim initially refused her father's demand to take her
clothes off and "do it." In both cases, she complied when the demand was
repeated and she sensed that her father was becoming angry. The court
held that the defendant could be convicted of incest, but not of rape:
In the instant case there is evidence that the acts of sexual inter-
course between defendant and his fifteen-year-old daughter ...
were against her will. There is no evidence, however, that defendant
used either actual or constructive force to accomplish the acts with
which he is charged. As Alston makes clear, the victim's fear of de-
fendant, however justified by his previous conduct, is insufficient to
show that defendant forcibly raped his daughter on 25 November
and 18 December.59
A digression is in order. Some people have suggested that I make these
cases up. I don't. Others suggest that they must be rare. Such abuse of
teenagers is not rare.60 Some suggest that even if these cases are not rare,
decisions such as Lester must be, or must only happen in North Carolina,
or must in some other easy and convenient way be sufficiently distinguish-
able as to be an unsuitable basis for either analysis or anxiety. I don't
think so. Just a year before Lester, the Pennsylvania appellate court was
confronted with a father who used a different approach to the same end
with his 17-year-old daughter. Over a one year period, the defendant had
sex with her on several occasions. She "did so because her father told her
that the Bible said that 'if the mother could no longer provide as a mother,
it was up to the oldest daughter, and if she could no longer do it, it would
go right down to the last daughter in the family.' "6 The defendant also
told his daughter that if she reported these incidents to anyone, he would
show people pictures he had taken of her in the nude. His conviction for
rape, like Mr. Lester's, was reversed:
The record clearly shows that defendant never used or threatened
to use force in inducing his daughter to participate in sexual inter-
course. Rather, he asserted a biblical basis for the intercourse and
assured his daughter's silence by threats, not of force, but of humilia-
tion. Although this conduct is reprehensible, it is not the conduct
59. Id. at 761, 321 S.E.2d at 168 (emphasis in original).
60. In part due to the efforts of feminists reformers, many states have amended their statutory
rape laws to lower the "age of consent," see Bienen, supra note 25, and thus render men like these
immune from prosecution for statutory rape, and subject to the category of "adult" rape addressed in
this Article.
61. Commonwealth v. Biggs, 320 Pa. Super. 265, 267, 467 A.2d 31, 32 (1983).
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proscribed by section 3121 of the Crimes Code, which forbids inter-
course by threat of forcible compulsion.62
Decisions such as Lester and Alston are vulnerable to attack on tradi-
tional doctrinal grounds. The courts' unwillingness to credit the victim's
past experience of violence at the hands of the defendant stands in sharp
contrast to the black letter law that a defendant's knowledge of his at-
tacker's reputation for violence or ownership of a gun is relevant to the
reasonableness of his use of deadly force in self-defense.6"
That these decisions depart so straightforwardly from established crimi-
nal law doctrine is noteworthy but not unusual in the law of rape. More
interesting is the apparent paradox that they create. In each case, the
court says-and this is explicit, not implicit-that sex was without the
woman's consent. It also says that there was no force. In other words, the
woman was not forced to engage in sex, but the sex she engaged in was
against her will.
Such a paradox is almost inevitable if one adopts, and then enforces, the
most traditional male notion of a fight as the working definition of
"force." In a fight, you hit your assailant with your fists or your elbows
or your knees. In a fight, the one attacked fights back. In these terms,
there was no fight in Alston. Therefore, there was no force.
I am not at all sure how the judges who decided Alston would explain
the victim's simultaneous refusal to consent and failure to resist. For my-
self, it is not at all difficult to understand that a woman who had been
repeatedly beaten, who had been a passive victim of both violence and sex
during the "consensual" relationship, who had sought to escape from the
man, who is confronted and threatened by him, who summons the courage
to tell him their relationship is over only to be answered by his assertion
of a "right" to sex-a woman in such a position would not fight. She
wouldn't fight; she might cry. Hers is the reaction of "sissies" in play-
ground fights. Hers is the reaction of people who have already been
beaten, or who never had the power to fight in the first instance. Hers is,
from my reading, the most common reaction of women to rape." It cer-
tainly was mine.
62. Id. at 268, 467 A.2d at 32 (emphasis in original).
63. Lester and Alston are classic examples of the manipulation of the "time frame" for criminal
liability. See generally Kelman, Interpretive Construction in the Substantive Criminal Law, 33
STAN. L. REv. 591, 600-16 (1981). With respect to women victims, it is also a classic one-way
ratchet; one would be hard pressed to find any case anywhere holding that a victim's past sexual
experience with this defendant is not relevant to the issue of her consent. Indeed, while forty-one
states have passed some form of rape evidence statute, even the most protective of these statutes allows
evidence of prior sexual conduct between victim and accused to be admitted on the issue of consent.
See Bienen, supra note 25, at 197-206.
64. Cf R. PERKINS & R. BOYCE, supra note 44 (arguing that resistance is fact of "human na-
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To say that there is no "force" in such a situation is to create a gulf
between power and force, and to define the latter solely in schoolboy
terms. Mr. Alston did not beat his victim-at least not with his fists. He
didn't have to. She had been beaten-physically and emotionally-long
before. But that beating was one that the court was willing to go to great
lengths to avoid recognizing.
That the law prohibiting forced sex understands force in such narrow
terms is frustrating enough for its women victims. Worse, however, is the
fact that the conclusion that no force is present may emerge as a judgment
not that the man did not act unreasonably, but as a judgment that the
woman victim did.
Pat met Rusk at a bar. They talked briefly. She announced she was
leaving, and he asked for a ride. She drove him home. He invited her up.
She declined. He asked again. She declined again. He reached over and
took the car keys. She followed him to his room. He went to the bath-
room. She didn't move. He told her to remove her slacks and his clothing.
She did. After they undressed:
I said, 'you can get a lot of other girls down there, for what you
want,' and he just kept saying, 'no' and then I was really scared,
because I can't describe, you know, what was said. It was more the
look in his eyes; and I said, at that point-I didn't know what to say;
and I said, 'If I do what you want, will you let me go without killing
me?' Because I didn't know, at that point, what he was going to do;
and I started to cry; and when I did, he put his hands on my throat,
and started lightly to choke me; and I said, "If I do what you want,
will you let me go?' And he said, yes, and at that time, I proceeded
to do what he wanted me to.65
After sex, the defendant walked her to her car, and asked if he could see
her again.
How does a court respond to facts like this? Is "force" established by
the "look in his eyes," by light choking (her description)/heavy caresses
(his description),6" or by taking the car keys of an adult woman? Is the
latter force, or motor vehicle larceny? If we accept Pat's testimony, as the
jury did, then it is established that she was overcome. Is that enough?
Rusk's case was heard en bane by both the Maryland Court of Special
ture" absent "intimidation").
65. Rusk v. State, 43 Md. App. 476, 478-79, 406 A.2d 624, 626 (1979) (en banc), rev'd, 289
Md. 230, 424 A.2d 720 (1981).
66. The difference in their characterizations is noteworthy. It may be that one of them was lying.
But it may also be true that neither was lying: that "light choking" to her was nothing more than a
"heavy caress" to him; that this is simply one example that happened to survive into an appellate
opinion of the differences in how men and women perceive force.
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Appeals and the Maryland Court of Appeals. The Court of Special Ap-
peals reversed the conviction, 8-5.617 The Maryland Court of Appeals re-
instated it, 4-3.68 All told, twenty-one judges, including the trial judge,
considered the sufficiency of the evidence. Ten concluded that Rusk was a
rapist. Eleven concluded that he was not.69
Those who considered the evidence insufficient focused nearly all their
attention not on what Mr. Rusk did or did not do, but on how the woman
victim should have responded. Prohibited force was defined according to a
hypothetical victim's resistance: The defendant's words or actions must
create in the mind of a victim a reasonable fear that if she resisted, he
would have harmed her, or that faced with such resistance, he would have
used force to overcome her. The intermediate court majority found tinper-
suasive the argument that an honest fear was sufficient where there is
nothing whatsoever to indicate that the victim was "anything but a nor-
mal, intelligent, twenty-one year old, vigorous female."170 Of course, the
question remains as to what is "reasonably" expected of such a female
faced with a man who frightens her, in an unfamiliar neighborhood, with-
out her car keys. To the Maryland Court of Appeals dissenters, the an-
swer was clear:
While courts no longer require a female to resist to the utmost or
to resist where resistance would be foolhardy, they do require her
acquiescence in the act of intercourse to stem from fear generated by
something of substance. She may not simply say, "I was really
scared," and thereby transform consent or mere unwillingness into
submission by force. These words do not transform a seducer into a
rapist. She must follow the natural instinct of every proud female to
resist, by more than mere words, the violation of her person by a
stranger or an unwelcomed friend. She must make it plain that she
regards such sexual acts as abhorrent and repugnant to her natural
sense of pride. She must resist unless the defendant has objectively
manifested his intent to use physical force to accomplish his
purpose 1
In the dissenters' view, Pat was not a "reasonable" victim, or even a
67. Rusk v. State, 43 Md. App. 476, 406 A.2d 624 (1979) (en banc), rev'd, 289 Md. 230, 424
A.2d 720 (1981).
68. State v. Rusk, 289 Md. 230, 424 A.2d 720 (1981).
69. Rusk had been convicted of second degree rape in violation of MD. CODE ANN. art. 27, §
463(a)(1) (1982), which provides in part: "A person is guilty of rape in the second degree if the
person engages in vaginal intercourse with another person. . . [bly force or threat of force against the
will and without the consent of the other person."
Of the 21 judges who reviewed Rusk's conviction, one was a woman. She voted to convict. See 289
Md. at V, 230, 424 A.2d at VII, 720.
70. 43 Md. App. at 482, 406 A.2d at 627.
71. 289 Md. at 255, 424 A.2d at 733 (Cole, J., dissenting).
1113
The Yale Law Journal
victim at all. Instead of fighting, she cried. Instead of protecting her vir-
tue, she acquiesced. Far from having any claim that her bodily integrity
had been violated, she was adjudged complicit in the intercourse of which
she complained. She was "in effect, an adulteress.
'7 2
In a very real sense, the "reasonable" woman under the view of the
eleven judges who would reverse Mr. Rusk's conviction is not a woman at
all. Their version of a reasonable person is one who does not scare easily,
one who does not feel vulnerability, one who is not passive, one who fights
back, not cries. The reasonable woman, it seems, is not a schoolboy
"sissy." She is a real man.
The court of appeals majority ultimately affirmed the conviction on the
narrowest possible ground. The court stated that "generally,. . . the cor-
rect standard" is that the victim's fear must "be reasonably grounded in
order to obviate the need for either proof of actual force on the part of the
assailant or physical resistance on the part of the victim."'73 Was this vic-
tim's fear reasonable? The court strove to avoid the question. The funda-
mental error of the intermediate court was its violation of the principle of
appellate restraint; the question of reasonableness was a question of fact
to be left to the jury. Still, the court of appeals could not avoid entirely the
obligation to review the sufficiency of the evidence. Thus, "[c]onsidering
all of the evidence in the case, with particular focus upon the actualforce
applied by Rusk td Pat's neck, we conclude that the jury could rationally
find that the essential elements of second degree rape had been
established."74
72. This is exactly how Judge Wilner, the dissenting judge in the Court of Special Appeals,
characterizes the majority's decision to reverse Rusk's conviction. 43 Md. App. at 498, 406 A.2d at
636. The Court of Appeals dissenters, for their part, attacked that majority for declaring her to be
innocent:
The law regards rape as a crime of violence. The majority today attenuates this proposition. It
declares the innocence of an at best distraught young woman. It does not demonstrate the
defendant's guilt of the crime of rape.
289 Md. at 255-56, 424 A.2d at 733. The debate, quite dearly, is focused not on whether Rusk is a
rapist but on whether Pat is a real victim.
73. 289 Md. at 244, 424 A.2d at 727 (footnote omitted).
74. Id. at 246-47, 424 A.2d at 728 (emphasis added). On facts substantially similar to those in
Rusk, the Wyoming Supreme Court in 1973 reversed a conviction entered by a trial judge sitting
without a jury on the ground that the judge had failed to consider the reasonableness of the victim's
fear. In Gonzales v. State, 516 P.2d 592 (Wyo. 1973), as in Rusk, the victim and the defendant met in
a bar, and he requested a ride home. The victim refused, but the defendant got into the car anyway.
After unsuccessfully refusing him again, she started driving; he asked her to turn down a road and,
according to the supreme court:
He asked her to stop "to go to the bathroom" and took the keys out of the ignition, telling her
she would not drive off and leave him. She stayed in the car when he "went to the bathroom"
and made no attempt to leave. When he returned he told her he was going to rape her and she
kept trying to talk him out of it. He told her he was getting mad at her and then put his fist
against her face and said, "I'm going to do it. You can have it one way or the other."
Id. at 593. The trial judge, in finding Mr. Gonzalez guilty of rape, reasoned that a victim "does not
have to subject herself to a beating, knifing, or anything of that nature. As long as she is convinced
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The emphasis on the light choking/heavy caresses is, perhaps, under-
standable: It is the only "objective" (as the supreme court dissent put it)
force in the victim's testimony; it is certainly the only "force" that a
schoolboy might recognize. As it happens, however, that force was not
applied until the two were already undressed and in bed. Whatever it
was-choking or caressing-was a response to the woman's crying as the
moment of intercourse approached. It was not, it seems fairly clear, the
only force that produced that moment.
Unable to understand force as the power one need not use (at least
physically), courts are left either to emphasize the "light choking" or to
look for threats of force. Technically, these threats of force may be im-
plicit as well as explicit.75 But implicit to whom? That a woman feels
genuinely afraid, that a man has created the situation that she finds
frightening, even that he has done it intentionally in order to secure sexual
satisfaction, may not be enough to constitute the necessary force or even
implicit threat of force which earns bodily integrity any protection under
the law of rape.76
In Goldberg v. State,7 a high-school senior working as a sales clerk
was "sold a story" by the defendant that he was a free-lance agent and
thought she was an excellent prospect to become a successful model. She
accompanied him to his "temporary studio" where she testified that she
engaged in intercourse because she was afraid. Her reasons for being
afraid, according to the appellate court which reversed the conviction,
were: "1) she was alone with the appellant in a house with no buildings
something of a more serious nature will happen, she is then given by law the right to submit." Id. at
594 (quoting unreported trial court opinion). Not, however, according to the Wyoming Supreme
Court, which found the trial judge's standard to be in error "because it would place the determination
solely in the judgment of the prosecutrix and omit the necessary element of a reasonable apprehension
and reasonable ground for such fear; and the reasonableness must rest with the fact finder." Id.
What is stunning about Gonzales is not so much the Wyoming court's statement of the proper
standard-it very much resembles that of the other courts noted here-as the fact that the court
thought application of that standard to these facts could conceivably lead to a different verdict. The
error, in the court's view, was far from harmless: "[T]he evidence of the nature and sufficiency of the
threat to justify nonresistance is far from overwhelming in this case." Id. The reasonable woman in
Wyoming, apparently, is not simply a man, but Superman.
75. See, e.g., People v. Flores, 62 Cal. App. 2d 700, 703, 145 P.2d 318, 320 (Dist. Ct. App. 1944)
("A threat may be expressed by acts and conduct as well as by words."); Hazel v. State, 221 Md. 464,
469, 157 A.2d 922, 925 (1960) ("acts and threats" may create in victim's mind real apprehension of
imminent bodily harm); State v. Lewis, 96 Idaho 743, 760, 536 P.2d 738, 745 (1975) ("Threats or
force can come in forms other than verbalized threats or displays of weaponry.").
76. Cases recognizing threats short of force as sufficient for rape convictions are virtually nonexis-
tent. The closest, perhaps, is the oft-cited People v. Cassandras, 83 Cal. App. 2d 272, 188 P.2d 546
(Dist. Ct. App. 1948), where the defendant used an elaborate ploy to lure the complainant into a
hotel, and then threatened to have the hotel clerk report her to the police as a prostitute and to have
her children taken away from her. The court, in affirming the defendant's conviction, found that there
was sufficient evidence of threats of physical harm, but also implied that mental coercion might be
enough to overcome the woman's will.
77. 41 Md. App. 58, 395 A.2d 1213 (Ct. Spec. App. 1979).
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close by and no one to help her if she resisted, and 2) the appellant was
much larger than she was. "78 According to the appellate court, "[i]n the
complete absence of any threatening words or actions by the appellant,
these two factors, as a matter of law, are simply not enough to have cre-
ated a reasonable fear of harm so as to preclude resistance and be 'the
equivalent of force.' "
The New York Supreme Court, sitting as the trier of fact in a rape
case, reached a similar conclusion with respect to the threatening situation
facing an "incredibly gullible, trusting, and naive" college sophomore. In
People v. Evans,80 the defendant posed as a psychologist conducting a
sociological experiment, took the woman to a dating bar to "observe" her,
and then induced her to come to an apartment he used as an "office."
When she rejected his advances, he said to her: "'Look where you are.
You are in the apartment of a strange man. How do you know that I am
really who I say I am? How do you know that I am really a psycholo-
gist?. . . I could kill you. I could rape you. I could hurt you physi-
cally.' "81 The trial court found his conduct "reprehensible," describing it
as "conquest by con job." But it was not criminal; the words were ambig-
uous, capable of communicating either a threat to use ultimate force or the
chiding of a "foolish girl."' 2 While acknowledging that the victim might
be terrified, the court was not persuaded beyond a reasonable doubt that
the guilt of the defendant had been established.88
In both Goldberg and Evans, a woman finds herself alone and poten-
tially stranded in a strange place with a man who is bigger than she. One
78. Id. at 69, 395 A.2d at 1219.
79. Id. (citation omitted).
80. 85 Misc. 2d 1088, 379 N.Y.S.2d 912 (Sup. Ct. 1975), affid, 55 A.D. 2d 858, 390 N.Y.S.2d
768 (1976).
81. 85 Misc. 2d at 1093, 379 N.Y.S.2d at 917.
82. Id. at 1095, 379 N.Y.S.2d at 920.
83. Id. at 1096, 379 N.Y.S.2d at 921. Since the Evans decision, New York has amended its
statute. Historically, New York had strictly enforced a standard of utmost resistance, which required
a victim to resist "until exhausted or overpowered." People v. Dohring, 59 N.Y. 374, 386 (1874). By
the time of Evans, the words of the law had changed to require earnest resistance; following Evans,
the New York legislature amended the statute to make clear that the earnest resistance standard was
not to be equated with the utmost resistance requirement. 1977 N.Y. LAws ch. 692. The 1977 ver-
sion, however, still required "reasonable" earnest resistance. Id. § 2.
In 1982, the New York legislature again amended the law. 1982 N.Y. LAws ch. 560. The new law
prohibits the use of actual physical force or "a threat, express or implied, which places a person in
fear of immediate death or physical injury to himself, herself or another person, or in fear that he, she
or another person will immediately be kidnapped." N.Y. PENAL LAW § 130.00(8) (Consol. 1984). See
generally Note, Elimination of the Resistance Requirement and Other Rape Law Reforms: The New
York Experience, 47 ALBANY L. Rav. 871, 872-74 (1983). New York law also includes a misde-
meanor provision entitled "sexual misconduct," which occurs when a male "engages in sexual inter-
course with a female without her consent." N.Y. PENAL LAW § 130.20(1) (Consol. 1984).
Many states continue to follow New York's earlier definition of "forcible compulsion," see supra
note 49, and the requirement of "actual physical force" or a threat which the court understands to
place the victim in fear may continue to protect con-men like Mr. Evans, although it need not.
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need not be "incredibly gullible" to find oneself in this situation; one need
only, as did the woman in Rusk, agree to give an average man (who is
bigger than an average woman) a ride home.8" There are at least four
possible doctrinal approaches to these threatening situations, even ac-
cepting the courts' understanding that "force" can only be understood in
relation to a woman's resistance. 5 It is noteworthy that all the decisions
discussed above adopt the approach that not only makes conviction most
difficult, but also operates to place guilt most squarely on the victim.
The simplest approach would be to ask whether this woman's will to
resist was in fact overcome by this defendant's actions. Is she lying, or did
she submit because she was truly frightened? If she is not lying-and
none of the courts suggested that any of the women in these cases were
actually lying-then affirm the conviction. But what about the poor man
who didn't realize that the woman was overcome by fear of him, rather
than desire for him? Properly regarded, such a man lacks mens rea as to
force or consent.86
A second approach resolves that problem without relying explicitly on
mens rea. It asks instead: Were the defendant's acts and behavior in-
tended to overcome this woman's will to resist? Under such a standard, at
least Mr. Lester, Mr. Alston, Mr. Goldberg, and Mr. Evans-if not Mr.
Rusk as well-will have a hard time claiming that they didn't mean to
84. Had there been two or more men involved, rather than one, it seems likely that the defendants
in Goldberg and Evans would have fared far less well in the courts. It is in such cases-and almost
only in such cases-that courts consider the situations sufficiently threatening to not require that
threats be verbally explicit. In California, four men have long been presumed dangerous: "If one were
met in a lonely place by four big men and told to hold up his hands or to do anything else, he would
be doing the reasonable thing if he obeyed, even if they did not say what they would do to him if he
refused. . . . We think similar considerations are applicable here [in a rape case]." People v. Flores,
62 Cal. App. 2d 700, 703, 145 P.2d 318, 320 (Cal. Dist. Ct. App. 1944). However two may be
enough:
The victim was in the company of two men whom she had met for the first time that evening.
On a winter night, she was driven to a remote area, tried to escape, was caught and was thrust
back to the car....
[S]he submitted in the back seat to the act of intercourse with the defendant while his com-
panion was nearby in the front seat, obviously ready to help defendant restrain and do bodily
harm to the victim if she resisted ....
Jones v. Commonwealth, 219 Va. 982, 986-87, 252 S.E.2d 370, 372 (1979). See also State v. Lewis,
96 Idaho 743, 750, 536 P.2d 738, 745 (1975) (fearing for her life, woman engaged in intercourse with
three men). But where only one man is involved, even if he intentionally created the situation which
the woman finds threatening, it is rather difficult to find appellate cases; most such complaints are not
prosecuted in the first instance. See infra Section IV(B). Where they are, however, courts intent on
protecting an individual man's right to "seduce" often reverse rape convictions.
85. To abandon that understanding would suggest either that force itself is unlawful, regardless of
whether it is used to coerce submission, or that consent is inconsistent with force. It would, in short,
call into question the almost universal common law understanding that regardless of what the man
does ("force"), consent remains a defense. See infra Section C.
86. In Model Penal Code terms, if the man recognized but disregarded a substantial risk of non-
consent, he would be reckless; even if he did not recognize the risk, he would be guilty of negligent
rape if a reasonable man would have recognized this risk.
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succeed, and that success was not defined as creating a situation that
would frighten the woman into submission.87
A third approach probes whether the defendant's acts and statements
were calculated to overcome the will of a reasonable woman. This stan-
dard, very close to the "reasonable calculation" standard actually used in
earlier decisions in Maryland and elsewhere,"8 obviously allows men
greater freedom than the second approach. It tolerates their exploitation of
naive and gullible women by claiming that, in their "reasonableness cal-
culation," the tactics should not have been threatening enough. Even at its
best, the "reasonably calculated" standard creates something of a paradox:
If most women have a different understanding of force than most men,
then the reasonable calculation standard is one that asks how a reasonable
man understands the mind of a reasonable woman. But at least it focuses
primarily on the defendant's actions and thoughts and makes his guilt or
innocence the center of the trial.
The final approach doesn't even do that. It judges the woman, not the
man. It asks-as did the court in each of these cases-whether the will of
the reasonable woman would have been overcome given the circumstances.
The focus is on women generally, and on the victim as she compares
(poorly) to the court's assessment of the reasonable woman. The court
then proceeds to conclude that a reasonable woman's will would not have
been overcome in those circumstances, because there is no "force" as men
understand it.
Such an approach accomplishes two things. First, it ensures broad male
freedom to "seduce" women who feel powerless, vulnerable, and afraid;
the force standard guarantees men freedom to intimidate women and ex-
ploit their weaknesses, as long as they don't "fight" with them. Second, it
makes clear that the responsibility and blame for such seductions belong
with the woman. Because the will of a reasonable woman by definition
would not have been overcome, a particular woman's submission can only
mean that she is sub-par as women go or that she was complicitous in the
intercourse.
It is one thing to argue that none of the men in these cases should be
considered in the same category (in terms of their blameworthiness, their
87. This is precisely the standard applied to men who engage in theft by false pretenses; gullibil-
ity is no defense if the defendant's acts were intended to prey on that gullibility. See W. LAFAvE & A.
Scorr, CRIMINAL LAW 669 (1972); Clarke v. People, 64 Colo. 164, 171 P. 69 (1918); State v. Foot,
100 Mont. 33, 48 P.2d 1113 (1935).
88. See Hazel v. State, 221 Md. 464, 469, 157 A.2d 922, 925 (1960) (citing State v. Thompson,
227 N.C. 19, 40 S.E.2d 620 (1946); State v. Dill, 42 Del. 533, 40 A.2d 443 (1944)):
[Florce may exist without violence. If the acts and threats of the defendant were reasonably
calculated to create in the mind of the victim. . . a real apprehension, due to fear, of immi-
nent bodily harm, serious enough to impair or overcome her will to resist, then such acts and
threats are the equivalent of force.
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dangerousness, or the harm caused by their actions), as the man who puts
a gun to his victim's head and threatens to kill her if she refuses to have
sex. It is quite another to argue that these men have committed no crime.
Most striking about these cases is the fact that had these men been
seeking money instead of sex, their actions would plainly violate tradi-
tional state criminal prohibitions.89 Had Mr. Goldberg used his modeling
agent story to secure money rather than sex, his would be a case of theft
by deception or false pretenses. As for Mr. Evans, had he sought money
rather than sex as part of his "sociological test," he too could have been
found guilty of theft.9  Neither Goldberg nor Evans could have escaped
liability on the ground that a "reasonable person" would not have been
deceived, any more than a victim's leaving his front door unlocked or his
keys in the automobile ignition serves as a defense to burglary or lar-
ceny. 1 Had Mr. Rusk simply taken the woman's car keys, he would have
been guilty of larceny or theft. 2 And had Mr. Lester threatened to expose
89. State v. Witherspoon, 648 S.W.2d 279 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1983), is a worthy comparison in
this regard. In Witherspoon, the defendant, who had been convicted of robbery, claimed on appeal
that the government failed to establish the causal connection between his conduct and the victim's fear
(required to make his taking of money robbery). According to the victim, the defendant came over to
her car door so that she was unable to close it; he stood there for a few minutes; then, as he was
asking for directions, he grabbed the money bag. The victim testified that she was afraid-not of
robbery, but of rape: "Well, at that point I forgot I had the money and the only thing that I could
think that he wanted was rape." Id. at 280. The court upheld the robbery conviction, reasoning that
"the standard for determining whether the victim was put 'in fear' is largely subjective;" that the
victim's testimony was credible and not apparently unreasonable; and concluding that "the record
tends to indicate not only that the defendant's intention was to 'intimidate and frighten the victim into
docile nonresistance and meek compliance,'. . . but also that he succeeded in his purpose, whether or
not the victim realized it and whether or not she was able to articulate it at trial." Id. at 280, 281.
The difference between this standard and its application and the approaches in Goldberg and Evans
could not be greater, particularly since the defendants in the latter two cases pursued far more elabo-
rate schemes to frighten their victims. Notably, all three women feared rape; that fear was enough to
sustain a conviction of robbery, but not of the crime feared.
Moreover, even courts adopting a narrow definition of "physical force" for purposes of robbery
statutes have recognized that where defendants manage to avoid physical force or its threatened use
through a ruse-i.e., by portraying a police officer-the felonies of larceny by trick or by false pre-
tenses plainly could be charged, in addition to petit larceny. The absence of "physical force" as con-
ventionally defined did not render the taking of money a lawful gift. See People v. Flynn, 123 Misc.
2d 1021, 475 N.Y.S.2d 334 (Sup. Ct. 1984).
90. While defined slightly differently in different jursidictions, conviction for false pretenses gen-
erally requires a false representation of a material fact which causes the victim to pass title or prop-
erty to the defendant, who knows his representation to be false and intends to use such representation
to defraud the victim. See W. LAFAvE & A. Scorr, supra note 87, at 655; MODEL PENAL CODE §
223.3 comment at 180-81 (1980).
91. In false pretenses statutes, "the almost universal modern rule" is that gullibility or careless-
ness is no defense, because "the criminal law aims to protect those who cannot protect themselves."
W. LAFAVE & A. Scorr, supra note 87, at 669. See, e.g., State v. Nash, 110 Kan. 550, 204 P. 736
(1922); Clarke v. People, 64 Colo. 164, 171 P. 69 (1981); Lefler v. State, 153 Ind. 82, 54 N.E. 439
(1899); State v. Foot, 100 Mont. 33, 48 P.2d 1113 (1935).
92. See, e.g., MODEL PENAL CODE § 223.2 (1980) ("A person is guilty of theft if he unlawfully
takes, or exercises unlawful control over, movable property of another with purpose to deprive him
thereof."). Under the Model Penal Code, theft of an automobile is a third degree felony. Id. at §
223.1(2)(a).
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the nude pictures were he not paid, he might well have been guilty of
state law extortion.93
Lying to secure money is unlawful theft by deception or false pretenses,
a lesser crime than robbery, but a crime nonetheless. Yet lying to secure
sex is old-fashioned seduction-not first-degree rape, not even third-
degree rape. A threat to expose sexual information has long been consid-
ered a classic case of extortion, if not robbery itself.9 4 But securing sex
itself by means of a threat short of force has, in many jurisdictions, been
considered no crime at all.
To the argument that it is either impossible or unwise for the law to
regulate sexual "bargains" short of physical force, the law of extortion
stands as a sharp rebuke: It has long listed prohibited threats in fairly
inclusive terms. 5 While extortion may be a lesser offense than robbery, it
is nonetheless prohibited.
It is almost certainly impossible to expect that the law could address all
of the techniques of power and coercion which men use against women in
sexual relations. I am not suggesting that we try." Rather, I am sug-
gesting that we do something that is actually quite easy-prohibit fraud to
secure sex to the same extent we prohibit fraud to secure money, and
prohibit extortion to secure sex to the same extent we prohibit extortion to
secure money. Many states already have criminal coercion or fraud provi-
sions that are worded with sufficient breadth (e.g., "engage in conduct" 97)
to be applied to prohibit such coerced sex. But cases enforcing such
prohibitions are relatively rare,9" and the results have been divided.99 The
93. See, e.g., MODEL PENAL CODE § 223.4 (1980); W. LAFAVE & A. Scorr, supra note 87, at
705; Comment, Criminal Law-A Study of Statutory Blackmail and Extortion in the Several States,
44 MICH. L. REV. 461 (1945); Comment, A Rationale of the Law of Aggravated Theft, 54 COLUM.
L. REV. 84 (1954).
94. W. LAFAVE & A. Scorr, supra note 87, at 705 (threat to accuse victim of sodomy constitutes
robbery).
95. Traditionally, robbery has been limited to threats of immediate bodily harms, threats to de-
stroy the victim's home, or threats to accuse him of sodomy. Securing property through the use of
other threats-threats to accuse an individual of a crime, to impair his credit or business repute, to
take or withhold action as an official or cause an official to take or withhold action, to expose any
secret tending to subject the person to contempt or ridicule-have been prohibited as the lesser offense
of extortion or blackmail. Notably, extortion encompasses threats to do what is legal and even desira-
ble-to report a crime, for instance. It also encompasses threats to make public information which is
true and accurate. Nonetheless, when those threats are used to secure money, in the absence of an
honest claim of restitution or indemnification, they are prohibited as criminal. See generally W.
LAFAVE & A. Scorr, supra note 87, at 704-07; MODEL PENAL CODE § 223.4 comments at 201-03
(1980); Lindgren, Unraveling the Paradox of Blackmail, 84 COLUM. L. REV. 670 (1984).
96. Nor am I arguing that these cases must of necessity be considered in the same category as first
degree, armed and brutal rape. I am more than willing to treat them as a lesser degree of "rape" and
to impose lighter punishment in the same way that the unarmed robber, or the blackmailer, is treated
as a less serious offender than the one who uses a deadly weapon in a robbery.
97. OR. REV. STAT. § 163.275 (1980), declared unconstitutional in State v. Robertson, 293 Or.
402, 649 P.2d 569 (1982).
98. See United States v. Condolon, 600 F.2d 7 (4th Cir. 1979); Robertson, 293 Or. 402, 649 P.2d
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broad reach of such statutes not only invites overbreadth challenges and
claims of lack of warning, but fails to make clear that loss of bodily integ-
rity is a different and greater injury than loss of money and thus merits
greater punishment. Criminal coercion statutes are, at best, poor substi-
tutes for an expanded understanding of the "force" that makes sex rape.
C. Consent
This Section will examine what has long been viewed as the most im-
portant concept in rape law-the notion of female consent. Nonconsent
has traditionally been a required element in the definition of a number of
crimes, including theft, assault and battery. 00 Thus rape may be the most
serious crime to encompass a consent defense, 01 but it is certainly not the
only one. 102
569; State v. Felton, 339 So. 2d 797, 800 (La. 1976).
99. Compare State v. Robertson (overturning Oregon criminal coercion statute as overbroad in
case of sexual coercion) with State v. Felton (upholding Louisiana extortion statute applied in case of
sexual coercion).
100. See Hughes, Consent in Sexual Offqnces, 25 Mon. L. REv. 672, 673-76 (1962); Williams,
Consent and Public Policy, 9 CRIM. L. REv. 74, 154 (1962) (pts. I & 2); Puttkammer, supra note 6.
By contrast, sexual offenses are a classic and deservedly criticized example of a "morals" offense for
which consent is no defense. See Kadish, The Crisis of Overcriminalization, 374 ANNALS 157, 159-60
(1967) (criticizing use of criminal law to enforce moral code prohibiting extramarital and abnormal
sexual intercourse). "Deviant" sex punishable by law has included homosexual sex, sex with children,
oral sex, sex for money, sex outside of marriage, and adultery. But in the long list of prohibited sexual
relations, the absence of a separate category of "consensual," violent heterosexual sex is noteworthy; to
the extent that such sex has traditionally been prohibited, it is because it has also been fornication or
adultery, not because it is violent; in such cases, both man and woman are considered equally guilty.
101. Technically, nonconsent is an element of the offense or a required attendant circumstance.
The difference between a defense and the absence of a required element or circumstance is not en-
tirely technical, although it probably should be; the United States Supreme Court, in determining the
constitutionality of requiring defendants to bear the burden of proof of "defenses," has drawn just
such a line. Compare Patterson v. New York, 432 U.S. 197 (1977) (state may require defendant to
prove defense of extreme emotional disturbance) with Mullaney v. Wilbur, 421 U.S. 684 (1975)
(state's requirement that defendant prove actions occurred in "heat of passion" to reduce crime from
homicide to manslaughter violates due process clause because requisite level of intent must be estab-
lished by state), overruled, Patterson v. New York, 432 U.S. 197 (1977).
102. Virtually the only exception to the rule requiring nonconsent in cases of rape or sexual
assault is one oft-cited (and criticized) English case. In The King v. Donovan, [1934] 2 K.B. 498
(C.A.), the accused was charged with caning a girl of seventeen "in circumstances of indecency" for
purposes of sexual gratification. His defense was consent, and he appealed his conviction on the
ground that the trial judge had failed to instruct the jury that the burden was on the prosecution to
establish lack of consent as an element of the offense of indecent assault. The court quashed his
conviction on the ground of misdirection of the jury, but in doing so held that where the blows were
likely or intended to do bodily harm, consent was no defense. It treated as an exception those cases of
"'cudgels, foils, or wrestling'" which are "'manly diversions, they intend to give strength, skill and
activity, and may fit people for defence'," as well as cases of "rough and undisciplined sport or play,
where there is no anger and no intention to cause bodily harm." Id. at 508 (quoting M. FoSTER,
CROWN LAW 259 (1756)). According to the court, "[n]othing could be more absurd or more repellent
to the ordinary intelligence than to regard his conduct as comparable with that of a participant in one
of those 'manly diversions'. . . . Nor is his act to be compared with the rough but innocent horse-
play." Id. at 509. For criticism of Donovan's "breadth," see, e.g., G. WiIsass, supra note 16, at
155.
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Rape is unique, however, in the definition which has been accorded to
consent. That definition makes all too plain that the purpose of the con-
sent rule is not to protect female autonomy and freedom of choice, but to
assure men the broadest sexual access to women. In matters of sex, the
common law tradition views women ambivalently at best: Even when not
intentionally dishonest, they simply cannot be trusted to know what they
want or to mean what they say. While the cases that engendered this
tradition date from the 1870's and 1880's, the law reviews of the 1950's
and 1960's, and the appellate cases of the 1970's and 1980's, have perpet-
uated-it.
The justification for the central role of consent in the law of rape is that
it protects women's choice and women's autonomy in sexual relations. Or,
as one leading commentator put it: "In all cases the law of rape protects
the woman's discretion by proscribing coitus contrary to her wishes."' 03
Not exactly. As discussed in the preceding Section, the law does not pro-
tect the woman from "coitus contrary to her wishes" when there is no
"force." Secondly, the definition of nonconsent requires victims of rape,
unlike victims of any other crime, to demonstrate their "wishes" through
physical resistance.
A 1906 Wisconsin case, Brown v. State,'°0 provides an example of the
classic definition of nonconsent in rape as it was applied for most of this
century.10 5 In a modified form, it continues to apply in some courts and
jurisdictions. The victim in Brown, a sixteen-year-old (and a virgin), was
a neighbor of the accused. She testified at trial that on a walk across the
fields to her grandmother's home, she greeted the accused. He at once
seized her, tripped her to the ground, and forced himself upon her. "I
tried as hard as I could to get away. I was trying all the time to get away
just as hard as I could. I was trying to get up; I pulled at the grass; I
screamed as hard as I could, and he told me to shut up, and I didn't, and
then he held his hand on my mouth until I was almost strangled."' 0'
Whenever he removed his hand from her mouth she repeated her screams.
The jury found the defendant guilty of rape.
103. Note, Forcible and Statutory Rape, supra note 6, at 71; see also MODEL PENAL CODE §
213.1 comment 4, at 301 (1980) ("The law of rape protects the female's freedom of choice and pun-
ishes unwanted and coerced intimacy.").
104. 127 Wis. 193, 106 N.W. 536 (1906).
105. See also King v. State, 210 Tenn. 150, 158, 357 S.W. 2d 42, 45 (1962) ("in every way
possible and continued such resistance until she was overcome by force, was insensible through fright,
or ceased resistance from exhaustion, fear of death, or great bodily harm"); Moss v. State, 208 Miss.
531, 536, 45 So. 2d 125, 126 (1950) ("resistance must be unto the uttermost"); Reynolds v. State, 27
Neb. 90, 91-92, 42 N.W. 903, 903-04 (1889); People v. Dohring, 59 N.Y. 374, 386 (1874) ("until
exhausted or overpowered"). In effect, the "utmost resistance" rule required both that the woman
resist to the "utmost" of her capacity and that such resistance must not have abated during the strug-
gle. See Note, Recent Statutory Developments supra note 5, at 1506.
106. 127 Wis. at 196, 106 N.W. at 537.
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On appeal, the Supreme Court of Wisconsin did not reverse Brown's
conviction on the ground that the force used was insufficient to constitute
rape. Nor did the court conclude that the defendant lacked the necessary
mens rea for rape. Rather, the court reversed the conviction on the ground
that the victim had not adequately demonstrated her nonconsent:
Not only must there be entire absence of mental consent or assent,
but there must be the most vehement exercise of every physical
means or faculty within the woman's power to resist the penetration
of her person, and this must be shown to persist until the offense is
consummated.1 07
Here, the victim failed to meet that standard: She only once said "let
me go;" her screams were considered "inarticulate;" and her failure to
actually "resist," to use her "hands and limbs and pelvic mus-
cles"-obstacles which the court noted that "medical writers insist...
are practically insuperable"-justified reversal of the conviction. 0 In-
deed, the court noted that "when one pauses to reflect upon the terrific
resistance which the determined woman should make," the victim's ab-
sence of bruises and torn clothirig was "well-nigh incredible." ' 9
Brown is almost eighty years old. But the problem it illustrates is not
merely of historical interest. Virtually every jurisdiction has eliminated
the requirement of "utmost resistance" to establish nonconsent 1 ° But by
statute and in practice, 11 many courts continue to inquire into the vic-
107. Id. at 199, 106 N.W. at 538.
108. Id. at 199-200, 106 N.W. at 538. According to the court, a woman
is equipped to interpose most effective obstacles by means of hands and limbs and pelvic mus-
cles. Indeed, medical writers insist that these obstacles are practically insuperable in absence of
more than the usual relative disproportion of age and strength between man and woman,
though no such impossibility is recognized as a rule of law.
Id. The latter qualification is, by the court's own opinion and holding, open to question. The view
that an unwilling woman physically could not be raped was not limited to Wisconsin or to the nine-
teenth century. It provided support for insisting that the least women should do was resist to the
utmost. See East, Sexual Offenders-A British View, 55 YALE L.J. 527, 543 (1946).
109. 127 Wis. at 201, 106 N.W. at 539.
110. See, e.g, People v. Jones, 28 I1. App. 3d 896, 899, 329 N.E.2d 855, 858 (1975) (resistance
not necessary where victim is overcome by superior strength or paralyzed by fear); State v. Verdone,
114 R.I. 613, 621, 337 A.2d 804, 810 (1975) (utmost resistance not necessary where victim "reasona-
bly believes" it would be useless and would result in "serious bodily injury"); Satterwhite v. Com-
monwealth, 201 Va. 478, 482, 111 S.E.2d 820, 823 (1960) (same); State v. Herfel, 49 Wis. 2d 513,
518-19, 182 N.W.2d 232, 235 (1971).
111. A number of states include "resistance" or "earnest resistance" in their definitions of "ford-
ble compulsion." See, e.g., HAwAn REv. STAT. § 707-700(11) (Supp. 1980); KY. REV. STAT. §
510.010(2) (1985); OR. REV. STAT. § 163.305(2) (1985); UTAH CODE ANN. 76-5406(1) (Supp.
1985); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 9A.44.010(5) (Supp. 1986). See generally Note, Recent Statutory
Developments, supra note 5, at 1512-14. Some states that do not require resistance as a statutory
element of the offense nonetheless provide in the statute that its absence is relevant to consent. In
Virginia, for example, the law until 1981 required reasonable resistance as an element of the offense.
The reform statute eliminated that requirement, but made clear that resistance was relevant to
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tim's -"earnest resistance" to establish that she did not consent to
intercourse.
The 1981 case of State v. Lima112 is, like the Rusk case discussed in the
preceding Section, an example of the sort of rape case that is causing con-
cern and division in the appeals courts today. As in Rusk, the intermediate
and highest appeals courts took different views of what was acknowledged
to be a difficult case.
Lima, like Brown, involved an alleged rape in an open field involving
no weapons and two individuals who knew each other. In Lima, the de-
fendant had agreed to give his wife's 14-year-old cousin a ride home, and
stopped at a park on the way. Once there, he pinned her shoulder to the
ground with his left hand and moved his right hand inside of her blouse to
her breast. When she told him to remove his hand, he told her to "shut
up" and began to unbutton her shorts. She protested, "Willy, why are you
doing this to me, you're my cousin," and began to cry.
Both the court of appeals and the supreme court viewed the key issue in
Lima as whether, on these facts, the prosecution had established the "ear-
nest resistance" of the victim required by Hawaii law. The court of ap-
peals answered the question in the negative, because the "only resistance
shown by the record are the victim's pleas to appellant to stop and an
attempt to push appellant off of her.""' In reversing, the Supreme Court
whether sex was "against the will" of the complainant:
The Commonwealth need not demonstrate that the complaining witness cried out or physically
resisted the accused in order to convict the accused of an offense under this article, but the
absence of such resistance may be considered when relevant to show that the act alleged was
not against the will of the complaining witness.
1981 VA. AcTS 397, codified at VA. CODE § 18.2-67.6 (1982). See Kneedler, Sexual Assault Law
Reform in Virginia-A Legislative History, 68 VA. L. REv. 459, 484-85 (1982); see also MODEL
PENAL CODE § 213.1 comment 4 at 306-07 (1980) (in describing Model Penal Code as fresh ap-
proach, "[t]his is not to say that consent by the victim is irrelevant or that inquiry into the level of
resistance by the victim cannot or should not be made. Compulsion plainly implies non-consent, just
as resistance is evidence of non-consent.") (footnote omitted).
112. 2 Hawaii App. 19, 624 P.2d 1374 (1981), rev'd., 64 Hawaii 470, 643 P.2d 536 (1982).
113. 2 Hawaii App. at 22, 624 P.2d at 1377. The court's analysis of the facts is strikingly similar
to that of the Brown court:
The force used by appellant when he pinned the victim to the ground with his one hand was
not of a degree that would prevent her from struggling, particularly in view of the fact that
appellant released Stacey while he removed his own clothing. She did not cry out, attempt to
flee or interfere with appellant's removal of her clothing or even her tampax.
Thus, we cannot conclude on the basis of evidence presented by the government at trial, that
the victim's resistance, such as it was, was a "genuine physical effort . . . to prevent her
assailant from accomplishing his intended purpose."
Id., 624 P.2d at 1377 (citing State v. Jones, 62 Hawaii 572, 574 617 P.2d 1214, 1217 (1980)). Nor
could Mr. Lima be convicted of any lesser included offense, in the view of the appellate court. Sexual
abuse in the first degree, like rape in the first degree, requires "forcible compulsion"-"the very
element which the prosecution failed to prove on the rape charge." Assault in the third degree re-
quires proof that the defendant intentionally caused "bodily injury," defined as "physical pain, illness
or any impairment of physical condition. Again, the prosecution failed to adduce any evidence to
support a finding of bodily injury." Id. at 22-23, 624 P.2d at 1377.
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of Hawaii made much of this "push" in its interpretation of nonconsent,
much as the Maryland court in Rusk emphasized the light choking/heavy
caresses in its interpretation of force. The court affirmed the conviction on
the ground that the victim "did not simply lie supine and unresisting
while the respondent had his way with her." Thus, it could not be said, as
a matter of law, that "the complainant here did not exhibit a 'genuine
physical effort' to resist.""1 4 Presumably, in Hawaii, to say no, cry, and
then "simply lie supine and unresisting while [a man] ha[s] his way" is to
consent to sex.
Hawaii is not unique in holding that a victim must do more than say
no, at least in the absence of deadly force. In Goldberg v. State,'15 where
the defendant brought a would-be modeling prospect to his fictitious and
deserted "temporary studio," his conviction of rape was reversed both on
the ground that the force used was insufficient and on the ground that the
victim had failed to offer "real resistance." On the latter point, the court
drew a bright line between verbal and physical resistance: "It is true that
she told the appellant she 'didn't want to do that [stuff].' But the resis-
tance that must be shown involves not merely verbal but physical resis-
tance 'to the extent of her ability at the time.' ""0
No similar effort is required of victims of other crimes for which con-
sent is a defense. In trespass, for example, the posting of a sign or the
offering of verbal warnings generally suffices to meet the victim's burden
of nonconsent; indeed, under the Model Penal Code, the offense of tres-
pass is aggravated where a defendant is verbally warned to desist and fails
to do so.12 7 A defendant's claim that the signs and the warnings were not
meant to exclude him normally goes to his mens rea in committing the
act, not to the existence of consent." 8
114. 643 P.2d at 541. See also State v. Jones:
"Earnest resistance" . . . is a relative term and whether or not the statutory requirement was
satisfied must be measured by the circumstances surrounding the alleged assault. Among the
factors to be considered are the relative strength of the parties, the age of the female, her
physical and mental condition, and the nature and degree of the force used by the assailant.
Resistance may appear to be useless, and may eventually prove to be unavailing, but there
must have been a genuine physical effort on the part of the complainant to discourage and to
prevent her assailant from accomplishing his intended purpose.
62 Hawaii 572, 574, 617 P.2d 1214, 1217 (1980) (citation omitted) (emphasis added).
115. 41 Md. App. 58, 395 A.2d 1212 (1979); see supra text accompanying notes 77-79.
116. 41 Md. App. at 68, 395 A.2d at 1219 (citation omitted). See also Hazel v. State, 221 Md.
464, 469-70, 157 A.2d 922, 925 (1960):
The authorities are by no means in accord as to what degree of resistance is necessary to
establish the absence of consent. However, the generally accepted doctrine seems to be that a
female-who was conscious and possessed of her natural, mental and physical powers when
the attack took place-must have resisted to the extent of her ability at the time, unless it
appears that she was overcome by numbers or was so terrified by threats as to overpower her
will to resist.
117. See MODEL PENAL CODE § 221.2(2) (1985) (defiant trespasser).
118. The Model Penal Code requires that the person enter the place "knowing that he is not
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In robbery, claims that the victim cooperated with the taking of the
money or eased the way, and thus consented, have generally been unsuc-
cessful. 1 9 Only where the owner of the property actively participates in
planning and committing the theft will consent be found. Mere "passive
submission"120  or "passive assent"' does not amount to con-
sent 22-except in the law of rape.
That the law puts a special burden on the rape victim to prove through
her actions her nonconsent (or at least to account for why her actions did
not demonstrate "nonconsent"), while imposing no similar burden on the
victim of trespass, battery, or robbery, cannot be explained by the oft-
observed fact that consensual sex is part of everyday life. Visiting (trespass
with consent) is equally everyday, as is philanthropy (robbery with con-
sent), and surgery (battery with consent). Instinctively, we may think it is
easier in those cases to tell the difference between consent and nonconsent.
But if so, it is only because we are willing to presume that men are enti-
tled to access to women's bodies (as opposed to their houses or their wal-
lets), at least if they know them,"' and to accept male force in potentially
"consensual" sexual relations.
licensed or privileged to do so." Id. at § 221.2(1). It also provides an affirmative defense if the "actor
reasonably believed that the owner of the premises, or other person empowered to license access
thereto, would have licensed him to enter or remain." Id. at § 212.2(3)(c).
119. In Smith v. United States, 291 F.2d 220 (9th Cir. 1961), cert. denied, 368 U.S. 834 (1961),
for example, a bank teller was approached by the defendant with plans for a bank robbery; the teller
pretended to agree, but told the manager, who instructed the teller to hand the defendant a bag when
he was "held up." On appeal, the defendant argued that the bank had consented to giving him the
money, and thus there was no robbery. The court of appeals rejected the argument and affirmed the
conviction, concluding that the bank had not consented but had merely "smoothed the way" for the
crime's commission. Id. at 221.
120. State v. Neely, 90 Mont. 199, 209, 300 P. 561, 565 (1931) (entrapment of cattle thief).
121. State v. Natalie, 172 La. 709, 716, 135 So. 34, 36 (1931) (entrapment of warehouse thieves).
122. See also Games v. State, 134 Tex. Crim. 8, 10, 113 S.W.2d 542, 544 (Tex. Crim. App.
1938); Alford v. Commonwealth, 240 Ky. 513, 42 S.W.2d 711, 712-13 (Ct. App. 1931) People v.
Teicher, 52 N.Y.2d 638, 649, 439 N.Y.S.2d 846, 851, 422 N.E.2d 506, 511 (1981).
Similarly, suspects in custody and patients approaching surgery are afforded respect and autonomy
that rape victims are not. Under Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966), a suspect's "no" must
mean no, and questioning must be terminated. Id. at 473-74. In the hospital, a doctor may be liable
for both criminal and civil penalties unless he secures not simply a "yes" to surgery, but an informed
yes. Expansive requirements of informed consent for abortions have been much litigated, see, e.g.,
Akron v. Akron Center for Reproductive Health, 462 U.S. 416 (1983), and typical modem statutes
establish detailed consent rules which must be followed to negate criminal liability for non-negligent
performance of a therapeutic sterilization, see Comment, Towards a Consent Standard, supra note 5,
at 639 n.124.
123. That no such presumption is applied to property is evidenced in cases holding, for example,
that leaving keys in the ignition does not exculpate a thief from prosecution for motor vehicle larceny,
nor does leaving a front door unlocked eliminate the trespass. See State v. Plaspohl, 239 Ind. 324, 157
N.E.2d 579 (1959); State v. Moore, 129 Iowa 514, 106 N.W. 16 (1906); W. LAFAVE & A. ScoTr,
supra note 87, at 410. In effect, conflicting presumptions are applied to bodily integrity (where a male
right of access is presumed) and financial integrity (where a right to privacy and control is protected).
Notwithstanding norms of charity, it is presumed that money is something which every individual is
entitled to exclusive possession of until and unless he decides to share it. And notwithstanding the
law's celebration of chastity and monogamy, a woman's body is presumed to be offered at least to any
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Were the purpose of the consent requirement really to afford autonomy
to women, there is no reason why a simple but clearly stated "no" would
not suffice to signify nonconsent. Viewing women as autonomous human
beings would mean treating them as persons who know what they want
and mean what they say. A woman who wanted sex would say yes; a
woman who did not would say no, and those verbal signals would be
respected.
From a woman's point of view, the danger in this position is that many
women who say "yes" are not in fact choosing freely, but are submitting
because they feel a lack of power to say "no." From some men's point of
view, the problem is that some women who say "no" would be willing to
say "yes," or at least to "go along," if properly pressured. The "no means
yes" philosophy, from this perspective, affords sexual enjoyment to those
women who desire it but will not say so-at the cost of violating the integ-
rity of all those women who say "no" and mean it.
A system of law that has traditionally celebrated female chastity and
frowned upon sex outside of marriage might be expected to err on the side
of less sex and to presume nonconsent in the absence of evidence to the
contrary. But if ours has now become a society in which women have been
"liberated" to say yes, that provides all the more reason-if more were
needed-to respect a no. If the stigma attached to saying yes has been
eliminated, then so have the grounds for claiming that no means yes. That
we treat women in sexual encounters more like spectators at sporting
events (where consent is presumed) 2' than like owners of property (who
are merely required to post a sign or verbally communicate nonassent) is
only partly explained by the fact that rape is a more serious offense than
trespass. It also reflects a view of women as lacking in autonomy, if not
integrity, and secures the priority of men's sexual satisfaction.
In the 1950's and 1960's, the leading law journals in this country pro-
vided detailed explanations of why women could not be relied upon to
know what they wanted or mean what they said; how it was that many
women enjoyed physical struggle as a sexual stimulant; and how unfair it
would be to punish men who realized that "no" means "yes," only to have
man whom she knows, drives home, or drinks coffee with, if not every man who desires it.
124. Participants and spectators in a sporting event are presumed to consent to injuries that might
result in the usual course of play. See W. LAFAVE & A. ScoTr, supra note 87, at 608 (1972);
Williams, supra note 100, at 80-81; Comment, Towards a Consent Standard, supra note 5, at 636.
But even here presumed consent is limited; where physical aggression exceeds the usual course of the
sport, consent becomes inoperative and assault may be charged. See Comment, Violence in Profes-
sional Sports, 1975 Wis. L. REv. 771 (discussing indictment of professional hockey player on aggra-
vated assault charges for intentionally striking another player with stick); People v. Lenti, 44 Misc. 2d
118, 123-24, 253 N.Y.S.2d 9, 15-16 (1964) (prosecutions of fraternity members for beatings given
during hazing).
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their ambivalent partners lie after the fact.125 According to a student au-
thor published in the Stanford Law Review:
Although a woman may desire sexual intercourse, it is customary for
her to say, "no, no, no" (although meaning "yes, yes, yes") and to
expect the male to be the aggressor. . . . It is always difficult in
rape cases to determine whether the female really meant "no" ...
The problem of determining what the female "really meant" is com-
pounded when, in fact, the female had no clearly determined atti-
tude-that is, her attitude was one of ambivalence. Slovenko ex-
plains that often a woman faces a "trilemma"; she is faced with a
choice among being a prude, a tease, or an "easy lay." Furthermore
a woman may note a man's brutal nature and be attracted to him
rather than repulsed.""
In order to remedy these problems, the author concluded that the resis-
tance standard must be "high enough to assure that the resistance is un-
feigned and to indicate with some degree of certainty that the woman's
attitude was not one of ambivalence or unconscious compliance and that
her complaints do not result from moralistic afterthoughts," but must be
"low enough to make death or serious bodily injury an unlikely outcome
of the event. 1 27 That death or serious bodily injury remains a possible
result of ignoring a woman's words is apparently not too great a cost to
pay.
Perhaps the most influential of all such commentary was the often and
still-cited Yale Law Journal Note on what women want.128 Relying on
Freud, the author pointed out that it is not simply that women lie, al-
125. Similar concerns led leading commentators to advocate special rules of proof in rape cases.
Professor Wigmore, for example, thought all women rape victims to be sufficiently suspect to argue
that the complainant be examined by a psychiatrist, and that no case go to the jury unless such an
examination had been performed and the physician had testified as to her personal history and mental
health. According to Professor Wigmore:
[Rape complainants'] psychic complexes are multifarious, distorted partly by inherent defects,
partly by diseased derangements or abnormal instincts, partly by bad social environment,
partly by temporary physiological or emotional conditions. . . .The unchaste. . . mentality
finds incidental but direct expression in the narration of imaginary sex incidents of which the
narrator is the heroine or the victim. On the surface the narration is straight-forward and
convincing.
3A J. WIGMORE, EVIDENCE § 924a, at 736 (Chadbourn rev. ed. 1970). See also Note, Corroborating
Charges, supra note 6, at 1138 ("[slurely the simplest, and perhaps the most important, reason not to
permit conviction for rape on the uncorroborated word of the prosecutrix is that that word is very
often false.") (footnote omitted).
126. Note, Resistance Standard, supra note 6, at 682 (footnotes omitted) (quoting Slovenko, A
Panoramic Overview: Sexual Behavior and the Law, in SEXUAL BEHAVIOR AND THE LAW 5, 51
(Slovenko ed. 1965)).
127. Note, Resistance Standard, supra note 6, at 685 (emphasis added).
128. Note, Forcible and Statutory Rape, supra note 6. This Note is cited, and its influence ap-
parent, not only in the Model Penal Code provisions adopted in the 1950's, but in the comments to
them edited in the 1970's and published in 1980. See infra Section III(A).
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though there is an "unusual inducement to malicious or psychopathic ac-
cusation inherent in the sexual nature of the crime." Even the "normal
girl" is a confused and ambivalent character when it comes to sex. Her
behavior is not always an accurate guide to her true desires; it may sug-
gest resistance when in fact the woman is enjoying the physical struggle:
When her behavior looks like resistance although her attitude is one
of consent, injustice may be done the man by the woman's subse-
quent accusation. Many women, for example, require as part of pre-
liminary "love play" aggressive overtures by the man. Often their
erotic pleasure may be enhanced by, or even depend upon, an accom-
panying physical struggle. The "love bite" is a common, if mild, sign
of the aggressive component in the sex act. And the tangible signs of
struggle may survive to support a subsequent accusation by the
woman.
129
And if women are ambivalent toward sex, it follows that it would be
unfair to punish the man who was not acting entirely against her wishes:
[A] woman's need for sexual satisfaction may lead to the unconscious
desire for forceful penetration, the coercion serving neatly to avoid
the guilt feelings which might arise after willing participation ...
Where such an attitude of ambivalence exists, the woman may,
nonetheless, exhibit behavior which would lead the factfinder to con-
clude that she opposed the act. To illustrate . . . . [T]he anxiety
resulting from this conflict of needs may cause her to flee from the
situation of discomfort, either physically by running away, or sym-
bolically by retreating to such infantile behavior as crying. The
scratches, flight, and crying constitute admissible and compelling evi-
dence of non-consent. But the conclusion of rape in this situation
may be inconsistent with the meaning of the consent standard and
unjust to the man. . . . [F]airness to the male suggests a conclusion
of not guilty, despite signs of aggression, if his act was not contrary
to the woman's formulated wishes.1 30
In short, the problem is not only that some women lie, but that many
women do not in fact know what they want, or mean what they say-at
least when they say no. And the presence of force does not even prove
rape, because many women enjoy and depend on force. According to this
view, insisting that women do more than simply say no to sex is an essen-
tial means of protecting the man who exercises his judgment to ignore a
woman's words of protestation.
129. Note, Forcible and Statutory Rape, supra note 6, at 66 (footnotes omitted).
130. Id. at 67-68 (footnotes omitted).
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Nonconsent, defined as physical resistance, serves this notice function in
two ways. First, resistance defines the limits of force. The law avoids the
task of inquiring into how much force in sex is too much by defining
proscribed force according to victim resistance. Second, physical resistance
means that this woman in fact means what she says; men are free to ig-
nore words, but resistance signifies that no, in this case, means no. Resis-
tance thus serves to give notice that sex is indeed unwelcome, that force is
just that, and that the man has crossed the line.
Under this view, the "utmost resistance" standard could be understood
by judges to reflect their view that a truly unwilling woman would fight
nearly to the death to protect her virtue. If the judges believed this, then
certainly a male defendant did not deserve the serious punishment of a
rape conviction for acting on the same belief. Unless the woman offered
utmost resistance, or had good reason (fear of death, unconsciousness, in-
competence) for not doing so, the man presumably could not be held to be
on notice that his advances were truly unwelcome.
In practice, the nonconsent standard has served a second important
function as well. It has provided a convenient means for distinguishing
between those victims deserving of the law's protection, characteristically
the chaste, white victim, and those who were not.1 1 Thus the Court of
Appeals of Virginia reasoned, in reversing the conviction of a black man
for attempted rape of a black woman (who, the court thought it important
to note, had never been married and had two children, and attended a
performance with the prisoner paying all the expenses):
The evidence indicates that he had wooed her pretty roughly in a
way that would have been horrible and a shocking outrage toward a
woman of virtuous sensibilities, and should have subjected him to the
severest punishment which the law would warrant. But how far it
affected the sensibilities of the prosecutrix does not appear. It by no
131. See, e.g., Government of Virgin Islands v. John, 447 F.2d 69, 73 (3d Cir. 1971) (finding
prejudicial error in trial court's failure to instruct jury of "substantial probative value," with respect
to issue of consent); Packineau v. United States, 202 F.2d 681, 685-87 (8th Cir. 1953) (holding that
evidence of "her concupiscence-of her having sexual lust and unlawfully indulging it" must be ad-
mitted to balance jury's view of her as "very refined" and unsophisticated; but error to allow defend-
ant to be questioned about illegitimate children and arrests because "[alcts of misconduct, not resulting
in conviction of a crime, are not the proper subjects of cross-examination to impeach a witness"); see
also Wynne v. Commonwealth, 216 Va. 355, 356, 218 S.E.2d 445, 446 (1975); People v. Collins, 25
Ill. 2d 605, 611, 186 N.E.2d 30, 33 (1962); Lee v. State, 132 Tenn. 655, 658, 179 S.W. 145, 145
(1915) ("no impartial mind can resist the conclusion that a female who had been in the recent habit of
illicit intercourse with others will not be so likely to resist as one who is spotless and pure"); Bailey v.
Commonwealth, 82 Va. 107, 110-11 (1886) (upholding rape conviction of man who had sex with
fourteen-year-old chaste stepdaughter, notwithstanding absence of active resistance, though insisting
that physical resistance generally required); People v. Abbot, 19 Wend. 192, 195 (N.Y. Sup. Ct.
1838) ("[W]ill you not more readily infer assent in the practised Messalina, in loose attire, than in the
reserved and virtuous Lucretia?").
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means appears, from the facts certified, that it was an attempt to
ravish her, against her will, or that it was not only an attempt to
work upon her passions, and overcome her virtue, which had yielded
to others before-how often it does not appear. . . .Without any
interference, or any outcry on her part, together with his after con-
duct, shows, we think, that his conduct, though extremely reprehen-
sible, and deserving of punishment, does not involve him in the crime
which this statute was designed to punish.132
Eventually, the "utmost resistance" standard came to be replaced by a
"reasonable resistance" standard: Chastity may be valuable, but judges
came to realize that it may not be more valuable than life itself. The
reasonable resistance standard spares the woman the choice of risking her
life or serious injury to prevent unwanted sex, instead asking whether she
had offered "reasonable" resistance. But for many courts, saying
"no"-passive resistance-does not count as resistance. In those courts,
the understanding of the law review authors of the 1950's and 1960's, that
"no means yes," continues to have the force of law.
The consent standard, like the force standard, thus emerges as another
means to protect men against unfair convictions by giving them full and
fair warning that their (forceful) advances constitute an unwelcome rape
rather than a welcome, or at least accepted, seduction. An alternative ap-
proach to this fair warning problem would be to spell out the crime or
crimes of "rape" in detail, without regard to the response of the woman.
In fact, most courts recognize the use of deadly weapons or a threat of
imminent death as criminal without the need for too much reliance on the
woman's response, at least most of the time. But to go further and pro-
hibit all forms of physical force would inject the criminal law into what
many conceive as private and appropriate choices: It is one thing to ban
guns and deadly weapons, or even fraud and extortion, but quite another
to say that "love bites"' 33 or vigorous thrashing or pushing is criminal
regardless of consent.
Our inability or unwillingness to detail the sexual practices that we as
132. Christian v. Commonwealth, 64 Va. (23 Gratt.) 954, 955, 959 (1873). The Virginia Court
subsequently upheld the death penalty for the attempted rape of a white "simple, good, unsophistica-
ted country girl" by a black man. Hart v. Commonwealth, 131 Va. 726, 729, 109 S.E. 582 (1921).
But even virginity could have its costs, at least in cases involving simple white country boys as defend-
ants; the story of Brown v. State, 127 Wis. 193, 106 N.W. 536 (1906), discussed earlier, is, after all,
the story of Little Red Ridinghood on her way to her grandmother's house when attacked in the fields
by the accused. In her case, it appears, virginity was seen not as a factor earning her the court's
protection but one which would motivate her to lie about her sexual indiscretion. According to the
court, when she found that she was bleeding, she realized that she would have to lie: "[The] prosecu-
trix turned from her way to friends and succor to arrange her underclothing and there discovered a
condition making silence impossible. . . .She could not conceal from her family what had taken
place." Id. at 201, 106 N.W. at 539.
133. Note, Forcible and Statutory Rape, supra note 6, at 66.
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a society will not tolerate, regardless of consent, creates the law's heavy
reliance on the behavior of the woman. Because the law has provided that
if the woman "consents"-regardless of the amount of force
used-intercourse is not rape, men have a right to fair warning as to con-
sent. But the consent standard does not necessarily lead to the denial of
autonomy to women, or to the "no means yes" philosophy. Quite the con-
trary, the consent standard could be viewed as a means to afford women
their deserved freedom to engage in sex however they choose-whether
that is sex with women or sex with forcible penetration. The harm of
rape, or part of it, is the denial of that freedom. Indeed, a consent stan-
dard that allowed the individual woman to say "yes" as well as "no," to
define all of the limits of permissible sex for herself and then to have that
definition incorporated and respected in law, would be a means of em-
powering women. It could also expand liability for criminal sex to any
man who refuses to respect those limits.
Many feminists would argue that as long as women are powerless rela-
tive to men, viewing a "yes" as a sign of true consent is misguided. Yet if
a "yes" might really mean "no," we might at least agree to respect the
courage of a woman who dared to say "no." The insistence that men are
entitled not only to presume consent from silence but actually to ignore a
woman's explicit words makes all too clear the law's absolute determina-
tion not to empower women at all. The fear that women, acting from
shame or spite or vengeance, will abuse any power they are afforded in
sexual relations at the expense of "innocent" men is the most pervasive
theme in the legal commentary on rape. A consent standard that further
empowered women and potentially eased the burden of proving
rape-limited sexual access-has been plainly unacceptable.
The refusal of the law (and the society it reflects) either to limit the
scope of seduction regardless of consent or to empower women through
the consent standard creates the fair warning problem that demands a
resistance standard as its answer. We could seek to prohibit certain forms
of seduction. We could seek to empower women, at least when they say
no. Both alternatives would mean less freedom for men to coerce submis-
sion and secure sexual access. Both would eliminate the need for women
to resist physically. Having chosen neither, we have created a fair warn-
ing problem whose only solution, at least to many courts and commenta-
tors, is to interpret force and consent in ways that punish women for
"complicity" in sex, making their conduct the determinant of liability and
the subject of our verdicts. There is nothing inevitable about either the
problem or the solution.
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III. Two MODELS OF REFORM LEGISLATION
As of 1980, every state had considered and most had passed some form
of rape "reform" legislation."' The scope of legislative change varies
enormously among the states. In many cases, the reform effort centered
not on the definition of the crime itself, but on the means of disproving it:
Rape shield laws were enacted to limit the admissibility of the victim's
prior sexual conduct. In other cases, the reform effort consisted of the
adoption of the Model Penal Code standards for rape and other crimes; in
still others, the impetus for legislation was opposition to certain of the
Code's provisions on rape (such as corroboration and fresh complaint).
My purpose here is not to summarize all of the changes that have been
made on a state-by-state basis; others have done that.1 5 Rather, I want to
focus on the two statutory schemes which have been the most important
models of reform-the Model Penal Code and the Michigan criminaf sex-
ual conduct statute.13 Both models claim to be "reforms" in that they
seek to make changes in the common law tradition. The Model Penal
Code, its commentators claimed in 1980, is the "balanced" approach.13 7
The Michigan statute has been widely described as a model "feminist"
approach.13 8
Theoretically, a reform statute might move beyond the most traditional
understanding of rape either by focusing on the victim and giving meaning
to the consent standard and respect to a woman's words of refusal, or by
focusing on the man and expanding our understanding of the force and
coercion that makes intercourse rape. The Model Penal Code focuses on
the woman, but it does not empower her. The Michigan statute focuses on
the man; but it does not expand our understanding of force and coercion.
As "reforms," both are far more limited than either their proponents or
opponents would acknowledge. According to the empirical studies, neither
134. Bienen, supra note 25, at 171.
135. See id.; see, e.g., H. FEILD & L. BiFNEN, JURORS AND RAPE 207-458 (1980) (state-by-state
listing of rape provisions); Note, Recent Statutory Developments, supra note 5, at 1500.
136. See, e.g., MODEL PENAL CODE § 213.1 comment at 286 (1980):
Of those states which have departed from the traditional common-law approach to the defini-
tion of rape, the vast majority have followed the Model Penal Code, the New York statute, the
Michigan statute, or some combination of the three. Both the New York and Michigan stat-
utes have been influenced by the Model Code, although the departures in the Michigan statute
are more dramatic.
The then existing New York statute departed from the Code most significantly in its requirement
of "earnest resistance," a requirement still followed by a number of other states, but since eliminated
in New York, See supra note 111; see also Bienen, supra note 25, at 172 (Michigan statute "contin-
ues to be the most important model for reform"); Note, Recent Statutory Developments, supra note 5,
at 1502.
137. See MODEL PENAL CODE § 213.1 comment at 303 (1980).
138. See, e.g., J. MARSH, A. GEIsT & N. CAPLAN, RAPE AND THE LiMrrs OF LAW REFORM 2
(1982); Ben Dor, Justice After Rape: Legal Reform in Michigan, in SEXUAL ASSAULT: THE VICTIM
AND THE RAPIsT 149 (M. Walker & S. Brodsky eds. 1976).
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of these reforms, or any of the statutes modeled on them, have had a sig-
nificant, measurable impact on the actual processing of rape complaints.
A. The Model Penal Code
The Model Penal Code provisions on rape were first presented to the
American Law Institute in 1955 and were ultimately adopted in 1962."39
Since that time, they have been enormously influential: Many states today
enforce rape laws based on, or at least significantly influenced by, the
Code.140 In 1980, the final Commentaries were completed and pub-
lished."" Those Commentaries not only justify, but applaud the 1962
Code. With the exception of the gender-specificity of the Code, which the
commentators now consider a close question, 42 the provisions of the Code
are praised as a "fresh," "balanced," and "enlightened" resolution of the
issues involved in providing statutory definitions for the elements of rape.
The Code creates three categories of prohibited sexual intercourse with
adult, competent women. Rape is a felony of the second degree where a
male has sexual intercourse with a female not his wife if "he compels her
to submit by force or by threat of imminent death, serious bodily injury,
extreme pain or kidnapping, to be inflicted on anyone." Rape becomes a
first degree felony where these requirements are met and serious bodily
139. MODEL PENAL CODE § 213.1 comment at 274 n.* (1980).
140. E.g., DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 11, § 761 (1974); HAWAII REv. STAT. § 707-30 (1976 & Supp.
1980); ME. REv. STAT. ANN. tit. 17-A, §§ 252-253 (1983); N.D. CENT. CODE § 12.1-20-03 (Supp.
1983); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2907.02 (Supp. 1985); see MODEL PENAL CODE § 213.1 comment
at 299-300 (1980); Note, Recent Statutory Developments, supra note 5, at 1512.
141. MODEL PENAL CODE and comments, Part II (Definition of Specific Crimes) (1980), pub-
lished in three volumes. The provisions on sexual offenses are included in volume 1. The revised
Commentaries relating to the general provisions of the Code-Part I-were published in three
volumes in 1985.
142. See MODEL PENAL CODE § 213.1 comment at 335-37 (1980):
The Model Penal Code was drafted at a time when the social climate was such that the
limitation of rape to male aggression was hardly questioned. This is not to say that the possi-
bility of male attacks upon males or female attacks upon males or females was ignored.
Rather, the significance of the difference between these cases on the one hand and the case of a
male attack upon a female on the other was largely perceived as one of grading.
If the Model Code were being redrafted today, it might well be that preserving these differ-
ences would not be thought to outweigh the advantages of describing the entire offense of rape
in gender-neutral terms.
The passage is significant because it is the only point in these Commentaries where the authors
suggest that a different result might or should obtain were the Code redrafted today. Compare, e.g.,
id. at 344-46 (defending marital exemption) with MODEL PENAL CODE § 213.6 comment at 428-29
(1980) (defending corroboration requirement at time when virtually every jurisdiction had abandoned
it as formal rule). But even with respect to gender neutrality, the Code writers continue to defend the
view-reflected in the current Code-that there are significant differences between heterosexual and
homosexual rape. The current Code enforces those perceived differences by classifying the crime of
"deviate sexual intercourse" (a striking title in itself given the Code's abandonment of criminal penal-
ties for sodomy) as under no circumstances more serious than a felony in the second degree, while




injury is inflicted or "the victim was not a voluntary social companion of
the actor upon the occasion of the crime and had not previously permitted
him sexual liberties." Sexual intercourse constitutes the third degree fel-
ony of "gross sexual imposition" where a man compels a female not his
wife to submit "by any threat that would prevent resistance by a woman
of ordinary resolution." '143
The Code further provides that a complaint to the police within three
months is required for all of these offenses; that the victim's testimony
must be corroborated by other evidence; and that the jury must be given a
cautionary instruction to evaluate the victim's testimony with special
care.
1 4 4
Surprisingly, given their long history and influence, the Code provisions
have not been the subject of searching scrutiny or criticism in the litera-
ture. On occasion summarily praised,1 45 on occasion summarily "con-
demned, 46 the innovations of the Code have rarely been examined at any
length except by their own approving commentators. These innovations
fall into two categories. Both focus on the victim, but in significantly dif-
ferent ways. The first innovation involves the Code's efforts to enforce a
set of "objective" rules which "avoid making the imposition-consent in-
143. MODEL PENAL CODE § 213.1(1) & (2) (1980) provides in pertinent part:
(1) Rape. A male who has sexual intercourse with a female not his wife is guilty of rape if
. . . he compels her to submit by force or by threat of imminent death, serious bodily injury,
extreme pain or kidnapping, to be inflicted on anyone;
. . . Rape is a felony of the second degree unless (i) in the course thereof the actor inflicts
serious bodily injury upon anyone, or (ii) the victim was not a voluntary social companion of
the actor upon the occasion of the crime and had not previously permitted him sexual liberties,
in which cases the offense is a felony of the first degree.
(2) Gross Sexual Imposition. A male who has sexual intercourse with a female not his wife
commits a felony of the third degree if. . . he compels her to submit by any threat that would
prevent resistance by a woman of ordinary resolution.
144. MODEL PENAL CODE § 213.6(2), (4) & (5) (1980) provides in pertinent part:
(2) Spouse Relationships. Whenever in this Article the definition of an offense excludes
conduct with a spouse, the exclusion shall be deemed to extend to persons living as man and
wife, regardless of the legal status of their relationship. The exclusion shall be inoperative as
respects spouses living apart under a decree of judicial separation.
(4) Prompt Complaint. No prosecution may be instituted or maintained under this Article
unless the alleged offense was brought to the notice of public authority within [3] months of its
occurrence or, where the alleged victim was less than [16] years old or otherwise incompetent
to make complaint, within [3] months after a parent, guardian or other competent person
specially interested in the victim learns of the offense.
(5) Testimony of Complainants. No person shall be convicted of any felony under this Arti-
cle upon the uncorroborated testimony of the alleged victim. Corroboration may be circumstan-
tial. In any prosecution before a jury for an offense under this Article, the jury shall be in-
structed to evaluate the testimony of a victim or complaining witness with special care in view
of the emotional involvement of the witness and the difficulty of determining the truth with
respect to alleged sexual activities carried out in private.
145. See, e.g., Note, Recent Statutory Developments, supra note 5.
146. See, e.g., Bienen, supra note 25, at 176.
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quiry entirely on a subjective basis"'147 by imposing obstacles both on the
circumstances in which and the extent to which the woman's "subjective"
view is credited. The second innovation involves the Code's definition of a
lesser offense of gross sexual imposition which depends on the will to re-
sist of the woman of "ordinary resolution," a new construct in the law.
1. The "Objective" Rules
The Code begins with the premise that the nonconsent of the woman is
critical to make male conduct, no matter how aggressive, rape: "If the law
regards the female as competent to consent and if she does do so, inter-
course is not rape." 148 Moreover, "the possibility of consent by the victim,
even in the face of conduct that may give some evidence of overreaching,
cannot be ignored. '149 But at the same time, echoing the Freudian ap-
proach of student commentaries of the 1950's and 1960's, the Code argues
that a consent standard that allowed women, simply in saying no to a man
and repeating it to a jury, to establish a charge of rape would afford them
unjustified power:
[O]ften the woman's attitude may be deeply ambivalent. She may not
want intercourse, may fear it, or may desire it but feel compelled to
say 'no.' Her confusion at the time of the act may later resolve into
non-consent. . . . The deceptively simple notion of consent may ob-
scure a tangled mesh of psychological complexity, ambiguous com-
munication, and unconscious restructuring of the event by the
participants. 5 '
This is, of course, precisely the dilemma that traditionally led common
law courts and commentators to insist on resistance by the woman-even
utmost resistance-as a matter of law. The Code is "balanced" in its at-
tack on both sides of the resistance debate, criticizing both those who
"place[] disproportionate emphasis upon objective manifestations of non-
consent by the woman" (the resistance school) and those who go "too far
in the opposite direction" (Michigan) by statutorily eliminating the resis-
tance requirement. 51
The Code's answer to the immediate resistance conflict is to recognize
the evidentiary relevance, if not legal necessity, of female resistance.15 2 As
147. MODEL PENAL CODE § 213.1 comment at 307 (1980).
148. Id. at 301. Notably, the converse is most assuredly not true: If the law regards the female as
competent to consent and she does not do so, intercourse may also not be rape.
149. Id. at 303.
150. Id. at 302-03. The commentators, it should be noted, feel no need to cite any authority
whatsoever in support of their understanding of how women behave and think in sexual encounters.
151. Id. at 303.
152. The harder question is not whether the presence of physical resistance ought be considered
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for the larger dilemma, the Code eschews any effort to provide objectivity
by actually defining force and consent: The Code requires force (or
threats of serious bodily injury)153 by the man and nonconsent by the wo-
man, 15  but defines neither, thus leaving courts and juries free to focus
their attention and judgment on the woman victim in the most traditional,
restrictive way. Instead the Code seeks "objectivity" through a series of
rules that call into question female reliability and honesty ("subjectivity"),
even as the focus of inquiry remains almost exclusively on the woman.
The first such rule is the requirement of corroboration of the victim's
testimony, a rule which did not exist at common law15 5 and which is im-
posed by the Code only in cases of rape and sexual assault.1 56 The usual
justfication for corroboration requirements is that women intentionally lie
about sex.15 7 The Code commentaries tread carefully on the paradigm of
the vengeful and lying female, and the one who fantasizes rape. "[N]o
probative of nonconsent, but whether its absence ought be considered probative of consent. In myjudgment, the assumption that women who do not consent resist physically-and that therefore the
absence of physical resistance is at least suspect and must be explained-reflects a view of reality that
bears little relation to the experience of rape victims.
153. The qualifying threats under the Code-imminent death, serious bodily injury, or extreme
pain or kidnapping-are broader than some common law statutes, which even further restricted the
threats that would excuse "utmost resistance." The Code includes threats made against persons other
than the victim, and includes neither the "reasonable person" nor the "apparent power of execution"
restrictions of some common law statutes. See MODEL PENAL CODE § 213.1 comment at 309-12(1980).
154. While pointing with pride to the fact that consent is not included as an element of the offense
of rape defined in the article on sexual offenses, the Commentators recognize in a footnote that the
Code's general consent defense is fully applicable to rape. Id. at 306 & n.93.
155. At one time, the rule was enforced by a significant minority of American jurisdictions, but by
the time of the Commentaries in 1980, it had been abandoned by most of them. The commentators
were able to cite only one revised Code-Georgia's-which included a corroboration requirement for
all rape cases. MODEL PENAL CODE § 213.6 comment at 428 n.37 (1980). They also cited twojurisdictions which had accomplished the result judicially-the U.S. Court of Appeals for the District
of Columbia Circuit, in Washington v. United States, 419 F.2d 636 (D.C. Cir. 1969), and Nebraska,
in State v. Garza, 187 Neb. 407, 191 N.W.2d 454 (1971). See MODEL PENAL CODE § 213.6 com-
ment at 428 n.38 (1980). The U.S. Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit abandoned its corroboration
requirement in 1977. See United States v. Sheppard, 569 F.2d 114 (D.C. Cir. 1977). Nebraska may
now be the only state that requires corroboration in all rape cases, as the Code does, though some
others continue to require it in more limited categories of cases. See S. KADISH, S. SCHULHOFER, &
M. PAULSEN, supra note 22, at 394-95. See generally State v. Byers, 102 Idaho 159, 627 P.2d 788
(1981) (reviewing recent authorities); Note, Rape Corroboration, supra note 5; Clarke, Corrobora-
tion in Sexual Cases, 1980 CRIM. L. REv. 362.
156. While this means that the requirement technically applies in cases where men may be vic-
tims (e.g., deviate sexual intercourse), the commentators acknowledge that in practice those whose
testimony would require corroboration under the Code will generally be female. MODEL PENAL
CODE § 213.6 comment at 422 (1980).
157. See, e.g., Note, Corroborating Charges, supra note 6, at 1137-38 (citations omitted):
Because of the inordinate danger that innocent men will be convicted of rape, some states have
adopted the rule that the unsupported testimony of the complaining witness is not sufficient
evidence to support a rape conviction . ...
Surely the simplest, and perhaps the most important, reason not to permit conviction for
rape on the uncorroborated word of the prosecutrix is that that word is very often false ....
Since stories of rape are frequently lies or fantasies, it is reasonable to provide that such a
story, in itself, should not be enough evidence to convict a man of a crime.
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doubt such cases exist," but the whole area is a "murky ground."15 Nor
do the commentaries seek to justify the corroboration rule on the ground
that judges and juries will too quickly rush to express their outrage about
rape through conviction. 59 Their concern echoes Lord Hale's insistence
on the difficulty of defending against a false accusation of a sexual of-
fense. 60 The commentary argues:
The difference between criminal and non-criminal conduct depends
ultimately on a question of attitude. Proof of this elusive issue often
boils down to a confrontation of conflicting accounts. The corrobora-
tion requirement is an attempt to skew resolution of such disputes in
favor of the defendant. It does not, or at least need not, rest on the
assertion that one person's testimony is inherently more deserving of
credence [than] another's. . . . It is, rather, a determination to favor
justice to the defendant, even at some cost to societal interest in effec-
tive law enforcement and to the personal demand of the victim for
redress. In short, the corroboration requirement should not be under-
stood as an effort to discount female testimony or as an unsympa-
thetic understanding of the female experience with sexual aggression.
It is, rather, only a particular implementation of the general policy
that uncertainty should be resolved in favor of the accused. 6
The problem with this explanation is that the policy of resolving uncer-
tainty in favor of the defendant is one which is already addressed in every
criminal trial by the requirement of proof beyond a reasonable doubt.
Why is that constitutional mandate sufficient to protect the rights of all
criminal defendants except those accused of rape? The answer-if it is not
that rape victims are disproportionately liars or that rape juries are dis-
proportionately conviction-prone (and the Commentary rejects both of
these answers)-is that the crime of rape, because it turns on a woman's
nonconsent to sex, is different from other offenses.
The reference to consent as an "elusive issue" involving "a question of
attitude" is revealing. What makes the "attitude" component so troubling
is, of course, the ambivalence ("subjectivity") problem-the danger either
that the woman did not know what she wanted or mean what she said, or
at least that the man did not hear it or see it that way. The corroboration
158. MODEL PENAL CODE § 213.6 comment at 427 (1980).
159. Id. at 427-28. While recognizing the paradigm of this argument in the trial of a black
defendant accused of raping a white woman, the Comments "expect that enforced non-discriminatory
juror selection might provide a partial answer."
160. 1 M. HALE, supra note 15, at 635 (Rape "is an accusation easily to be made and hard to be
proved, and harder to be defended by the party accused, tho never so innocent."). Lord Hale's "in-
sight" is also incorporated in the separate requirement of a cautionary instruction in rape cases.
MODEL PENAL CODE § 213.6(5) (1980).
161. MODEL PENAL CODE § 213.6 comment at 428 (1980).
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requirement, as offered by the Code, addresses that problem by requiring
other proof, beyond the woman's word then or now, that she did not con-
sent. In effect, it requires violence (as schoolboys know it) and resistance:
Because there are rarely witnesses to a rape, that proof almost inevitably
must consist of the bruises and torn clothing which such force and resis-
tance produce. 162
The additional requirement that a complaint must be filed within three
months-the "fresh complaint" rule-was a true "innovation" of the
Model Penal Code. At common law, absence of a fresh complaint created
a strong but not conclusive presumption against a woman1 6 3 and at the
time the Code was drafted, no jurisdiction barred prosecution in the ab-
sence of a fresh complaint.1 ' The rule is unique to rape, and its justifica-
tion is unique to women victims of sexual assault: "The requirement of
prompt complaint springs in part from a fear that unwanted pregnancy or
bitterness at a relationship gone sour might convert a willing participant
in sexual relations into a vindictive complainant."" 5 "Perhaps more im-
portantly," the commentary continues, "the provision limits the opportu-
nity for blackmailing another by threatening to bring a criminal charge
for sexual aggression," an objective which "is especially critical for those
162. There may, to be sure, be individual rape cases where juries should not convict based on
uncorroborated testimony, and where judges should not allow their convictions to stand if they do.
Where the case is indeed a contest of credibility between two parties-particularly where one of the
two may have a complaint growing out of a long-term relationship (as business partners might)-the
prosecution may well have a difficult time meeting its constitutional mandate, let alone convincing ajury to vote for conviction. But this recognition does not support the blanket corroboration rule for
rape cases. There is absolutely no evidence that juries need such a rule in order to protect defendants;
quite the contrary, the empirical evidence points both to the rarity of cases which are in fact contests
of credibility, see Note, Rape Corroboration, supra note 5, and to the suspicion with which juries
consider the testimony of rape complainants, particularly in the absence of aggravating circumstances,
see, e.g., H. KALVFN & H. ZEiSEL, THE AMERICAN JURY 142 (1966). Moreover, the Code's corrobo-
ration rule is not limited to cases where there is concern about a motive to lie or about affording an
unfair advantage to one of two parties in a long-standing relationship. Indeed, the Code requires
corroboration even in cases where consent is not at issue. Where, for instance, the defense is misiden-
tification-which is common in traditional, stranger cases-the Code's position that "the court should
require some supporting evidence for whatever aspect of the case is most in issue," MODEL PENAL
CODE § 213.6 comment at 430 (1980), would require corroboration of the victim's identification-a
position whose justification cannot be the problems of consent, but must be the problems of rape
victims being particularly untrustworthy witnesses.
163. See 4 W. BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES* 211; 1 W. HAWKINS, HISTORY OF THE PLEAS OF
THE CROWN 22 (8th ed. 1824); MODEL PENAL CODE § 213.6(5) (1980).
164. MODEL PENAL CODE § 213.6 comment at 420 (1980). As the comment points out, id. at 420
& n.29, at least one American jurisdiction, Texas, had shortened the statute of limitations for rape to
one year, TEX. CODE CRIM. Ptoc. art. 12.03 (repealed 1974)-a period still four times longer than
that allowed for fresh complaints under the Code. After the Code was promulgated, several jurisdic-
tions followed it in requiring fresh complaints, although some were later repealed. See N.D. CENT.
CODE § 12.1-20-01(3) (1976 & Supp. 1983); UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-5-407 (1953); PA. CONS. STAT.
tit. 18, § 3105 (repealed 1976); N.H. REv. STAT. ANN. § 632-A:7 (1974) (six months for adults);
HAWAII REv. STAT. § 707-740 (1976) (one month); CONN. GEN. STAT. § 53a-69 (1985) (one year);
MODEL PENAL CODE § 213.6 comment at 421 (1980).
165. MODEL PENAL CODE § 213.6 comment at 421 (1980).
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offenses involving consensual relations" with underage girls, although the
rule is not so limited."'
The Code commentary on the fresh complaint rule is startingly atten-
tive to the problem of the vindictive, spurned woman, but silent about the
woman who legitimately worries about the receptiveness of police, prose-
cutors, juries and even friends or employers to a report that she was
raped. If the statistics are credited at all, rape's uniqueness comes not in
the disproportionate numbers of false complaints, but in the dispropor-
tionate numbers of cases that are never reported at all.167 That rape, par-
ticularly among acquaintances, is a strikingly underreported offense; that
the adverse consequences of pursuing a rape complaint may be substan-
tial; in short, that there may be legitimate reasons for delay, is not even
acknowledged by the Code. Instead, in order to protect men from an un-
substantiated risk of lies or blackmail, the Code imposes an initial statute
of limitations of unique and unheard-of brevity in the criminal law, re-
gardless of the circumstances or justifications for delay in the particular
case.
Even where there is both a fresh complaint and corroboration, the Code
is still unwilling to allow a jury simply to evaluate a woman's testimony
about a rape. Beyond the instruction that the jury must be persuaded be-
yond a reasonable doubt, the Code further requires that the jury also be
specifically warned "to evaluate the testimony of a victim or complaining
witness with special care in view of the emotional involvement of the wit-
ness and the difficulty of determining the truth with respect to alleged
sexual activities carried out in private.""" This "cautionary instruction"
very clearly says that all women who are forced to have sex have an
"emotional involvement" in the event and are therefore not to be totally
trusted in their recounting of it. The force of this instruction is, not unin-
tentionally I would think, likely to be greatest in those cases where there
is some prior "involvement," if not emotion, between the man and the
woman. But no woman is entirely above suspicion: "Objectivity" demands
that the jury be reminded to view the testimony of every victim or com-
plaining witness with the "special care" uniquely required in rape cases.
Men have written for decades, if not centuries, about women's rape
fantasies. But perhaps the better explanation for the law, as reflected in
the Code and commentaries, lies in the fantasies of men. The male rape
fantasy is not a pleasant dream. It is a nightmare of being caught in the
classic, non-traditional rape. A man engages in sex. Perhaps he's a bit
aggressive about it. The woman says no but doesn't fight very much. Fi-
166. Id.
167. See Note, Rape Corroboration, supra 5, at 1374-75; see also infra Part IV.
168. MODEL PENAL CODE § 213.6(5) (1980) (emphasis added).
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nally, she gives in. It's happened like this before, with other women, if not
with her. But this time is different: She charges rape. There were no
witnesses. It's his word against hers. At best, it's a contest of credibility,
and the jury is on her side: After all, he's an accused "rapist."
It is important to note that this is not simply a nightmare about women;
it is also, the Code's comments to the contrary notwithstanding, a
nightmare about juries, and about the unwillingness or inability of prose-
cutors to exercise screening discretion and judges to exercise meaningful
review. 6 9 Rape has long been viewed not only as a crime against women,
but also as a crime against the man who is entitled to exclusive possession
of that woman.170 The male nightmare is thus not simply the lying, con-
fused or ambivalent woman, but the men on the jury whose passions are
169. As noted earlier, in discussing the corroboration requirement, the Code comments eschew the
justification that juries will be prejudiced against a defendant because of the hostility generated by a
charge of rape, and recognize that juries are in fact reluctant to return rape convictions in the absence
of aggravating circumstances. MODEL PENAL CODE § 213.6 comment at 427-28 (1980) (citing H.
KALVEN & H. ZEISEL, supra note 162, at 29, 142). Yet if juries were not distrusted, then they could
be expected to recognize the "ambivalent" woman without the corroboration requirement, to take into
account the absence of a fresh complaint as one factor to be considered in judging her credibility, and
certainly to resolve the issues presented without the necessity of a cautionary instruction. While the
Code does not rest explicitly on jury distrust-perhaps because the weight of empirical evidence flows
so greatly the other way-its ultimate positions seem to incorporate it. In fact, it offers no alternative
justification for some rules, i.e., the fresh complaint rule. Virtually every court and author who has
ever agreed with these Code positions has done so explicitly on the ground of distrust of both juries
and women. See, e.g., Note, Corroborating Charges, supra note 6, at 1139 ("[it is important that the
conflict be resolved automatically because a jury-or even a judge-cannot always be trusted to re-
solve it fairly."); 3A J. WIGMORE, EVIDENCE § 924(a), at 736-37 (Chadbourn ed. 1970); 1 M.
HALE, supra note 15, at 636; Roberts v. State, 106 Neb. 362, 366-67, 183 N.W. 555, 557 (1921);
State v. Connelly, 57 Minn. 482, 486, 59 N.W. 479, 481 (1894); see also, Note, Rape Corroboration,
supra note 5, at 1378-82.
170. Deuteronomy punished the rape of an unbetrothed virgin by requiring the man to marry the
woman and pay fifty shekels to her father. Deuteronomy 22:28-29. See generally Gold & Wyatt, The
Rape System: Old Roles and New Times, 27 CATH. U. L. REV. 695, 696-700 (1978). Freud viewed
the "exclusive right of possession of a woman" as the "essence of monogamy;" and the "demand that
the girl shall bring with her into marriage with one man no memory of sexual relations with another"
as a "logical consequence" of that right. 4 S. FREUD, COLLECTED PAPERS 217 (Riviere's trans. 1925).
An author in the Yale Law Journal, putting Freud's views in the legal context, asserted:
The consent standard in our society does more than protect a signficant item of social currency
for women; it fosters, and is in turn bolstered by, a masculine pride in the exclusive possession
of a sexual object. The consent of a woman to sexual intercourse awards the man a privilege of
bodily access, a personal "prize" whose value is enhanced by sole ownership. . . . Words like
"ravaged" and "despoiled" used to describe the rape victim reflect the notion of a stain attach-
ing to the body of the girl. The man responds to this undercutting of his status as "possessor"
of the girl with hostility toward the rapist; no other restitution device is available. The law of
rape provides an orderly outlet for his vengeance.
Note, Forcible and Statutory Rape, supra note 6, at 72-73 (footnotes omitted).
Notably, in this account of the crime, the woman victim is nearly invisible. Cf. S. BROWNMILLER,
supra note 4, at 15 (rape is "nothing more or less than a conscious process of intimidation by which
all men keep all women in a state of fear"). Instead, rape emerges as a conflict between and among
men, with one man's woman used wrongly by another. Cf. E. CLEAVER, SOUL ON ICE 14 (1968):
Rape was an insurrectionary act. It delighted me that I was defying and trampling upon the
white man's law, upon his system of values, and that I was defiling his women-and this
point, I believe, was the most satisfying to me because I was very resentful over the historical
fact of how the white man had used the black woman.
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inflamed by the violation of rape. It is "because the crime of rape arouses
emotions as do few others,' 17'  because of "the respect and sympathy natu-
rally felt by any tribunal for a wronged female,"17 2 because "[p]ublic sen-
timent seems preinclined to believe a man guilty of any illicit sexual of-
fense he may be charged with,"1M that juries cannot be trusted.
Actual occurrence of the male fantasy has never been substantiated by
an empirical study. According to what we do know, the nightmare case is
highly unlikely even to be reported to the police, let alone prosecuted;
cases that are simply credibility contests are virtually non-existent; and
juries tend to be highly suspicious of rape complainants, particularly in
the non-traditional, non-stranger rape.1 7' The fantasy, in short, appears
to be just that. Yet it lives on in the "objective rules" of the Model Penal
Code, which impose obstacles in not only the non-traditional cases, which
would appear to be their raison d'etre, but in all rapes.
The final objective rule of the Code explicitly downgrades the serious-
ness of the non-traditional rape in which there was a prior relationship of
intimacy. Forcible rapes are graded by the Code according to two factors.
If serious bodily injury is inflicted, forcible rape is a first degree felony. If
there is no serious bodily injury, then the grading of rape depends entirely
on the relationship between victim and defendant and the circumstances of
their encounter: It is a first degree felony if "the victim was not a volun-
tary social companion of the actor upon the occasion of the crime and had
not previously permitted him sexual liberties."' 75 If the two are married,
or even living as husband and wife, it is no crime at all.'1 6
171. Note, Corroborating Charges, supra note 6, at 1139.
172. 3 J. WIGMORE, EVIDENCE § 924a, at 459 (Chadbourn ed. 1970).
173. Roberts v. State, 106 Neb. 362, 367, 183 N.W. 555, 557 (1921).
174. See Note, Rape Corroboration, supra note 5, at 1382-85; H. KALVEN & H. ZESEL, supra
note 162, at 141-42, 249-54. Nor do the Code commentators claim otherwise; to the extent that they
respond to the empirical evidence, it is by claiming: "[t]hat the existence of a rule of corroboration
may not make much difference lends as much support to retention as it does to repeal." MODEL
PENAL CODE § 213.6 comment at 429 (1980). But that rationale ignores not only the individual case
where corroboration will exclude a meritorious charge (even a traditional stranger rape may be uncor-
roborated), but also ignores the symbolic importance of "encasling] . . .in a rule of law" (the com-
mentators' own phrase for a rule that they do not like, see id. at 305-06) a requirement which
inevitably communicates the message that rape is different than all other crimes because its victims
(women) are not to be trusted.
175. MODEL PENAL CODE § 213.1(1) (1980). In other words, armed rape which does not result
in serious bodily injury is a first degree felony unless there is a prior relationship of "sexual
liberties."
176. MODEL PENAL CODE § 213.6(2) (1980). Under the Code's provision, a legal marriage is not
required to get you inside the marital exemption from the rape law, but a legal separation is required
to get you out. While the marital exemption is not a focus of this piece, the Code's justification of it is
too striking to ignore. The commentators recognize that the historical basis of this exception "probably
lies" in the conception of the "wife as chattel." MODEL PENAL CODE § 213.1 comment at 343 (1980).
But its retention, they argue, is necessary to avoid the "unwarranted intrusion of the penal law into
the life of the family." To punish a man for forcibly raping his wife "would thrust the prospect of
criminal sanctions into the ongoing process of adjustment in the marital relationship." Id. at 345. The
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Prior relationship is regularly considered by police and prosecutors in
exercising their discretion and screening complaints."" But I know of no
other instance, either in the Model Penal Code or, for that matter, in any
other Code, where the prior relationship between the victim and the of-
fender determines liability in the actual provision of the substantive crimi-
nal law.
The commentators provide two reasons for the inclusion of a provision
downgrading prior relationship cases. First, the authors are of the view
that when a prior relationship existed, "the gravity of the wrong is argua-
bly less severe. '178 Contrary to the commentators' view, however, many
women report that they feel greater injury and betrayal when raped by
someone they know than by someone they do not.'7
While degree of injury may be a debatable matter, the commentators'
second justification for reliance on prior relationship is not. According to
the Code, the absence of a prior sexual relationship is "strong objective
corroboration of the fact that the sexual act was accomplished by imposi-
tion," 1 0 while "[ilts presence reduces confidence in the conclusion of ag-
gression and nonconsent."' s
The practical reality has long been that rapes by intimates, in order to
result in convictions, must have caused more physical harm than rapes by
strangers, precisely because the problems of proof are greater in such
cases. The presence of a prior sexual relationship is always considered
relevant evidence of consent, even where a rape shield law otherwise lim-
its the admissibility of the victim's prior sexual conduct or reputation.18 2
Police, prosecutors and juries tend to be particularly skeptical of such
complaints, and relatively few cases result in convictions."' 8 The fact that
there was a prior relationship and voluntary social companionship, and
that a prosecutor is nonetheless willing to prosecute and a jury willing to
convict (or a defendant to plead), ought signal us that we are dealing with
a particularly clearcut and brutal case of rape or a particularly dangerous
explanation should be familiar to anyone who has heard the argument that domestic beatings should
not be considered crimes either. Marital rape would, in practice, be the most difficult to prove, pre-
cisely because of assumptions of consent. The law must be clear and provide fair warning, but where
the woman is willing to prosecute, and a jury is willing to convict, forcible rape should not be consid-
ered a part of the "life of the family" whose sanctity we need worry about preserving.
177. See infra text accompanying notes 289-97.
178. MODEL PENAL CODE § 213.1 comment at 307 (1980). They do not say how or why they
think that this is so.
179. See D. RussELL, supra note 4, at 71. In contrast, robberies and assaults are graded not by
whether you know your assailant but by whether he is armed. An ex-boyfriend who places a loaded
pistol against your temple may be every bit as frightening-and as dangerous-as a stranger who does
SO.
180. MODEL PENAL CODE § 213.1 comment at 307 (1980).
181. Id. at 280.
182. See Bienen, supra note 25, at 197; Berger, supra note 5, at 58-59.
183. See infra text accompanying notes 278-305.
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felon. Yet it is in precisely these cases that the Code's gradation rule limits
the prosecutor's hand in charging and plea bargaining, and protects the
rapist from the most serious penalties.
2. Gross Sexual Imposition
The Model Penal Code provides third degree felony liability when a
man "compels" a woman (not his wife) to submit to intercourse "by any
threat that would prevent resistance by a woman of ordinary resolu-
tion. ' " The offense of gross sexual imposition, like the offense of forcible
rape, is limited by the corroboration, fresh complaint, and cautionary in-
struction rules. But it suggests an understanding of coercion potentially
far more expansive than that usually found in statutes or opinions.
Just how all-encompassing this new crime could be is a source of some
concern in the Commentaries. Gross sexual imposition is, to be sure, a
lesser offense than rape. But it is also an offense that is defined according
to a supposedly "objective" male understanding of the female will to re-
sist, and limited by an uncertain line between coercion and bargain in
male-female relations.
The requirement that the threat be such as would prevent resistance
"by a woman of ordinary resolution" is intended to provide an "objective
requirement of minimal gravity." While the "woman of ordinary resolu-
tion," unlike the reasonable man, is hardly "a staple of the law," it was
"thought to be sufficiently meaningful in context to achieve the essential
purpose of eliminating cases of intimidation by threat of remote or trivial
harm."185 The standard of the "woman of ordinary resolution" was
adopted as preferable to a formulation requiring a threat "reasonably cal-
culated to prevent resistance." The reason for the choice given was that:
The alternative would have raised problems of the actor's anticipa-
tion of the peculiar effect of a given threat on the individual in ques-
tion. The present version achieves a more manageable inquiry into
the gravity of the threat. Moreover, it focuses clearly on the coercive
conduct and state of mind of the actor.18
Both approaches, it bears emphasizing, phrase the inquiry in terms of
resistance: A prohibited threat is one that would prevent resistance. 8
Thus, neither resolves the problem that resistance defined in male
184. MODEL PENAL CODE § 213.1(2) (1980).
185. MODEL PENAL CODE § 213.1 comment at 313 (1980).
186. Id.
187. The Model Penal Code's reliance on resistance as definitive is particularly striking in view
of the comments' criticism of the statutory use of "earnest resistance" in New York's definition of
prohibited force. See MODEL PENAL CODE § 213.1 comment at 278 (1980).
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terms-fighting back, as opposed to saying no and please don't and cry-
ing-may not be the usual response of most women to threats of either
physical or economic force.
Still, the rejected approach at least judges the man's intention with re-
spect to this woman. The approach adopted by the Code, by contrast,
judges the woman; and it does so by comparing her submission to an ex-
ternal standard of when other women (as viewed by men) would resist.
The rejected approach asks if the actor, in making the threat to this
particular woman, did so with the knowledge (or at least knowledge of the
risk) that it would lead her to submit. It matters not at all if she is "in-
credibly gullible, trusting and naive," as the victim in Evans 188 was, as
long as he knows it, which he certainly did. Or, to take the example of the
Lester case, 8 ' a threat to expose nude pictures might, for aspiring Play-
boy centerfolds, be no threat at all; for a young and modest woman it
would be a serious threat indeed. The question for the man is not how
other women, let alone the mythical "woman of ordinary resolution,"
would react, but how this woman would; and it is he, not the woman,
who is judged.
In contrast, the approach of the Code and Commentaries shows great
concern for protecting the man who makes a "trivial" threat which has an
unusual effect on this particular woman. In such cases, "the male may
make the plausible assumption that the woman's acquiescence has as
much to do with his own attractiveness as with the prospect of threatened
harm." 90 But gross sexual imposition is not a strict liability offense; as
long as the reasonable calculation must be made by the man (and that is
how the rejected standard reads), and as long as a mens rea of at least
recklessness is required (and it is), there is no danger that a man will be
found guilty on the basis of a threat which he reasonably assumed would
be considered trivial and which the woman for some reason unknown to
him considered substantial. The difference between the rejected and
adopted standards is that the first punishes a man when he knowingly
preys on a vulnerable or naive woman, while the other not only protects a
man's right to do so, but accomplishes this result by judging her to be sub-
par-not up to the standard of the woman of "ordinary resolution."
How great a difference there will be in practice depends on what at-
tributes we attach to the "woman of ordinary resolution." That is a com-
plicated task. The goal of much of liberal feminism, and of much Title
VII litigation, has been to attack stereotypes of women as weak, passive,
188. People v. Evans, 85 Misc. 2d 1088, 1091, 379 N.Y.S.2d 912, 915 (Sup. Ct.), affd mem. 55
A.D.2d 858, 390 N.Y.S.2d 768 (1975).
189. State v. Lester, 321 S.E.2d 166 (N.C. Ct. App. 1984).
190. MODEL PENAL CODE § 213.1 comment at 313 (1980).
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and deserving of special protection from the state-as different from men.
To argue for a characterization of "the woman of ordinary resolution"
that includes all of those stereotyped characteristics seems uncomfortably
inconsistent with the goal of eliminating them. Not to do so, however, is to
blink at the reality of women's vulnerability, and is therefore to leave
them vulnerable.1 1
The efforts to define the well-known "reasonable man" provide little
guidance in the task." While the reasonable man is itself far from an
"objective" and "manageable" standard, at least it tends to be a standard
applied by men to other men. The definition of the "woman of ordinary
resolution" is in the hands of men. The jury that applies the standard
may be composed of both men and women, but it is not their interpreta-
tion of the woman's resolution, but their understanding of the defendant's
understanding, which is controlling. Because gross sexual imposition re-
quires a mens rea of at least recklessness, it is not enough to find that the
woman of ordinary resolution would have succumbed to the threat that
was made. Mens rea also requires that the jury must find that the man, in
making the threat, knew, or at least was aware of the risk, that the wo-
man would succumb. Thus, liability turns on the jury's judgment both of
the woman's response and of the man's assessment (through the mens rea
requirement) of the woman's response.
A further constraint on the offense of gross sexual imposition is, accord-
ing to the Commentators, implicit in the requirement that the threat
"compel" the woman to submit:
The threat must be such that submission by the female results from
coercion rather than bargain. This inquiry into the essential charac-
ter of the threat is distinct from, though complementary to, the re-
191. A similar problem of characterization is faced when a woman claims self-defense to an as-
sault-as in State v. Wanrow, 88 Wash. 2d 221, 559 P.2d 548 (1977) (en banc)-and the reasonable-
ness of her conduct must be judged. See Schneider, Equal Rights to Trial for Women: Sex Bias in the
Law of Self-Defense, 15 HARv. C.R.-C.L. L. REv. 623 (1980); MacKinnon, Toward a Feminist
Jurisprudence (Book Review), 34 STAN. L. REv. 703 (1982).
192. The Model Penal Code, in defining negligence, refers to the care that would be exercised by
a reasonable person in the actor's situation. The comment explains the compromise inherent in
"situation":
There is an inevitable ambiguity in "situation." If the actor were blind or if he had just
suffered a blow or experienced a heart attack, these would certainly be facts to be considered in
a judgment involving criminal liability, as they would be under traditional law. But the hered-
ity, intelligence or temperament of the actor would not be held material in judging negligence,
and could not be without depriving the criterion of all its objectivity. The Code is not intended
to displace discriminations of this kind, but rather to leave the issue to the courts.
MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.02(2)(c) comment at 242 (1980). See also Bedder v. Director of Pub. Prose-
cutions, [1954] All E.R. 801 (discussing reasonable man standard in manslaughter context); Director
of Pub. Prosecutions v. Camplin, [1978] All E.R. 168 (same); Williams, Provocation and the Reason-
able Man, I CRim. L. REv. 740 (1954); Cal. Senate Bill No. 54 (1981) (overruling diminished
capacity defense in California).
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quirement that it achieve a gravity sufficient to "prevent resistance
by a woman of ordinary resolution." Thus, if a wealthy man were to
threaten to withdraw financial support from his unemployed girl-
friend, it is at least arguable under the circumstances that he is mak-
ing a threat "that would prevent resistance by a woman of ordinary
resolution." The reason why this case is excluded from liability...
is not the gravity of the harm threatened-it may be quite substan-
tial-but its essential character as part of a process of bargain. He is
not guilty of compulsion overwhelming the will of his victim but
only of offering her an unattractive choice to avoid some unwanted
alternative.193
As the Code commentators recognize, extortion law also requires the
drawing of lines between coercion and bargain. Interestingly enough, the
Code section on extortion is not limited to threats that a reasonable man
or person would find irresistable. Objectivity in extortion law is served not
by focusing on the victim, but by defining a rather long list of threats that
are prohibited as a means of securing money. Included in the list are
threats to commit any criminal offense, to accuse anyone of a criminal
offense, to expose any secret tending to subject any person to contempt or
ridicule, to take or withhold action as an official, to bring about or con-
tinue a strike, to testify or withhold testimony, or, in the catch-all provi-
sion, to inflict any other harm that would not benefit the actor.1 94
The Code recognizes that coercion-for sex as for money-is not lim-
ited to threats of bodily injury. But equivalent prohibitions are not pro-
vided: The protection afforded to women's bodily integrity depends on
how men conceive and judge the fortitude of the woman of ordinary reso-
lution and on where the line is drawn between coercion and bargain.
B. The Michigan Statute
The Michigan reform statute was largely the work of the Michigan
Women's Task Force on Rape. As one study put it: "Forming coalitions
with 'law and order' legislators concerned with the increasing frequency
of the crime and mobilizing statewide support through a newsletter, the
media, and intense lobbying efforts, the Michigan Task Force on Rape
passed a bill in 1975 that remains the most comprehensive and innovative
statute of its kind. '195 The statute has also been a lightning rod, praised
193. MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.13.1 comment at 314 (1980).
194. MODEL PENAL CODE § 223.4 comment at 201 (1980); see also W. LAFAvE & A. ScoTT,
supra note 87, at 704.
195. J. MARSH, A. GEtsTr & N. CAPLAN, supra note 138, at 23. The coalition with law-and-
order groups is a typical characteristic of feminist efforts to reform rape laws. According to one
author:
If feminists had not allied themselves with law-and-order groups, the recent backlash against
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by some writers as model legislation... and roundly denounced by others
as "plainly unacceptable" and a good example of an "overreaction" to
political pressures by the commentators of the Model Penal Code.
197
The Michigan model is, in many respects, the counterpoint to the
Model Penal Code. The Model Penal Code punishes rape by men against
women; Michigan's crime of criminal sexual conduct can be committed by
any person. Felony liability under the Model Penal Code is limited to
sexual interourse; in Michigan, sexual conduct is broadly defined to in-
clude not only penetration with objects, but offensive sexual contact. In
the Model Penal Code, the focus remains on the victim; in Michigan, it is
almost exclusively on the actor. The key to the Michigan statute is "force
or coercion" by the actor. But in its definition of "force or coercion,"
Michigan ultimately does not move very far beyond the Model Penal
Code and its traditional understanding of rape.198
The expansion of the crime to include male victims and female offend-
ers is a common element of reform statutes.19' Similarly, the change in
labels-from rape to criminal sexual conduct or assault-is not unique to
Michigan. By renaming "rape," reformers have sought to rid the crime of
its common law baggage of unique rules (in Model Penal Code terms,
"objective" rules) of resistance and proof.
However well-intentioned, these changes risk obscuring the unique
meaning and understanding of the indignity and harm of "rape." Rape is
a different and more serious affront than assault. Women who have been
raped are very clear that they have not only been beaten or assaulted. As
one woman testified in opposition to changing the name of the crime in
Washington:
the women's movement might have blocked the enactments of reform legislation in many
states.
Bienen, supra note 25, at 171 n.1. Yet, notwithstanding the alliances with law-and-order, women
have-in Michigan and elsewhere-played the leading role. J. MARSH, A. GaIST & N. CAPLAN,
supra note 138, at 18-19; Bienen, supra note 25, at 171 n.3 ("men are rarely committed to the
enormous political effort required to enact rape reform legislation").
196. See Bienen, supra note 25, at 172 (the Michigan statute "continues to be the most important
model for reform"); Note, Recent Statutory Developments, supra note 5, at 1502 (Michigan statute
"is already being presented as a model in numerous jurisdictions").
197. MODEL PENAL CODE § 213.1 comments at 298 (1980). The comments do acknowledge,
however, the importance of the Michigan statute as a model for other states. Id. at 286, 300. See, e.g.,
MINN. STAT. ANN. §§ 609.341-.349 (West. Supp. 1985); COL. REV. STAT. §§ 18-3-401-410 (1973
& Supp. 1985); N.J. STAT. ANN. §§ 14-1-14-3 (1982); Wis. STAT. ANN. § 940.225 (West Supp.
1985).
The Michigan statute also has the advantage of being one of the few that has been subject to any
serious empirical study as to its impact on the processing of cases in the criminal justice system, see J.
MARSH, A. GEIST & N. CAPLAN, supra note 138.
198. MIcH. CoMP. LAWS ANN. §§ 750.520a-.5201 (West 1985).
199. See Bienen, supra note 25, at 174-75; H. FEILD & L. BIENEN, supra note 135, at 153;
Note, Recent Statutory Developments, supra note 5, at 1513-14; MODEL PENAL CODE § 213.1 com-
ment at 335 n.169 (1980).
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I think rape is a particular crime. I think that it's different than
assault. People who commit rape commit it for different reasons than
people who commit assaults. Changing the name of the crime isn't
going to do any good. It's going to be throwing the issue under the
rug, so to speak. I think this would be very detrimental to our work
with rape victims, because rape is not simply a form of assault.2 00
Moreover, rape (at least as defined in traditional gender terms) does
raise unique and important issues of male and female power. It invokes
the differences in male and female ways of understanding force and con-
sent, and each other. Defining the crime in terms of "actors" and "vic-
tims" neither resolves those conflicts nor changes the empirical realities of
male abuse of women. But it may sweep them under the rug, thus raising
questions from a feminist standpoint about the decision in Michigan, and
the near-unanimity in the law reform community, that rape, or better yet
"assault" or "criminal sexual conduct," should be defined in gender-
neutral terms.20 1
The Model Penal Code approach casts some light on the concerns un-
derlying the Michigan statute. The Code provides separate and less seri-
ous penalties for "deviate sexual intercourse by force or imposition,"
which is defined in gender-neutral terms. 22 Deviate sexual intercourse is
at most a second degree felony, whereas (male on female) rape in identical
circumstances may be a first degree felony. Moreover, certain cases of
forced, non-consensual sex are not prohibited at all when men are the
victims. Because only "deviate sexual intercourse," defined to mean "in-
tercourse per os or per anum between human beings who are not husband
and wife," is covered by section 213.2, conventional vaginal intercourse
between a man and woman who uses force, threats of force, or other
threats that "would prevent resistance by a person of ordinary resolution"
are not prohibited at all. The Code comments respond to these differences
200. See Loh, The Impact of Common Law and Reform Rape Statutes on Prosecution: An Em-
pirical Study, 55 WASH. L. REa. 543, 553 n.51 (1980).
201. See, e.g., Note, Rape and Rape Laws: Sexism in Society and the Law, 61 CAUF. L. REv.
919, 941 (1973):
Men who are sexually assaulted should have the same protection as female victims, and
women who sexually assault men or other women should be as liable for conviction as conven-
tional rapists. Considering rape as a sexual assault rather than as a special crime against
women might do much to place rape law in a healthier perspective and to reduce the mythical
elements that have tended to make rape laws a means of reinforcing the status of women as
sexual possessions.
See also Bienen, supra note 25, at 174-75; Note, Recent Statutory Developments, supra note 5, at
1513-14 (gender neutrality set forth as way "to eliminate the traditional attitude that the victim is
expected to resist earnestly to protect her virginity, her female 'virtue,' or her marital fidelity"). As of
1980, well over half of all American jurisdictions had adopted or at least considered a gender-neutral
definition of both victim and offender. See MODEL PENAL CODE § 213.1 comment at 335 n.169
(1980).
202. MODEL PENAL CODE § 213.2 (1980).
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by suggesting that they may be justified, or at least that it is a close
question:
On the one hand, the male who is forced to engage in intercourse is
denied freedom of choice in much the same way as the female victim
of rape. On the other hand, the potential consequences of coercive
intimacy do not seem so grave. For one thing there is no prospect of
unwanted pregnancy. And however devalued virginity has become
for the modem woman, it is difficult to believe that its loss consti-
tutes a comparable injury to the male.203
The Code comments make the approach of the feminist law reformers in
seeking gender neutrality understandable, if not ideal.
The name chosen in Michigan to replace "rape" is significant as well.
To relabel rape "criminal sexual conduct" is, perhaps only accidentally, to
assume a position in a debate of some vigor as to whether rape should be
thought about as sex or as violence. The "rape as sex" position has been
articulated by individuals ranging from feminist theoreticians who argue
for a more expansive understanding of coerced sex20" to the judge in a
well-publicized South Carolina case who thought that convicted rapists
should have a choice between castration and imprisonment."0 5 The "rape
as violence" position, said to be the response of "liberal" (as opposed to
radical) feminists,20 ' seems to me the better approach both theoretically
and strategically: Focusing on the violent aspects of rape makes clear that
you are not trying to prohibit all sex and that violent men (such as the
rapists in that South Carolina case) must not only be treated as sexually
aberrant, but also be incapacitated as dangerous to the community.20
7
Moreover, to see rape as violence is, one hopes, to recognize that sex
should be inconsistent with violence, a message which is needed precisely
because violence in sex has been accepted by so many as normal. The
problem is that a man can also force a nonconsenting woman to engage in
sex without resort to actual "violence." Power will do. The "rape as vio-
lence" approach may strengthen the case for punishing violently coerced
sex, but it may do so at the cost of obscuring the case for punishing forced
sex in the absence of physical violence. On this point, Michigan is curi-
203. MODEL PENAL CODE § 213.1 comment at 338 (1980).
204. See MacKinnon, supra note 4, at 646; see generally D. RussELL, supra note 4; A. MEDEA
& K. THOMPSON, supra note 4; L. CLARK & D. LEwiS, RAPE: THE PRICE OF COERCIVE SEXUAL-
rry (1977).
205. See Goldfarb, Practice of Using Castration as Sentence Being Questioned, 15 CRIM. JuST.
NEWSLETTER, Feb. 15, 1985, at 3. The castration option in the South Carolina case was ultimately
reversed on appeal. State v. Brown, 284 S.C. 407, 326 S.E.2d 410 (1985).
206. See MacKinnon, supra note 4, at 646.
207. See S. BROWNMII.ER, supra note 4 (describing rape in riots, wars, pogrom).
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ously ambivalent. While the statute writers relabel rape as a crime of
"sexual conduct," the force and coercion that are required to make sexual
conduct criminal largely limits the statute's application to cases of conven-
tional violence.
Michigan's definition of "sexual conduct" itself stands in sharp contrast
to the traditional intercourse requirement that has been criticized as a
male understanding of what constitutes sex and sexual violation. 0 8 First,
Michigan's definition of sexual penetration goes beyond even most reform
laws in including not only oral and anal intercourse, but also "any other
intrusion, however slight, of any part of a person's body or of any object
into the genital or anal openings of another person's body."' 20 9 The prob-
lem here, as in many places in this statute, is that while it is easy to think
of cases (rape with a Coke bottle) where penetration by an object is as
serious, and potentially more dangerous, as the traditional form, it is also
easy to think of cases (an "unacceptabl[y]" performed medical examina-
tion, which is included in the definition of force) 10 where penetration is
not as serious and should plainly not be included. The Michigan statute
fails to draw such distinctions.
Second, the Michigan statute moves beyond any requirement of pene-
tration by its inclusion of "sexual contact" as a felony punishable by a
prison sentence of up to 15 years where aggravating factors are present.211
Sexual contact is defined to include any intentional touching of intimate
parts of either the victim or the actor, or the clothing covering them, if
that intentional touching can "reasonably be construed" as being for the
purpose of sexual arousal or gratification. The Model Penal Code com-
mentaries see the quoted Michigan standard as totally unacceptable:
Permitting conviction against such a standard is unduly harsh, even
draconian, given the petty nature of many forms of "sexual contact"
as defined and the unlikelihood in many situations that the "victim"
will be seriously offended. There are also substantial fair warning
arguments that could be made against a standard so vaguely
worded. 12
It is not the notion of sexual arousal or gratification per se that troubles
208. See MacKinnon, supra note 4, at 647.
209. MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 750.520a(B)(1) (West Supp. 1985).
210. Id. at § 750.520b(o(iv) (defining force or coercion to include circumstances "[wihen the actor
engages in the medical treatment or examination of the victim in a manner or for purposes which are
medically recognized as unethical or unacceptable").
211. Id. at § 750.520c(2). In the absence of aggravating factors, criminal sexual contact is a nis-
demeanor punishable by imprisonment for not more than 2 years, by a fine of not more than $500.00,
or both. Id. at § 750.520e.
212. MODEL PENAL CODE § 213.1 comment at 298 (1980).
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the commentators, but the notion of what "can reasonably be construed"
by a jury. The suggestion that it is somehow impossible for a jury to
determine according to a standard of reasonableness the purpose of a de-
fendant's actions would, if accepted elsewhere, be a wholesale indictment
of the Code's definitions of mens rea, which require precisely such deter-
minations.21 Apparently, it is only when it comes to sexual contact that
an emphasis on a defendant's purpose and reasonableness becomes some-
how too indeterminate and too vaguely worded to afford fair warning.
More straightforward is the Code commentators' characterization of the
harm-of a "petty nature"-and of their view of "the unlikelihood in
many situations that the 'victim' will be seriously offended."' " The quo-
tation marks suggest that she is not to be considered a victim at all.
Attitudes such as those of the Code commentators explain the Michigan
statute. To be out jogging and have one's breast grabbed by a man who
jumps from behind a tree, to take a common example, is not a "petty"
indignity; the woman is a victim, and she is likely to be seriously offended.
In some respects, the Michigan statute may be an overreaction to these
attitudes, although there is surely a great deal to overreact to. To impose
the maximum authorized sentence of fifteen years for aggravated sexual
contact (where bodily injury results) might well be unduly harsh, not be-
cause the standard of sexual contact is too amorphous and not because the
offense is victimless but because, particularly in view of the statute's broad
definition of bodily injury, the sentence might be disproportionate both to
the harm and to sentences for other crimes of assault and battery. But to
say that forcibly fondling a woman's body, or forcing her to fondle and
stimulate a man's, is-as the Model Code provision would have it-the
criminal equivalent of surreptitiously grabbing her wallet from her pock-
etbook 215 is to denigrate the personal integrity of men and women.
213. Nor does it appear to be especially difficult here where the purpose must be sexual: The
intent of the drafters is, quite clearly, to distinguish the man who pushes or shoves a woman out of his
way, and may touch her breast in the process, from the man who intentionally reaches for the breast
to fondle it. There is no reason to think juries incapable of drawing and applying such a distinction,
and the Code offers no parade of horrible hypotheticals which might confuse them.
The problem remains (in theory, if not likely in practice) of what to do in cases where a jury
concludes that a defendant's intentional actions were, according to an external standard of reasonable-
ness, for the purpose of sexual gratification, but the defendant himself lacked that purpose or, per-
haps, did not even realize the risk. Such cases would, of course, be rare: It would be very difficult to
convince a jury that the purpose as it appeared externally was not in fact the defendant's purpose. Cf.
notes 30-39 and accompanying text. Whether such cases would be covered by the statute depends on
whether the required "purpose of sexual gratification" is that of the defendant (at least recklessness)
or that of a reasonable man (negligence). A felony term for the latter seems particularly harsh, not
because of the problems of vagueness stressed in the Model Penal Code, but because of the lack of (or
at least reduced) criminal intent.
214. MODEL PENAL CODE § 213.1 comment at 298 (1980).
215. The Code punishes as a misdemeanor sexual assault, defined in the case of competent adults
to include:
A person who has sexual contact with another not his spouse, or causes such other to have
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The breadth of Michigan's understanding of "sexual conduct" is not
well-matched by its definition of what makes that conduct criminal. There
are four degrees of criminal sexual conduct under the Michigan approach.
Unlawful "sexual penetration" is punished as either criminal sexual con-
duct in the first degree (CSC1), with a penalty of imprisonment for life or
any term of years, or criminal sexual conduct in the third degree (CSC3),
punishable by imprisonment for not more than 15 years, depending on the
circumstances. The remaining two categories of criminal sexual con-
duct-the second and fourth degrees-are reserved for unlawful "sexual
contact. '2 16 With respect to normal adults, sexual penetration constitutes
CSCI, and sexual contact CSC2, if:
(c) Sexual penetration occurs under circumstances involving the
commission of any other felony.
(d) The actor is aided or abetted by 1 or more other persons and
.. . the actor uses force or coercion to accomplish the sexual
penetration ...
(e) The actor is armed with a weapon or any other article used or
fashioned in a manner to lead the victim to reasonably believe it to
be a weapon.
(f) The actor causes personal injury to the victim and force or
coercion is used to accomplish sexual penetration. Force or coercion
includes but is not limited to any of the following circumstances:
(i) When the actor overcomes the victim through the actual
application of physical force or physical violence.
(ii) When the actor coerces the victim to submit by threaten-
ing to use force or violence on the victim, and the victim be-
lieves that the actor has the present ability to execute these
threats.
(iii) When the actor coerces the victim to submit by threaten-
ing to retaliate in the future against the victim, or any other
person, and the victim believes that the actor has the ability to
execute this threat. As used in this subdivision, "to retaliate"
includes threats of physical punishment, kidnapping, or
extortion.
(iv) When the actor engages in the medical treatment or ex-
amination of the victim in a manner or for purposes which are
medically recognized as unethical or unacceptable. 1
sexual conduct [sic] with him, is guilty of sexual assault, a misdemeanor, if. . .he knows that
the contact is offensive to the other person. . . .Sexual contact is any touching of the sexual
or other intimate parts of the person for the purpose of arousing or gratifying sexual desire.
MODEL PENAL CODE § 213.4 (1980). The Code provision, it is worth noting, while similar in certain
respects to Michigan's, requires the government to prove in addition that the defendant knew that the
contact was offensive to the other person; even recklessness is not enough for misdemeanor liability.
216. The statute also provides penalties for the separate crime of assault with intent to commit
criminal sexual conduct. See MICH. CoMP. LAWS ANN. § 7 50.520g (West Supp. 1985).
217. Id. § 750.520b(1)(c)-(0(iv).
1153
The Yale Law Journal
Where the victim is a competent adult, the lesser offenses-CSC3 and
CSC4-depend solely on the presence of "force or coercion" as defined
.above.2 "' For all of these offenses, the statute provides that the testimony
of a victim need not be corroborated and that a victim "need not resist the
actor."
,219
"Force or coercion" are thus the key to the Michigan approach. Where
they are present, sex is a crime; if personal injury was inflicted or the
actor was aided by one or more individuals, it is an aggravated offense.
The word "nonconsent" never appears as a required circumstance of the
offense.
The Michigan statute's emphasis on force or coercion attempts to shift
the focus of rape prosecutions from what the victim does or does not do
(consent or resist) to the actions of the defendant. Moreover, because non-
consent is not an element of the crime, the message of the law may be that
violence is inconsistent with sex and that violent sex is prohibited regard-
less of any claimed consent. Yet if that is the point, it is one that is poorly
executed, to say the least.
First are problems of poor draftsmanship. 220 For example, the defini-
tion of force, consisting of either actual or threatened infliction of injury,
is limited solely to the victim; a threat to kill the victim's escort or child,
or the actual infliction of injury on another, does not come within the
stated definition of force or coercion.2 21 Inexplicably, in the succeeding
section, threats to retaliate in the future against the victim "or any other
person" are included.222
The problems go beyond poor draftsmanship, however. The inclusion
of medical treatment conducted in a medically unacceptable manner, while
novel,223 seems highly objectionable; why feminists would want to allow
218. Id. §§ 750.520d(1)(b); 750.520e(1)(a).
219. Id. §§ 750.520h-.520i.
220. The only instances in which sex (penetration or contact) is penalized in the absence of force
or coercion is where the act takes place "under circumstances involving the commission of any other
felony" or the actor is armed with a weapon. The former provision technically prohibits consensual,
nonviolent sex among kidnappers themselves; the latter includes by its terms any circumstances in
which the actor is armed with a weapon, even a lawfully registered weapon, regardless of whether he
ever brandishes it. Thus, consensual sex with a woman with a handgun in her pocketbook or with a
police officer is technically a first degree offense.
221. Id. § 750.520b(l)(f(ii).
222. Compare id. § 750.520b(1)(O(ii) ("on the victim") with id. § 750.520b(1)(f)(iii) ("against
the victim, or any other person"). Of course, a court could read the language defining force or coer-
cion as non-exclusive and include threats to others within its scope. But that is hardly an ideal re-
sponse in a criminal statute, one of whose purposes was to provide needed definitions for these terms.
Clarity is not simply desirable in criminal statutes; it is constitutionally required. Even if fair warning
is not a problem, the courts surely have been, from a feminist perspective. To leave it to the courts to
define force or coercion is to invite duplication of the pre-reform standards.
223. Id. § 750.520b(1)(f)(iv) ("When the actor engages in the medical treatment or examination
of the victim in a manner or for purposes which are medically recognized as unethical or
unacceptable.").
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the male-dominated medical profession to define as a crime punishable by
life imprisonment the failure to follow their standards for proper exami-
nations, childbirth or abortion, is frankly beyond me.
And yet in its other definitions, Michigan is painfully conventional.
The first and most basic definition of force or coercion-"when the actor
overcomes the victim through the actual application of physical force or
physical violence" 224 -invites application not only of the traditional,
schoolboy-fight definition of force, but also of the traditional requirements
of nonconsent; if "overcome" does not require nonconsent, it is hard to see
what it means. Moreover, the subsequent definitions of force wholly ig-
nore the reality illustrated by the cascs-that coercion of a woman need
not involve either actual violence or threats of future physical injury.225
Threats of retaliation, other than physical injury, kidnapping or extortion,
are not included; thus, if a man coerces a woman to engage in sex by
threatening to fire her from her job or destroy her property or reputation,
he has not used force or coercion within the definition of the statute.226 In
this sense, the Michigan statute actually appears to be narrower than the
Model Penal Code, which might at least prohibit such conduct as the
lesser offense of gross sexual imposition. The statute adds nothing to the
resolution of these cases, except, perversely, to make clear that the wo-
man's lack of consent is irrelevant to the determination of criminal
liability.
The elimination of consent as a defense where traditional violence and
threats are involved can be justified on either of two grounds: that lawful
sex ought to be inconsistent with violence (on grounds of either danger-
ousness or immorality); or that consent in such circumstances is meaning-
224. Id. § 750.520b(1)(O(i).
225. In the provisions of the statute relating to sexual conduct with those between the ages of 13
and 16, one of the aggravating circumstances is that "the actor is in a position of authority over the
victim and used this authority to coerce the victim to submit." Id. § 750.520b(1)(b)(iii). No similar
provision exists in the detailed definitions of force and coercion of adult women, and although these
definitions are said to be non-exclusive, the omission of a category specifically stated in another section
seems a most curious way of inviting courts to include it. The more logical explanation is that this
form of coercion is only punished when used against young women; older women are thus assumed to
be in a better position to "resist" coercion by teachers or bosses. As a "feminist" law reform approach,
such a strong focus on age seems curious, for one would think that a prime aim of feminist law reform
would be to make clear that it is power and powerlessness, not simply age, which leads to coercion
and submission. At best, the Michigan approach is unclear; at worst, it seems traditional in the most
oppressive form.
226. Under the terms of the Michigan statute, a threat to commit extortion "in the future" counts
as force. If the purpose of this provision was to expand liability for coercion to all those threats that
might qualify under the extortion statutes, it is one which is not accomplished by the words of the
statute, which speak of a threat to commit the actual crime of extortion in the future, not of inducing
submission to sex in the present through any threat which would be included within the scope of an
extortion statute. Moreover, the statute indiscriminately groups together those who threaten to commit
a first degree felony (murder) and those who threaten to commit what may be only a misdemeanor
(extortion), a result plainly inconsistent with any effort to expand liability by careful grading.
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less. But in reality, it is a very limited reform, particularly since the most
oppressive aspects of the consent standard are addressed by the existence
of an evidentiary shield law22 7 and the provision that resistance is not
required.228 What the Michigan statute does not address is the myriad of
situations in which a woman engages in sex without her consent though
traditional force is not applied.
Feminist reformers seeking to protect women from such threatening sit-
uations have only two choices: to focus on the man and seek to redefine
what is meant by force in broader terms; or to focus on the woman and
rely on her word as to nonconsent, properly defined (not saying yes, or at
least saying no). The Michigan statute, the supposed model of reform,
does neither. It neither empowers women to say no, harnessing the power
of criminal sanctions behind them, nor redefines the conditions of force
and coercion.
Finally, beyond differentiating between penetration and contact, the
Michigan statute fails meaningfully to staircase criminal sexual conduct.
To be sure, there are two degrees of criminal sexual penetration, CSC1
and CSC3. But force or coercion, defined in exactly the same terms, is the
common denominator of both. The infliction of "personal injury" deter-
mines whether a forcible rape by a single individual is CSCI or CSC3.
"'Personal injury' means bodily injury, disfigurement, mental anguish,
chronic pain, pregnancy, disease, or loss or impairment of a sexual or
reproductive organ."22
There is nothing unusual in the criminal law about tailoring liability to
the injury inflicted, even if that injury was at least partly fortuitous. Im-
pregnating a woman is just as much a foreseeable risk of rape, for which
the rapist can be held responsible, as hitting a pedestrian is a risk of driv-
ing recklessly. The Model Penal Code commentators see pregnancy as
insignificant; it "hardly seems to justify" a substantial difference in the
ranges of punishment.230 But a man who forces a woman to choose be-
tween abortion and carrying and bearing a child fathered by her rapist
has inflicted a terrible injury, at least from a woman's perspective.
The Michigan injury provision, which functions as the key grading
provision of this statute, encompasses all "mental anguish." It is hard to
227. Under the statute, evidence of prior sexual conduct by the victim is inadmissible unless the
judge finds that it is material to a fact in issue and that its inflammatory or prejudicial nature does not
outweigh its probative value. Id. § 750.520j.
228. Id. § 750.520i. Moreover, while the statute's silence as to consent would seem to reflect an
intention to "preclude a consent defense" in these circumstances, see Binan, supra note 25, at 181, the
Michigan courts have nonetheless construed the statute as implicitly preserving a consent defense, see
People v. Thompson, 117 Mich. App. 522, 324 N.W.2d 22 (1982); People v. Jansson, 116 Mich.
App. 674, 323 N.W.2d 508 (1982); People v. Hearn, 100 Mich. App. 749, 300 N.W.2d 396 (1980).
229. Id. § 750.520aj).
230. MODEL PENAL CODE § 213.1 comment at 296 (1980).
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imagine any forcible rape that would not result in "mental anguish" for
the victim, however; indeed, this is what makes rape a more serious of-
fense than other forms of assault. But if we are serious about staircasing,
then it will not do merely to say that all rapes are bad. The question
remains which rapists deserve greater punishment. The Michigan statute
succeeds in creating grades of the offense for the ad hoc use of prosecutors
in plea bargaining and of juries in reducing charges. But it does not suc-
ceed in meaningfully defining, from a feminist perspective or any other,
how liability should be graded.
While the Michigan statute expands what we think of as sex in its
definitions of penetration and contact, it does not really expand what we
think of as offensive sex. Beyond the problems of poor draftsmanship, the
Michigan statute does not meaningfully expand our notions of force or
threat. It does not recognize a woman's interest in saying no and in having
her word respected in situations where force or threats in traditional terms
are not present. To do so would, I believe, require a meaningful grading
system, which Michigan has failed to provide.
C. Epilogue: The Limits of Law Reform
Many of the goals of rape law reform cannot easily be tested by statisti-
cal studies. The decision whether to focus on the actor or the victim may
or may not have an impact on quantifiable events such as the reporting of
rapes and conviction rates, but it almost certainly will have an impact on
the experience of an individual victim as she proceeds through the system.
Similarly, eliminating legal rules that are premised on a stereotype of
women as vengeful liars or fantasizing cheats may or may not result in
more convictions, but it is critical in any conception of the law as a force
which seeks to reflect and even educate public sentiment. The rape reform
effort has been both an occasion for women to exercise power in the legis-
lative process and a part of a larger effort to change the way the law and
our society think about women, sex and sexuality.
The fact remains that both those who have favored and those who have
opposed different models of reform have done so on the assumption that
legislative changes would have some impact on the actual processing of
cases. The conflicting models of reform discussed in this Section are
clearly worthy of scrutiny as a theoretical matter. Whether and how much
difference these provisions and others influenced by them have made on
the system's operations is far from clear.
The record is scanty, but the results that have surfaced must be a disap-
pointment to the "reformers," however defined. The few "before and af-
ter" studies within particular jurisdictions suggest limited, if any, changes
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in the processing of rape cases in the aftermath of major law reform
enactments.
Professor Kenneth Polk examined arrest, conviction, and disposition
data from California for the years 1975-1982.2"1 He found no significant
increases in either the percentage of rape complaints that resulted in ar-
rest or the percentage of felony complaints that resulted in convictions.2" 2
The only dramatic trend occurred at sentencing, where the probability
that a convicted rapist would receive an institutional sentence increased
substantially. But that was equally true for homicide and burglary, and
seemed to reflect the move to determinate sentencing for all feloniis in
California, not the efforts of rape reformers.3 3 Indeed, increasing the se-
verity of sentences for individual rapists has not even been one of the
stated goals of feminist law reform.
2 34
Of course, focusing solely on clearance and conviction rates, as Profes-
sor Polk and some feminist commentators do, may mask changes, or even
work against them. The danger of such a focus is that it may encourage
precisely the sort of screening that strictly limits the definition of rape to
the most traditional model (violence among strangers) where convictions
are most certain, and eliminates from criminal penalties precisely those
cases at the margin (less violence, non-strangers) which should be subject
to criminal penalties, albeit reduced ones. Thus, while increasing convic-
tion rates was a stated purpose of law reform, to the extent that those
efforts were also intended to expand the scope of the crime of rape, their
success might well be evidenced by broader standards for prosecution
which would not necessarily result in higher rates of convictions. As it
231. Polk, Rape Reform and Criminal Justice Processing, 31 CRIME & DELINQUENCY 191
(1985); see also Galvin & Polk, Attrition in Rape Case Processing: Is Rape Unique?, 20 J. RE-
SEARCH IN CRIME & DELINQUENCY 126 (1983).
232. As for convictions, no trend can be observed as to when felony convictions are considered as a
percentage of felony complaints filed; rape, with conviction rates in the high-50% to mid-60% range, is
significantly lower than murder, somewhat lower than robbery, similar to burglary and higher than
assault. A slight upward trend appears when the calculation is made in terms of all those arrested for
the offense, as opposed to felony complaints filed; the author explains this increase as reflecting the
slight increase in the probability that rape cases will be filed as felonies. Polk, supra note 231, at
197-99.
233. Id. at 199. Upwards trends, though not as strong, were found for robbery and assault. De-
terminate sentencing took effect in California in 1976, and the sentence ranges were increased in
1978.
234. Quite the contrary, the severe punishments for a single crime of rape have been viewed as a
significant deterrent to convictions, and it was hoped by some that grading systems providing for lesser
offenses and lesser punishments would increase conviction rates. See Bienen, supra note 25. Thus, it
was thought that juries were reluctant to convict given the severity of the offense, and might be more
willing to convict were lesser punishments available. The reality, of course, is that the overwhelming
majority of cases are resolved not by jury trials but by plea bargaining. Id. at 177. Moreover, the
Washington study, Loh, supra note 200, at 591-98, discussed below, suggests that within the old
structure, lesser penalties were available through charges and convictions of assault. The grading
schemes may improve labeling in these cases (by calling it rape 3 instead of assault), without having
any necessary impact on conviction rates.
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happens, Professor Wallace Loh, in his study of the Washington reform
statute, went beyond the disposition statistics in search of just such
changes-and found none.
Professor Loh examined the charging and disposition of 445 rape com-
plaints filed by the police with the Kings County (Seattle) Prosecuting
Attorney between 1972 and 1977, before and after the Washington rape
reform law took effect on July 1, 1975.2"5 He found that the reform law
had no impact on the proportion of cases charged.2"' Prior to reform, of
those cases presented by police for prosecution, 51% were filed as rape,
16% as carnal knowledge (statutory rape), 13% as another offense (other),
and 20% were declined for prosecution. Under the new law, 51% were
filed as (first, second, or third degree) rape, 19% as statutory rape, 10% as
other, and 19% declined. Moreover, "[t]here are practically no noteworthy
distinctions in the setting, circumstances, and evidentiary background, or
in the personal characteristics of victims and suspects, between the cases
presented for prosecution before and after the law reform. 1117
As for the decisionmaking process in charging, the impact of the reform
statute has been "negligible."2 8 The five most important factors in decid-
ing whether or not to charge, under both the old and the new statutes,
were, in descending order of importance, the amount of physical force, the
social interaction between suspect and victim prior to the alleged rape,
corroborative evidence, victim credibility and race.239
The most significant change Loh found as a result of reform was the
more accurate labeling of convicted offenders. Under the old statute, 37%
of those charged with rape were convicted of rape, and 35% were con-
victed of another crime; the total conviction rate was thus 72%. Under the
new law, 56% of those charged with rape are convicted of rape, and 15%
are convicted of another crime; the total conviction rate is 71%. The over-
all conviction rate thus remains unchanged, but more accurate labels are
now placed on convicted offenders (that is, they are convicted of "rape"
rather than "assault"). 240
235. Loh, supra note 200, at 585.
236. Id. at 601.
237. Id. at 603 (footnotes omitted).
238. Id. at 613.
239. Id. at 605. The only surprising application of any of these factors was race: It was not
minority victim/minority suspect cases that were most likely to be declined, as had been found in
other studies and as was true under the old statute, but those involving black suspects and white
victims. The author found "no adequate explanation" for the increase in the failure to file charges in
these cases.
240. Id. at 591-93; see also Loh, Q: What Has Reform of Rape Legislation Wrought? A: Truth
in Criminal Labelling, 37 J. Soc. Issu.s 28 (1981); K. WILUAms, THE PROSECUOIoN OF SEXUAL
ASSAULTS 43 (Promis Research Project No. 7, Institute for Law and Social Research, 1978) (finding
no increase in conviction rates in District of Columbia in immediate aftermath of repeal of its corrobo-
ration requirement); Chappell, The Impact of Rape Legislation Reform: Some Comparative Trends,
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The only major study to find any significant change in disposition as a
result of law reform was conducted in Michigan by Professors Teanne
Marsh, Alison Geist, and Nathan Caplan.2" While they found some sta-
tistical improvement in conviction rates, the dimensions of improvement
are not clear. 2  Their overall conclusion, based both on interviews and
statistics, was that "the law has very little impact on the' system's ap-
proach to sexual assault cases, despite statistical improvements in convic-
tion rates.12 43 The major change discerned from interviews with prosecu-
tors, defense attorneys and judges was the decline in the importance
attached to the victim's prior sexual history.244 But even as to this issue,
the defense attorneys responded that they continued to investigate the vic-
tim's sexual history as a matter of course, and to seek ways to use such
information to discredit the victim.
245
At one level, the results are not all that surprising: The criticisms of the
Model Penal Code commentators and others notwithstanding, if Michigan
is considered one of the more "radical" reform efforts, then it is quite
clear that law reform has been neither as radical as some have feared, nor
as effective as some might hope. Indeed, the interrelationship between
force, consent, and mens rea as understood by courts means that simply
moving these pieces around in a statute is unlikely to affect the legal sys-
tem's working definition of the crime, although it may alter the message
communicated to the public by the law.
246
Moreover, standard, short-term "before and after" studies may not be
7 INT'L J. WOMEN'S STuDIES 70-80 (1983) (suggesting that impact of 1983 rape law reform, as
measured by criminal justice statistics, is likely to be slight, although long-term symbolic impact may
be great).
241. J. MARSH, A. GmaST & N. CAPLAN, supra note 138.
242. Id. at 29-37. They base this conclusion of improvement on two calculations. The first is the
increase in the monthly number of convictions, an increase which may reflect-in some unstated
part-an increase in the number of reports and arrests; it does not necessarily mean an improvement
in the success rate of prosecutions. As for conviction rates, the authors examine convictions as a per-
centage of reports rather than of cases presented for prosecution. This combines in a somewhat un-
clear way police and prosecutorial effectiveness. The two do not go hand in hand; the types of cases in
which arrests are most easily made-cases where the victim and offender have a prior relationship,
and thus the alleged offender is easily identifiable-are precisely those which prosecutors claim are
the most difficult to convict. From their numbers, my own rough calculations of convictions (either as
charged or of a lesser offense) as a percentage of arrests suggest a somewhat uneven pattern, but
somewhat greater improvement (from 12.8% in 1972 to 17.5% in 1974, 17.6% in 1976, 27.1% in
1977, 19.5% in 1978), but these numbers not only seem quite low, but are so inconsistent with convic-
tion rates presented for Detroit for the post-reform period (upwards of 70% of all arrests, which seems
quite high) as to lead one to wonder which figures can fairly be relied upon. And as for the Detroit
figures, while they make clear that CSC1 charges and convictions overwhelmingly predominate, there
is no comparison data for the pre-1975 period to suggest what impact law reform may have had.
243. Id. at 65.
244. Id. at 52.
245. Id. at 55.
246. Similarly, changes in the rules of proof may be more important symbolically than practically,
at least in the short run; eliminating corroboration as a legal requirement has not, for example, elimi-
nated its practical necessity in many jurisdictions, see infra Part IV.
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the best measure of the impact of law reform. On the one hand, the
changes in social attitudes necessary to enact reform statutes may have
already been reflected, to some extent, in the operation of the criminal
justice system before the new statutes were enacted. Alternatively, it may
be that at least some changes take longer than the few years measured in
the before and after studies. Anecdotal evidence suggests that the pressures
on prosecutors to prosecute rape complaints have mounted substantially in
the last decade; for example, it is difficult to believe that some of the cases
discussed in Part II of this Article would have been reported or tried, let
alone resulted in convictions, prior to the changes in attitudes if not also in
statutes of the late 1970's. Some have suggested that the problem is not
that prosecutors are using their discretion to screen out too many rape
complaints, but that the politicization of the crime is leading prosecutors
not to screen out enough complaints. Such concerns have yet to emerge
from the data, but they suggest the importance of continued study. In the
meantime, the record on the impact of law reform remains uncertain, at
best.
IV. THE CRIMINAL JUSTICE SYSTEM'S UNDERSTANDING OF RAPE
Statutes and appellate court opinions provide a background for the way
rape is defined in practice within the criminal justice system. But on a
day-to-day basis, the critical decisions are made not by the legislators or
the appellate judges, but by the actors within the system: by the victims
themselves, in reporting a crime; by police, in investigating it and making
arrests; by prosecutors, in charging, dismissing, and plea bargaining; and
by juries and judges, at trial and in sentencing. This Part will examine
the practical definition of the crime of rape which is produced by these
decisions, focusing on the way in which both victims and officials distin-
guish between the traditional and the non-traditional rape-in effect, de-
fining at least two crimes.
Whether "rape" is the most underreported crime in America-a fre-
quent claim of some critics of the system 2 7-depends on how one defines
"rape," and to what extent one treats the non-traditional rape as a crime.
The available data suggest that while violent, stranger rape may be
among the most frequently reported crimes in this country, the non-
traditional rape-the case involving non-strangers, less force, no beatings,
no weapons-may be among the least frequently reported, even when its
victims perceive it to be "rape." In many if not most of these cases, forced
sex is tolerated by its victims as unavoidable, if not "normal."
247. See, e.g., Robin, Forcible Rape: Institutionalized Sexism in the Criminal Justice System, 23
CRIME & DEUNQUENCY 136, 137 (1977).
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Along with victim underreporting, the criminal justice system provides
a second screen on the understanding of rape. Prosecution and conviction
rates are highest when force and resistance are greatest, when the rape is
corroborated, when no prior relationship exists between victim and de-
fendant, and when the initial contact between the two is involuntary. In-
deed, when such factors are present, prosecution and conviction rates are
quite high; when they are not, the case is far more likely to be dismissed
or at least pleaded out as a minor offense, or if taken to trial, most likely
to result in an acquittal.
The downgrading of cases involving prior relationships, less force, no
injuries, and no corroboration is characteristic of the criminal justice sys-
tem's treatment of both violent and property crimes, and the overall statis-
tics on rape (at least among reported cases) are not substantially different
or worse than other serious crimes. To the extent that the feminist cri-
tique of the system depends on rape being treated uniquely-and that has
been the predominant claim-the studies fail to prove the case, and the
system's defenders would seem to carry the day.
My own critique depends on no such proof of uniqueness. I am willing
to assume, along with the system's defenders, that in certain basic respects
the criminal justice system operates no differently with respect to rape
complaints than with respect to other crimes. In my view, it is precisely by
treating rape the same as other crimes that the criminal justice system
manages to duplicate in every-day practice the most oppressive aspects of
the common law tradition. The system's emphasis on force, resistance, and
corroboration, the familiar factors of the appellate court opinions, tends to
minimize the perceived severity of many rapes. Moreover, the reliance
placed on prior relationship between victim and defendant and the cir-
cumstances of their initial contact, which may be the most important fac-
tors in determining disposition, tends to legitimate the very notions of
male entitlement and female contributory fault which are at the core of
the common law tradition that I have criticized.
A. Screening by the Victims: The Reporting of Rapes
The underreporting of rapes has been a subject of substantial con-
trovery. It is often cited as one of the primary effects of the unfair rules of
law and the hostile attitudes that penalize and denigrate rape victims. Vic-
tims do not report rapes, it is said, because the traumas associated with
pursuing a complaint and the difficulties of securing a conviction are
daunting.248
248. Id. at 141. "[Almong crimes of violence, rape may be the one least often reported to authori-
ties. . . . 'Police brutalization of the victim is responsible for the failure of women to report the
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[T]he number of women with legitimate cases who refuse to prose-
cute in dread of what the system does to them is so high that it is
difficult to imagine a woman deliberately putting herself through it,
particularly when a shadowy corner of our consciousness says only
bad girls get raped.249
The final report of the Battelle Memorial Institute of its multi-year
project on forcible rape, published in 1978, sounded a similar theme, at
least with respect to the statistics. That report concluded that "victimiza-
tion studies have shown that rape is probably the most underreported of
all major crimes. If victimization estimates are accurate, the actual num-
ber of rapes in the United States is approximately four times the reported
number. '2 50
In contrast, using data from the National Crime Surveys for the years
1973-82, the Bureau of Justice Statistics (BJS) calculated that 52% of all
rapes (attempted and completed) were reported to police, while 47% were
not. 5 ' The data for completed rapes was higher still: 58% were reported,
while 40% were not. 52 In an earlier study of rape victimization in 26
American cities, reporting rates were even higher: 68% of those who
stated that they had been the victims of a completed rape by a stranger
told interviewers that they had reported the crime to the police.2 53
Jim Galvin and Kenneth Polk point to the crime survey data as proof
that rape underreporting is not unique among serious crimes, and that the
feminist hypotheses are therefore wrong.2" According to the BJS reports,
for the years 1976-1980 national rape reporting ranged from a high of
58% in 1977 to a low of 42% in 1980. Among the four crimes consid-
ered-rape, robbery, assault, and burglary-rape was, on average, second
only to robbery in terms of the percentage of victims reporting.2 55
crime.'I
249. Calvert, Is Rape What Women Really Want?, MADEMOISELLE, Mar. 1974, at 189.
250. NATIONAL INSTITUTE OF LAW ENFORCEMENT AND CRIMINAL JUSTICE, LAW ENFORCE-
MENT ASSISTANCE ADMIN., U.S. DFP'T. OF JUSTICE, FORCIBLE RAPE 15 (1978) (emphasis added)
[hereinafter cited as FORCIBLE RAPE]. The most recent study cited for this proposition, however, was
one done in 1965 by the National Opinion Research Center, id. at 22 n.1, which included only 15
rapes as its basis for prediction. See Hindelang & Davis, Forcible Rape in the United States: A
Statistical Profile, in FORCIBLE RAPE: THE CRIME, THE VICTIM AND THE OFFENDER 87 (D. Chap-
pell, R. Geis & G. Geis eds. 1977).
251. U.S. DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS BULLETIN, THE CRIME
OF RAPE, table 7, at 3 (Mar. 1985).
252. Id. The BJS itself noted that their statistics were almost certainly skewed by the fact that:
"Just as some women are reluctant to report rape to the police, others are reluctant to report the event
to a survey interviewer." Id. at 2.
253. U.S. DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, CRIMINAL JUSTICE RESEARCH CENTER, RAPE VICTIMIZA-
TION IN 26 AMERICAN CITEs, table 35, at 44 (1979).
254. Galvin & Polk, supra note 231, at 126.
255. Reporting rates are not necessarily a measure of how seriously a crime is viewed by its
victims. Insurance requirements may increase reporting rates for property crimes such as burglary;
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Galvin and Polk's argument disposes of the issue as long as one accepts
the victimization surveys as authoritative-or at least as no less authorita-
tive with respect to rape than they are with respect to the other crimes
compared. But the authority of the victimization surveys' finding of a 58%
completed rape reporting rate does not simply depend, as it does with
other crimes, on people accurately recalling whether the victimization was
within the last twelve months (the issue that is usually scrutinized) or
even whether they called the police. It also depends on two additional
factors: first, whether women correctly perceive when forced sex is a crime
and thus whether they think of themselves as rape victims;2 56 and second,
whether women who do perceive of themselves as being rape victims are
willing to tell surveyers about it. Both of these predicates are highly dubi-
ous when applied to the victim of the non-traditional rape, far more dubi-
ous than when applied to the victims of robbery, assault and burglary.
There is little question that the victims of traditional rapes are more
likely to report than are the victims of non-traditional rapes.257 Thus, one
should expect that the high reporting rate found in the surveys includes
relatively more of the violent rapes by strangers and fewer of the less
violent rapes by non-strangers; indeed, the victimization surveys them-
selves acknowledge this.258 But it appears that not only police reporting,
but "rape" itself as understood in the victimization survey, is dispropor-
tionately of the "traditional" variety. This is not necessarily because the
traditional rape reflects the social reality, but because those reporting are
the victims who both perceive themselves as having been raped and who
are willing to disclose the crime against them to the surveyers. Reporting
rates are high because "rape" is so narrowly defined by its victims.
In the sociological studies, almost no one has any difficulty recognizing
the classic, traditional rape-the stranger with a gun to the throat of his
victim forcing intercourse on pain of death-as just that. But when the
man in the hypothetical (even a stranger) "warns her to do as he said"
motor vehicle theft consistently emerges in studies as one of the most often reported crimes. See, e.g.,
U.S. DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS BULLETIN, CRIMINAL VITIMIZA-
TION 1982, at 3 (1984).
256. "Rape" is not defined by the victimization surveyors. See Hindelang & Davis, supra note
250, at 90.
257. Linda Williams, for example, in a study of 246 women who contacted a rape center in
Seattle, found that prior relationship correlated with both reporting itself and with the other variables
(force, injury, circumstances of initial contact) which were related to reporting. But notably, even
those women raped by friends or relatives who did experience serious threats, force, or injury were
less likely to report, leading Williams to find prior relationship the single most important variable in
police reporting rates. Williams, The Classic Rape: When Do Victims Report?, 31 Soc. PROB. 459,
464 (1984); see also M. AMIR, PATTERNS IN FORCIBLE RAPE 230 (1971); D. RUSSELL, SEXUAL
EXPLOITATION 96-97 (1984); Dukes & Mattley, Predicting Victim Reporting, 62 SOCIOLOGY &
Soc. RESEARCH 63-84 (1977); Weis & Borges, Victimology and Rape: The Case of the Legitimate
Victim, 8 ISSuES IN CRIMINOLOGY 71 (1973).
258. See THE CRIME OF RAPE, supra note 251, at 2.
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and "tells her to lie down" rather than "slashing her with a knife," those
who are certain that a "rape" has taken place decreases significantly in
every category except "pro-feminist" women.159 In situations where a wo-
man is presented as being forced to engage in sex after a "date with a
respected bachelor" or with a man she met in a bar who takes her to a
deserted road (instead of home) or with her boss after working late, less
than half of the female respondents in another survey were certain that a
"rape" had occurred. Notably, where the two were strangers and the cir-
cumstances of the initial contact were involuntary-accosted in parking
lots, house break-ins-nearly everyone was certain that a rape had oc-
curred. 6 Adolescents in one survey were least likely to label clearly
forced sex as "rape" when the couple was presented as dating.26 1 Accord-
ing to that study, "teenagers of both genders are quite accepting of forced
sex between acquaintances and often don't view it as rape."' 62
The distinctions are not limited to hypothetical responses. It is clear
that women act on them as well. The most striking findings of this sort
are based on Diana Russell's survey of 930 adult women (by other trained
women) in the San Francisco area in 1978. Some 22% of those surveyed
responded that they had been the victims of "a rape or completed rape" at
some time in their lives, a figure substantially higher than the annual
percentages produced by the victimization surveys.2 "6 Even so, when the
questions were rephrased inquiring as to forced intercourse or intercourse
obtained by threat (rather than the word "rape"), the number climbed to
56% (24% completed, 31% attempted).2" Eighty-two percent of Russell's
total rapes involved non-strangers-and under 10% of that group were
reported to the police. 65
Russell's findings as to the prevalence of forced sex among dates, ac-
quaintances and friends are not unique. In a 1977 study, over half of the
female college students interviewed reported experiencing offensive male
sexual aggression during the previous year. 66 A 1983 nationwide study of
259. Krulewitz & Payne, Attributions about Rape: Effects of Rapist Force, Observer Sex and Sex
Role Attitudes, 8 J. APPLIED SOC. PSYCHOLOGY 291-305 (1978).
260. Klemmack & Klemmack, The Social Definition of Rape, in SEXUAL ASSAULT 135-46 (M.
Walker & S. Brodsky eds. 1975).
261. Zellman & Goodchilds, Becoming Sexual in Adolescence, in CHANGING BOUNDARIES: GEN-
DER ROLES AND SEXUAL BEHAVIOR 60-61 (E. Allgeier & N. McCormick eds. 1983) [hereinafter
cited as CHANGING BOUNDARIES].
262. Id. at 61. See also L'Armand & Pepitone, supra note 25.
263. Compare Johnson, On the Prevalence of Rape in the United States, 6 SIGNS 136 (1980) with
Russell & Howell, The Prevalence of Rape in the United States Revisited, 8 SIGNS 688 (1983).
264. D. RUSSELL, supra note 4, at 34-37.
265. Id. at 101. Russell found the stranger rapes most likely to be reported (30%), compared to
reporting rates of 7% or less for friends or dates. The difference in absolute numbers would seem to
follow from a broader understanding of "rape" in her survey.
266. Malamuth, Rape Proclivity Among Males, J. SoCIAL ISSUES 138, 152 (Fall 1981).
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adolescents conservatively estimated that from 5 to 16% of adolescent
males "sexually assault" each year, and that most of these assaults are
"spontaneous events that occur in the context of a date. '267 Yet only 5% of
the female victims of these sexual assaults report them to the police as
rape.26 8 In three separate studies of college students released this year, one
in five women in each study reported being "physically forced" to have
sexual intercourse by their dates.269 Yet the majority of these women did
not think they had been raped; as one newspaper headline put it: "Rape
not rape to some victims.1
270
The reasons given in these studies for the failure to perceive forced sex
as rape and report it betray a view of rape that approaches the definition
of the "traditional" rape. Some women do not report attacks because they
were "successful" in resisting the actual penetration,7 1 suggesting a belief
that sexual aggression is only a crime when it ends in unwanted inter-
course. Other women do not report because they ended up "giving in" to
the sexual pressure without a "fight, '27 2 suggesting the traditional equa-
tion of nonconsent with utmost or at least reasonable physical resistance.
And many young women believe that sexual pressure, including physical
pressure, is simply not aberrant or illegal behavior in a dating situation.
Thus, one study concluded that most adolescent victims do not perceive
their experiences of victimization "as legitimate," meaning that "they do
not involve strangers or substantial violence. . . . Contemporary teenag-
ers expect and receive a fair amount of pressure for sex in dating situa-
tions. This expectation may lead them to accept as normative sexually
267. S. AGETON, SEXUAL ASSAULT AMONG ADoI.scENTs 134-35 (1983). Sexual assault was
defined to include "all forced sexual behavior involving contact with the sexual parts of the body;" the
force used could be "as mild as verbal pressure or as severe as a physical beating or injury from a
weapon." Id. at 8.
Interestingly, reports on the amount of force used in these adolescent encounters varied greatly
depending upon whether the subject questioned was a male aggressor or a female victim. While the
overwhelming number of young men reported using verbal persuasion (68% in 1978; 83% in 1979;
71% in 1980), only 7 to 12% reported using "pushing, slapping, mild roughness," and only 4 to 12%
reported using their size or strength to accomplish their goals during the period between 1978-1980.
Id. at 96. On the other hand, 27 to 40% of the female victims reported "pushing, slapping, mild
roughness," and 39 to 66% reported size and strength of the offender as a factor in the assault. Id. at
41.
268. Id. at 130.
269. The surveys were conducted at the University of South Dakota (20.6% of the women were
"physically forced by a dating partner to have sexual intercourse"). At Cornell, 19% reported they
had "intercourse against their will . . . through rough coercion, threats, force or violence"; but only
2% said they had been "raped"; and at a small college near Ithaca, 18% said they had engaged in
intercourse against their will through force and 9% said they had been "raped." See Boston Herald,
Sept. 22, 1985, at 6; Parade Magazine, Sept. 22, 1985, at 10.
270. Boston Herald, Sept. 22, 1985, at 6.
271. See, e.g., S. AGETON, supra note 267, at 129-30.
272. See, e.g., Knox & Wilson, Dating Problems of University Students, 17 COLLEGE STUDENT
J. 225, 226 (1983).
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agressive, assaultive behavior unless it occurs outside a dating situation or
becomes especially violent. 27 3
When we walk out of our houses and do not see our car, we know
(unless we've parked illegally in Cambridge) that we are the victims of a
car theft. The same is not true of women who say no, but are forced to
have sex. We know that we have been abused. But most of us do not think
that we have been raped-unless we happen to be women who are more
"pro-feminist" than most. 27 4 Rape is not, at least in the words of most
statutes or even appellate opinions, strictly limited to sex that begins as a
kidnapping or a breaking and entering. But in practice, when the victimi-
zation surveys find that reporting rates for rape are higher than for other
crimes, the rapes they are examining are disproportionately cases of
greater force, involuntary encounters, and strangers attacking strangers.275
The high reporting rate found in the victimization surveys is- also
skewed by the willingness or unwillingness of women who do perceive
themselves as rape victims to disclose this to the victimization surveyers.
One would think that the women most likely to be forthcoming to the
victimization surveyers would be those who had already reported to the
police; after all, they were certain enough that they had been victimized to
report it to the police, and the questions asked by a victimization surveyor
are far less intrusive and probing than those asked by the police. How-
273. S. AGETON, supra note 267, at 48.
274. See, e.g., Krulewitz & Payne, supra note 259; L'Armand & Pepitone, supra note 25.- In-
deed, at Washington State University, a survey reported that 5% of the women and 19% of the male
students do not even believe that forcible rape on dates is definitely criminal rape or that the male's
behavior is definitely unacceptable. See Professor Gloria Fisher, quoted in the Boston Herald, supra
note 270.
275. The victimization surveys find the reporting rate for attempted and completed rapes by
strangers (56%) to be significantly higher than that by non-strangers (45%), see THE CRIME OF
RAPE, supra note 251, at table 7, at 3. What is striking is that these results are based on the finding
that rapes committed by non-strangers are rare events (at least relative to those committed by stran-
gers) and in some surveys almost nonexistent. The 10-year victimization study found that 68% of all
the rapes it learned about were committed by strangers. Id. at table 5, at 3. And the 26-city survey
could not even find enough instances of non-stranger rape to form a statistically significant sample for
inclusion in the main body of its report.
The definitional problems of rape as studied in victimization surveys may also explain other seem-
ingly inexplicable distinctions found in them. The most striking is based on race: The 13-city crime
survey found that the reporting rate for white victims of completed rapes was 65%; for black/other
victims, the rate was 84%. See Hindelang & Davis, supra note 250, at 98. That finding is striking
because others have found minority women less likely than white women to report the same hypothet-
ical rape. Feldman-Summers & Ashworth, Factors Related to Intentions to Report a Rape, J. Soc.
IssuEs 53, 65-66 (Fall 1981). What I suspect is lurking in the distinction between white and black
reporting rates is a difference in understanding as to the scope of "rape." If black women have a
narrower understanding of rape-and socioeconomic status and feminist views have been found to
correlate with the breadth of one's understanding-then more of the events that black women charac-
terize as rape are likely to be of the traditional sort reported most often by all women. While the 13-
city study does not include such data, in the 1982 national victimization survey, 84.2% of the rapes
reported to survey interviewers by blacks involved strangers, compared to 62.7% reported by whites.
U.S. DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, CRIMINAL VICTIMIZATION IN
THE UNITED STATES 1982, table 37 (1982).
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ever, research suggests that even among those women who have reported
their rapes to the police, women victimized by non-strangers are substan-
tially less likely to describe themselves as having been raped to surveyors.
In 1971, the Bureau of the Census, in an effort to examine the accuracy
of its criminal victimization surveys, conducted what is known as a reverse
record check, interviewing 620 persons who were known from police
records to have reported that they were victims of specific crimes during
1970.27 In this report, entitled The San Jose Methods Test of Known
Crime Victims, the authors found that 84.2% of those raped by a stranger
reported the victimization to the interviewer, while only 54.2% of those
raped by someone they knew reported the victimization.2 77 Every one of
the victims in both groups, it bears emphasizing, had already reported the
victimization to the police.
The San Jose report found that rapes were both more and less likely to
be reported than other crimes-depending entirely on the circumstances.
Rape committed by a stranger was the crime most likely to be reported to
survey interviewers. Second to aggravated assault, rape committed by a
non-stranger was the crime least likely to be reported to the interviewers.
Why would women who had reported a rape to the police fail to dis-
close it to a survey interviewer? One possibility is that these women were,
quite simply, tired of talking about it, or considered it too private or too
painful to raise with a stranger who wanted the information for a survey.
But that possibility would seem to apply equally to all self-perceived rape
victims; it does not explain the striking difference between the very high
reporting rates of the victims of stranger rapes and the significantly lower
reporting rates of the victims of non-stranger rape. That distinction may
be explained both by the interviewee's concerns about the surveyor's re-
sponse and, even more troubling, by the fact that she may have received
just such a skeptical response from the police and the criminal justice sys-
tem. The latter would surely be enough to convince any woman that while
she herself felt victimized, this was not a "rape" as defined by the crimi-
nal justice system.
A very small minority of the victims of non-stranger, less violent rapes
perceive themselves to be rape victims, notwithstanding that they all felt
forced to have sex against their will through force or threat of force.
Among the minority who do perceive themselves as rape victims, only a
minority of that group contact the police. But even among the minority of
the minority who are not only convinced that they were raped, but suffi-
ciently certain of its "legitimacy" and sufficiently free of self-doubt as to
276. LAW ENFORCEMENT ASSISTANCE ADMINISTRATION, SAN JOSE METHODS TEST OF
KNOWN CRIME VICTIMS (Statistics Technical Report No. 1, June 1972).
277. Id. at table I, at 9.
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be willing to report to the police, barely half were later willing to tell
victimization surveyors that they were "raped."
The answer to the reporting controversy thus seems largely definitional:
The more narrowly rape is defined, the higher the rates of reporting.
Rape as a crime committed by strangers using substantial force is, by all
indicators, readily perceived as such and reported with greater frequency
than virtually any other crime. Forced sex among non-strangers, particu-
larly in social situations, is rarely perceived as a crime, and by all indica-
tors, rarely reported as such; the victimization studies themselves acknowl-
edge that nearly half of the non-stranger victims who do report to the
police are later silent when surveyed about their victimizations.
B. Screening Within the System: Arrest, Prosecution and Disposition
The future of a rape complaint, if it is reported, is determined in part
by luck (as in finding the perpetrator) and in part by discretion (of police,
prosecutors, judges, and juries). As with reporting, the debate over the
handling of rape cases has raged with intensity at the rhetorical level. The
institutional sexism of the criminal justice system has been pointed to by
some commentators as the prime cause of what are characterized as ap-
pallingly low rates of arrest, prosecution, and conviction. For example:
Forcible rape is unique among crimes in the manner in which its
victims are dealt with by the criminal justice system. Raped women
are subjected to an institutionalized sexism that begins with their
treatment by the police, continues through a male-dominated crimi-
nal justice system influenced by pseudo-scientific notions of victim
precipitation, and ends with the systematic acquittal of many de
facto guilty rapists.27 8
Or consider:
Although rapes tend to be both violent and planned, very few appre-
hended rapists are ever charged with and convicted of rape; fewer yet
are committed to institutions. . . . The reasons for this failure to
charge and convict are clear: legal and social attitudes about rape
have produced a network of formal and informal restraints on the
actions of police, prosecutors, judges, and juries that hinder prosecu-
tions for forcible rape.27 9
And finally:
278. Robin, supra note 247, at 136.
279. Note, Rape and Rape Laws, supra note 201, at 927-28.
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Although more and more rapes are reported to the police, very few
cases actually go to trial and even fewer result in convictions ...
The reasons for this tremendous lack of convictions are complex, but
it is clear that a major factor is related to the judgmental policies of
the police, the prosecuting attorneys, and the juries.2 80
Yet to the extent that the feminist critique depends on rapes being
treated uniquely, it rests on uncertain grounds. Although there are varia-
tions among studies, the statistics on arrests and prosecutions are not sub-
stantially worse nor are the factors that appear to guide discretion sub-
stantially different than for other crimes. The question that interests me,
however, is not so much whether rape is treated differently, but whether
treating it the same as other crimes masks significant differences and con-
veys inappropriate judgements. My view is that it does.
The studies of individual jurisdictions have found that 20% (Washing-
ton, D.C.) 8' or 25% (New York City) 82 or 34% (California) 8 ' or 32%
(Indiana) 84 of felony arrests for rape result in convictions. While those
figures may appear shocking to some, substantial felony attrition, as it is
called, is characteristic of the criminal justice system: Whether one looks
at New York City in 1973 or 1926, at California, Portland, Oregon,
Washington, D.C., New Orleans, or even Germany and Austria, from 40-
60% of all felony arrests result in dismissal or acquittal.285 Moreover,
studies of individual jurisdictions have found rape rather typical in the
level of felony attrition as compared to other crimes of violence.2 "8 For
example, Galvin and Polk found that in California between 1975 and
1980/81, rape ranked third (behind homicide and assault) in the average
percentage of offenses cleared by arrest, third (behind homicide and rob-
bery) in the percentage of all arrests resulting in the filing of a felony
complaint, second (behind homicide) in the percentage of felony filings of
all complaints, third (behind homicide and robbery) in the percentage of
felony convictions of all felony complaints filed, and third (again behind
homicide and robbery) in the percentage of felony arrests resulting in in-
280. Feldman-Summers & Ashworth, Perceptions of Victims and Defendants in Criminal As-
sault Cases, 3 CRIMINAL JUSTICE AND BEHAVIOR 135, 136 (1976).
281. K. WILLIAMS, supra note 240, at 25-27, 43.
282. FELONY ARRESTS: THEIR PROSECUTION AND DISPOSITION IN NEW YORK CITY'S COURTS
8 (Vera Institute of Justice 1981).
283. Galvin & Polk, supra note 231.
284. LaFree, The Effect of Sexual Stratification by Race on Official Reactions to Rape, 45
AMER. Soc. REV. 842 (1980); see also Galvin & Polk, supra note 231, at 129.
285. H. ZEISEL, THE LIMITS Or LAW ENFORCEMENT 22-24 (1982).
286. Of course, to the extent that "rapes" are screened more strictly by their victims than other
crimes in the reporting decision itself, an equivalent statistical record by the criminal justice system
may be proof of its diminished efficacy in rape cases. The studies have not focused on this problem.
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stitutional sentences.2 7 Galvin and Polk also point to the available na-
tional data to further buttress the proof from California that attrition in
rape case processing is not unique.288
Even if the conviction rates for rape are not unique, the question re-
mains whether the factors relied upon to produce them are. Studies of
individual jurisdictions, along with surveys of prosecutors, point to three
sets of crime-related factors which determine whether a rape arrest will
lead to prosecution and conviction: the relationship of victim and offender;
the amount of force and resistance; and the existence of corroborating
evidence.28 9
The relationship of victim and offender and the circumstances of their
initial encounter appear key in virtually every study. In New York, Chap-
pell and Singer found that 24% of the rape complaints in non-stranger
cases were judged by the police to be without merit, compared with less
than 5% in the stranger cases.290 A student review of the case files of the
Sex Crime Unit in the New York County (Manhattan) District Attor-
ney's Office found that in cases involving strangers, 33% were indicted,
33% were dismissed, and 16% were reduced. As for non-strangers, 7% of
the cases were indicted, 49% were dismissed, and 18% were reduced.291 In
effect, the numbers point toward a policy to reduce or dismiss cases in-
volving non-strangers, a policy that has been confirmed and defended (for
all crimes) in newspaper accounts. 2 2
New York is not unique in this regard. A national survey of prosecu-
287. Galvin & Polk, supra note 231, at 14-18.
288. An earlier study of processing in the District of Columbia yielded results which provide
somewhat greater support for those who argue that rape is treated uniquely. Researchers in 1973
found that one out of five arrests for forcible rape resulted in conviction, placing rape fifth among the
five serious crimes examined (murder, aggravated assault, robbery, burglary and rape). Rape ranked
last as well in the percentage of arrests accepted for prosecution, first in dismissals by judge or prose-
cutor, and last in the number of guilty pleas, although some of these rankings were based on relatively
small actual differences in percentages. The District of Columbia study is more than ten years old,
but it is not easily dismissed as dated; recognizing that their data was gathered before the District of
Columbia eliminated its corroboration rule in May, 1976, the authors went back and examined the
comparability of the data after that time. They found "not only that the number of reported rapes was
much lower than in previous years, but also that there was no increase in the conviction rate for the
last six months of 1976. In fact, the rate was somewhat lower than in 1973 and 1974. Conviction
rates and reporting behavior may change in the future but as yet we see no move in that direction."
K. WILLIAMS, supra note 240, at 25-27, 43 (emphasis in original).
289. As noted at the outset, I recognize the serious problems involved in my reliance, of necessity,
on the studies of others as they have chosen to present them. But the factors listed here are ones noted
with such regularity in the studies that, even if they are not as important as some of their authors
believe, it is likely that they remain significant; this is confirmed as well by my own conversations
with prosecutors.
290. Chappell & Singer, Rape in New York City: A Study of Material in the Police Files and Its
Meaning, in FORCIBLE RAPE: THE CRIME, THE VICrIM, AND THE OFF NDER 245-71 (D. Chappell,
R. Geis & G. Geis eds. 1977).
291. M. Pfeffer, Where Have All the Sex Crimes Gone? (on file at Harvard Law School, 1985).
292. See N. Y. Times, Feb. 12, 1982, at Al, col. 4.
1171
The Yale Law Journal
tors conducted by the Battelle Institute found the relationship between the
victim and the suspect and the circumstances of their initial contact to be
among the ten factors considered most important in screening rape cases
and obtaining convictions.2 93 In Washington, Professor Loh found the so-
cial interaction of the victim and the defendant to be the second most im-
portant factor, behind the amount of force used, in predicting disposi-
tion.294 In the District of Columbia, researchers found that the
relationship between the victim and the accused was substantially more
important than seriousness of the incident; while the latter did not predict
convictions, the former did, and the closer the relationship, the lower the
conviction rate.295 In Travis County, Texas (Austin), Professor Weninger
found that 58% of all stranger cases resulted in indictments, compared
with 29% of the cases among acquaintances and 47% among friends. Even
more important, when the initial encounter between the victim and the
defendant was voluntary, only one-third of the cases resulted in indict-
ment; when it was involuntary, the indictment rate was 62%.29' And at
Harvard's Center for Criminal Justice, proposed sentencing guidelines
drafted last year distinguish in each category of sexual assault between the
stranger and non-stranger, providing for lower sentencing recommenda-
tions when an otherwise similar rape is committed by a non-stranger. 2 7
The second set of factors critical to disposition relates to the amount of
force used by the defendant and the level of resistance offered by the vic-
tim. In the Battelle survey, use of physical force was rated by prosecutors
as the single most important factor in screening and securing conviction;
also included in the ten key factors were injury to the victim, use of a
weapon, and resistance by the victim.29 In Washington, Professor Loh
found that force was the most important factor.299 Similarly, in Texas,
both a high degree of force and substantial resistance were among the five
significant predictors of indictments. The existence of resistance was par-
ticularly critical in cases where the initial encounter was voluntary. In
voluntary encounter cases, the probability of indictment was only 13%
when little victim resistance was used, but jumped to 53% when resistance
was substantial. When the initial encounter was involuntary, the differen-
tial based on resistance was only 10% (from 57% to 67%).300
293. FORCIBLE RAPE, supra note 250, table 30, at 19.
294. Loh, supra note 200, at 604.
295. K. WILLIAMS, supra note 240, at 32.
296. See Weninger, Factors Affecting the Prosecution of Rape: A Case Study of Travis County,
Texas, 64 VA. L. REv. 357, 379-82 (1978).
297. Proposed Draft Sentencing Guidelines for the District Attorney's Office Project, Harvard
Center for Criminal Justice (1985).
298. FORCIBLE RAPE, supra note 250, table 30, at 19.
299. Loh, supra note 200, at 604.
300. Weninger, supra note 296, at 386.
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The final set of factors relates not to the quality of the evidence as
judged by the prosecutor's own evaluation of the victim's credibility, 01 but
to the existence of corroboration of her account. In Texas, Professor Wen-
inger found that where there was no medical corroboration (at least of
penetration) only 12% of the arrests resulted in indictment. 0 2 Proof of
penetration, extent of victim identification, and the availability of wit-
nesses were cited as among the ten most important factors in the Battelle
study, and corroborative evidence was the third most important factor in
Professor Loh's study of the state of Washington.30 3 In Indiana, Profes-
sors Myers and LaFree found that corroboration remained an informal
requirement despite the change in the law formally eliminating its neces-
sity,30 a conclusion also reached by those interviewed by Marsh and her
colleagues in Michigan.30 5
The factors emphasized by prosecutors are also considered significant
by juries in the minority of cases which go to trial. In their landmark
study of juries, Professors Kalven and Zeisel found not only that the jury
tends to be biased against the prosecution in a rape case, but that it will
go to great lengths to be lenient with the defendant when there are any
suggestions of "contributory behavior" on the part of the woman.3086
"Contributory behavior" justifying leniency includes hitchhiking, dating,
and talking to men at parties. To demonstrate their point, Kalven and
Zeisel divided the rape cases in their study into two categories, aggravated
and simple, and emphasized the dimensions of disagreement between
judge and jury in the two categories. "Aggravated" rape, according to
Kalven and Zeisel, included cases with extrinsic violence, multiple assail-
ants, or no prior relationship between victim and offender-what I have
termed the "traditional" rape. "Simple" rape included cases in which
none of the "aggravating circumstances" were present. Not only were jury
conviction rates nearly four times as high in the aggravated cases, but the
301. See Loh, supra note 200, at 605; K. WILLIAMS, supra note 240, at 27; Caringella-
MacDonald, The Comparability in Sexual and Nonsexual Assault Case Treatment: Did Statute
Change Meet the Objective? 31 CRIME & DEUINQuENCy 206 (1985). While prosecutors understanda-
bly do not admit to considering race and class, to the extent that such considerations enter into their
decisionmaking, it may well be related to their assessments of "credibility." Professor Loh found black
men arrested for the rapes of white women less likely to be charged and convicted, see Loh, supra
note 200, at 604, while Professor LaFree found that black men who assaulted white women were no
more likely than other suspects to be arrested or found guilty, but they were more likely to have their
cases filed as felonies, to receive longer sentences, and to be incarcerated in the state penitentiary,
LaFree, supra note 284, at 842-54. See also Note, Police Discretion and theJudgment That a Crime
Has Been Committed-Rape in Philadelphia, 117 U. PA. L. REV. 277 (1968).
302. Weninger, supra note 296, at 386, 389 n.115.
303. FORCIaLE RAPE, supra note 250, at 19; Loh, supra note 200, at 605.
304. Myers & LaFree, Sexual Assault and Its Prosecution: A Comparison with other Crimes, 73
J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 1282, 1300 (1982).
305. J. MARSH, A. GEIST & N. CAPLAN, supra note 138.
306. H. KALVEN & H. ZEIS.L, supra note 162, at 249-54.
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percentage of jury disagreement with the judge jumped from 12 per cent
in the aggravated cases to 60 per cent in the simple cases, 7 with the bulk
of the disagreement explained by the jury's absolute determination not to
convict for rape when there was any sign of contributory fault by the
woman.
308
The factors that determine the disposition of rape arrests are, in short,
those that have been emphasized throughout this paper in distinguishing
the "traditional" from the "non-traditional" rape. Reliance on these fac-
tors, however, is not limited to rape arrests. Although one study found
some variations in the application of prosecutorial discretion to rape
cases,309 others reached conflicting results.3 10 The importance attached to
prior relationship, force, and corroboration-like the statistics on attrition
of rape arrests-appears rather typical of the way in which the criminal
justice system processes cases generally.
But treating rape the same is only appropriate if it is the same. In my
view, rape is different in ways which demand that it be treated differently
from assault, robbery or burglary by the criminal justice system. Given
the nature of the crime, rapes are less likely to be supported by corrobora-
tion. Given the sex and socialization of the victims, rapes may require less
force and generate less resistance. Moreover, to take account of prior rela-
tionship in the same way and for the same reasons in rape as the system
does for other crimes communicates the common law tradition's most op-
pressive judgments of women victims-precisely the sort of judgments that
would lead women who had reported non-stranger rapes to the police to
later remain silent with the victimization surveyers.
Consider corroboration. There is surely reason to suspect that many
rape victims initially confront substantial skepticism from police and pros-
ecutors, if not as a result of the sexism of the individual officials, then as a
result of the officials' perceptions of the reactions of juries. Corroboration
of these victims' accounts is therefore that much more important to begin
307. Id. at 253. The focus on judge-jury disagreement suggests that judges can be relied upon to
disregard contributory fault and thus serve as a sort of control on the jury's consideration. Perhaps
that is so of Kalven and Zeisel's judges; if not, the results are even more striking. But whether it is
true of judges in general is far from clear given the tenor of the appellate opinions and the factors
found to be important in the studies above, which included relatively few jury trials.
308. Id. at 254. In some such cases, juries were willing to convict of a lesser offense where in-
structed that they could do so-a result which understandably led many feminist reformers to hope
that grading of rapes would increase conviction rates. More recent studies of potential jurors-samples
of the general population and of students asked to evaluate case descriptions as if they were ju-
rors-provide further support for Kaven and Zeisel's conclusions and for the emphasis on prior rela-
tionship and the circumstances of the initial contact (contributory fault/assumption of risk) in evaluat-
ing rape cases. See, e.g., H. FssLD & L. BiFttasN, supra note 135, at 125-41; Klemmack &
Klemmack, supra note 260, at 135-46; L'Armand & Pepitone, supra note 25, at 134-39; Krulewitz
& Payne, supra note 259, at 291-305.
309. K. WILLIAMS, supra note 240, at 26-27.
310. See, e.g., Myers & LaFree, supra note 304, at 1282.
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with. But corroborative evidence may be far more difficult to secure for
rape cases than for many other crimes. In a street theft, the requirement
of corroboration may be easily met: The defendant is arrested with the
stolen goods in his possession. In corruption, it is routine to secure needed
corroboration by sending in an informant with a tape recorder (if not the
video cameras of Abscam) or by wiretapping telephone lines. In drug
cases, there is both physical evidence and (often) tape recordings.
In a rape, corroboration may be impossible to find. In most cases, there
are no witnesses. The event cannot be repeated for the tape recorder-as
bribes or drug sales are. There is no contraband-no drugs, no marked
money, no stolen goods. Unless the victim actively resists, her clothes may
be untorn and her body unmarked. Medical corroboration may establish
the fact of penetration, but that only proves that the victim engaged in
intercourse-not that it was nonconsensual or that this defendant was the
man involved. Moreover, the availability of medical corroboration turns
not only on prompt and appropriate treatment by police and medical per-
sonnel but, in the first instance, on the victim not doing what interviews
find to be the most immediate response of many rape victims: bathing,
douching, brushing her teeth, gargling. On the surface, at least, rape ap-
pears to be a crime for which corroboration may be uniquely absent.
The second set of factors relates to force. In most crimes of violence, the
demographics of victim and offender tend to be nearly identical: young,
male, center city residents. Rape is different; its victims, even in jurisdic-
tions with gender-neutral laws, are overwhelmingly female."' The reality
of our existence, and our size, is that less force is required to overcome
most women than most men.
The importance accorded to the victim's resistance is troubling for the
same reason. To expect women to resist an attacker who is likely to be
both larger and stronger is to expect them to do what many or most
women have been brought up and conditioned (and, if they read some
manuals, instructed) not to do.3 12
In short, corroboration, force and resistance are not necessarily "neu-
tral" factors equally likely to be found in rape and assault cases and
therefore entitled to equal weight in both. For example, Professor Susan
311. See Caringella-MacDonald, supra note 301, at 206.
312. In one study where respondents were asked to impose hypothetical penalties for several dif-
ferent rapes, the male subjects imposed significantly more lenient sentences where there was low
resistance, but the female subjects imposed significantly harsher ones. Seeking to explain this "star-
tling finding," the author found that most of the female subjects "identified with the victim ...
That the rapist in the no resistance case so terrified his victim she dared not resist apparently aroused
more sympathy for her plight among female subjects. Perhaps they could more readily imagine them-
selves acting in a similar fashion." Scroggs, Penalties for Rape as a Function of Victim Provocative-
ness, Damage, and Resistance, 6 J. APPLiED Soc. PsYcHOLOGy 360, 367 (1976).
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Caringella-MacDonald, in a study of the treatment of sexual (CSC) and
non-sexual assault cases (including robbery) in Kalamazoo County, Mich-
igan between 1981-1983,13 found that the mean number of witnesses was
more than twice as high in the non-sexual cases, and victim credibility
problems, including implausible account, inconsistent statements, and sus-
pected ulterior motives, were noted by prosecutors in over a third of the
CSC cases and only 15% of the non-sexual assault cases. She also found
that the CSC victims, who were overwhelmingly female, offered less resis-
tance and sustained fewer injuries (other than the sexual attack) than the
non-sexual assault victims, who were predominantly male. The overall
conviction probability as rated by prosecutors was, not surprisingly, statis-
tically higher for the nonsexual than the CSC cases."1 4
The third set of factors relates to the prior relationship of the victim
and the accused and the circumstances of their initial contact. The more
broadly we define the crime of rape, the more prior relationship cases we
will see. Redefining force or consent in statutes or appellate opinions will
not make much practical difference if the system automatically down-
grades or dismisses the newly-included cases on the grounds that they in-
volve a "prior relationship."
Prior relationship cases often result in dismissal because the victim
withdraws her complaint. 1 ' The reasons victims withdraw range from
intimidation by the defendant to the private resolution of their dispute to
the inadequacy of either imprisonment or probation (which is all the
criminal justice system can offer) as a remedy for an individual who is
dependent on her attacker (e.g., the battered wife). To the extent that
vulnerability and dependence are factors that lead to withdrawal, women
may disproportionately withdraw not because they choose to but because
they lack any other choice. 1 '
But lack of victim cooperation is not the only reason-or perhaps even
the most important one-that prior relationship cases are dismissed or
downgraded. Outside of murder, prior relationship cases tend to be viewed
313. Caringella-MacDonald, supra note 301, at 206.
314. Id. at 212.
315. See generally PRESIDENT'S COMMISSION ON LAW ENFORCEMENT AND ADMINISTRATION
OF JUSTICE, REPORT ON A PILOT STUDY IN THE Drsmrcr OF COLUMBIA ON VICTIMIZATION AND
ATTITUDEs TOWARD LAW ENFORCEMENT (1967); R. DAVIS, V. RUSsELL, & F. KUNREUTHER,
THE ROLE OF THE COMPLAINING WITNESS IN AN URBAN CRIMINAL COURT (Vera Institute of
Justice 1980).
316. Of course, victim withdrawal in prior relationship cases may also be something of a self-
fulfilling prophecy, particularly in rape cases. If the prosecutor's attitude is that the victim will with-
draw-or that this is not a very serious case in any event-that message may readily be conveyed to
the victim. Pursuing a rape complaint under the best of circumstances has costs unique to that crime;
pursuing it where the prosecutorial response is that the crime is not serious or will not result in
serious punishment or does not deserve the prosecutor's attention is likely to be more than most
women are willing to endure.
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as simply less serious and less deserving of the attention of the system and
the resources of punishment. 317 At least four sets of reasons are generally
offered to explain this systemic bias. What is troubling is that each, when
applied to rape, incorporates the very notions of male power and entitle-
ment and female contributory fault that make the appellate courts' defini-
tion of the crime of rape so damning for women victims.
First, prior relationship cases are sometimes described as truly "pri-
vate" disputes which are not the business of the public prosecution system.
I have no particular problems with such an explanation when applied to
two friends of relatively equal size and strength fighting over a bet or a
baseball game. Leaving those two to their own devices is leaving them in a
situation of rough equality. But if that is the case, it is unlikely that either
will be pressing charges in any event. It is quite a different matter
when-and this is when one more often hears the explanation-the two
are estranged husband and wife, or ex-boyfriend and girlfriend. To treat
this relationship as private is to maintain the privilege of the more power-
ful (man) to rape or batter the less powerful (woman). The law claims to
be respecting the privacy of a relationship by denying the request of one
of the parties (the complaining witness) to not treat the relationship as
private and to intervene to save her. Privacy in this context means respect-
ing not voluntary relationships, but the abuse of greater power.
Second, prior relationship cases are said to be less serious (and the de-
fendants less blameworthy), because they often involve a claim of right
while attacks by strangers do not. The paradigm of the non-stranger theft,
for example, is a case in which underlying the taking of fifty dollars is a
claim of right; the defendant asserts that he is legitimately owed the
money and-when the victim refuses to pay-simply takes it. If prosecu-
tors want to view this case as less serious than a stranger theft or robbery,
fine. But the same reasoning applied to rape cases is wholly unacceptable.
The claim of right argument in that context means that once a woman
consents to sex, or even agrees to a date or a drink, the man has a right to
full and continuing sexual satisfaction; that her body might be his just
entitlement in the same way fifty dollars might.
Third, prior relationship cases often involve contributory fault by the
so-called victim, where offenses by strangers do not. The paradigm of the
non-stranger assault, for example, is the barroom fight. Both parties claim
the other started it; both may even file complaints; and both will be dis-
missed. The same inquiry in the rape context conveys a very different
message. When there we ask, "who started it," we imply that if the wo-
317. See generally FELONY ARRESTS, supra note 282, at 42-52; MODEL PENAL CODE § 213.1
comment at 280 (1980); M. MOORE, S. ESTRICH, D. MCGILLIS & W. SPELMAN, DANGEROUS OF-
FENDERS 12 (1984).
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man agrees to a ride or a date, she is responsible for her subsequent rape
and should not be heard to complain. Indeed, Menachem Amir, a sociolo-
gist who studied Philadelphia rape cases in 1958 and 1960, adapted the
concept of the "victim-precipitated" rape to describe, and implicitly
ascribe blame for, just such cases."' 8
Finally, it is said that an attack by a non-stranger-whether it is a rape
or assault-is a less terrifying incident, and therefore deserving of lesser
(or no) punishment. As often as I have seen and heard this explanation, it
continues to confound me. People are more afraid of stranger crime be-
cause they assume, often wrongly, that no one they know would victimize
them. But once it happens, betrayal may be every bit as terrifying, or
more so, than random violence. That you know your attacker is hardly a
guarantee of better treatment: For robbery and assault (no equivalent
figures are presented for rape), the most recent victimization survey finds
a greater likelihood of physical injury from attacks by non-strangers than
by strangers.3 2'
That is not to say that some prior relationship cases may not, on other
variables, prove less serious, although few studies have tested such correla-
tions and few commentators have asserted them as a basis for downgrad-
ing. It may be, as one study found, that strangers tend to use greater force
against their victims, but this should not excuse the non-stranger who uses
equivalent force. It may be, taking Amir's argument in the least insulting
light, that prior relationship cases will more often involve the lesser mens
rea category of negligence than is true of stranger cases, although this
should not excuse the non-stranger who acts purposefully or knowingly.
The problem with focusing on prior relationship per se as a critical factor
is not only that it is overinclusive, although this is surely a problem. The
problem is also that it legitimates notions of male entitlement and female
contributory fault which have no place in the law of rape, either as con-
strued in the appellate courts or as enforced within the criminal justice
system.
318. M. AMIR, supra note 257, at 259-76. The concept was adapted from Professor Wolfgang's
work on homicide, M. WOLFGANG, PATrERNS IN CRIMINAL HOMICIDE (1958). Amir included
within this category cases where the victim acts in a way that "is interpreted by the offender either as
a direct invitation to sexual relations or as a sign that she will be available for sexual contact if he will
persist in demanding it"-that is, she agreed to drinks, rides or dates, or failed to react strongly
enough to sexual suggestions and overtures. Excluded from this category, according to Amir, are cases
where there was no interaction between offender and victim, when what was involved was a sudden
attack. M. AMIR, supra note 257, at 260-61. Amir, a sociologist, says that the law does not recognize
precipitation, provocation, and seduction. Id. at 265-66. In this, he is clearly wrong. Most statutes
may not recognize such elements, but see MODEL PENAL CODE § 213.1(1) (1980); but in the defini-
tion of force and consent, the courts do, and the system does in its emphasis on prior relationship and
the nature of the initial contact.
319. U.S. DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, supra note 255; see also FELONY ARRESTS. supra note
282, at xii-xiii.
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V. TOWARD A BROADER UNDERSTANDING
The conduct that one might think of as "rape" ranges from the armed
stranger who breaks into a woman's home to the date she invites in who
takes silence for assent. In between are literally hundreds of variations:
the man may be a stranger, but he may not be armed; he may be armed,
but he may not be a stranger; he may be an almost, rather than a perfect,
stranger-a man who gave her a ride or introduced himself through a
ruse; she may say yes, but only because he threatens to expose her to the
police or the welfare authorities; she may say no, but he may ignore her
words.
In 1985, the woman raped at gunpoint by the intruding stranger-should
find most of the legal obstacles to her complaint removed. That was not
always so: As recently as ten years ago, she might well have faced a cor-
roboration requirement, a cautionary instruction, a fresh complaint rule,
and a searing cross-examination about her sexual past to determine
whether she had nonetheless consented to sex. In practice, she may still
encounter some of these obstacles; but to the extent that the law communi-
cates any clear message, it is likely to be that she was raped.
But most rapes do not as purely fit the traditional model, and most
victims do not fare as well. Oases involving men met in bars (Rusk)320 or
at work (Goldberg)321 or at airports (Evans),"2' let alone cases involving
ex-boyfriends (Alston)3 21 still lead some appellate courts to enforce the
most traditional views of women in the context of the less traditional rape.
And in the system, considerations of prior relationship and the circum-
stances of the initial encounter, as well as force and resistance and corrob-
oration, seem to reflect a similarly grounded if not so clearly stated view
of the limits of rape law.
In thinking about rape, it is not as difficult to decide which rapes are
more serious or which rapists deserving of more punishment: Weapons,
injury, and intent-the traditional grading criteria of the criminal
law-are all justifiable answers to these questions. Most jurisdictions that
have reformed their rape laws in the last ten years have focused on creat-
ing degrees of rape-aggravated and unaggravated-based on some com-
bination of the presence of weapons and injury.32' While mens rea or
mistake needs to be addressed more clearly in some rape laws, and bodily
320. Rusk v. State, 43 Md. App. 476, 406 A.2d 624 (1979) (en bane), rev'd, 289 Md. 230, 424
A.2d 720 (1981).
321. Goldberg v. State, 41 Md. App. 58, 395 A.2d 1213 (1979).
322. People v. Evans, 85 Misc. 2d 1088, 379 N.Y.S.2d 912 (Sup. Ct. 1975), affid mem., 55 A.D.
2d 858, 390 N.Y.S.2d 768 (1976).
323. State v. Alston, 312 S.E.2d 470 (N.C. 1984).
324. See H. FIELD & L. BiENEN, supra note 135, at 207-458 (state by state listing of rape
provisions); Bienen, supra note 25, at 170.
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injury more carefully defined in others, these are essentially problems of
draftsmanship which are hardly insurmountable.
The more difficult problem comes in understanding and defining the
threshold for liability-where we draw the line between criminal sex and
seduction. Every statute still uses some combination of "force," "threats"
and "consent" to define the crime. But in giving meaning to those terms at
the threshold of liability, the law of rape must confront the powerful
norms of male aggressiveness and female passivity which continue to be
adhered to by many men and women in our society.
The law did not invent the "no means yes" philosophy. Women as well
as men have viewed male aggressiveness as desirable and forced sex as an
expression of love;3 25 women as well as men have been taught and have
come to believe that when a woman "encourages" a man, he is entitled to
sexual satisfaction.3 26 From the sociological surveys to prime time televi-
sion, one can find ample support in society and culture for even the most
oppressive views of women, and the most expansive notions of seduction
enforced by the most traditional judges.3 27
But the evidence is not entirely one-sided. For every prime time series
celebrating forced sex, there seems to be another true confession story in a
popular magazine detailing the facts of a date rape and calling it
"rape.''13 8 College men and women may think that the typical male is
forward and primarily interested in sex, but they no longer conclude that
he is the desirable man.3 12  The old sex manuals may have lauded male
325. See Ruble, Sex Stereoopes: Issues of Change in the 1970's, 9 SEx ROLES 397, 400 (1983);
Kelley, Miller, Byrne & Bell, Facilitating Sexual Arousal via Anger, Aggression, or Dominance, 7
MOTIVATION & EMOTION 191, 200 (1983); see also E. SHAPIRO, DYNASTY: THE AUTHORIZED
BIOGRAPHY OF THE CARRINGTONS 47 (1984) (explaining rape of one character by another as man's
attempt to persuade woman to marry him through "a combination of love, warmth, and violent
threats").
326. See Burt, Cultural Myths and Supports for Rape, 38 J. PERSONALITY & SOc. PSYCHOL-
oGY 217, 229 (1980); Malamuth, supra note 266, at 143-44. Or as Ann Landers put it, "the woman
who 'repairs to some private place for a few drinks and a little shared affection' has, by her accept-
ance of such a cozy invitation, given the man reason to believe she is a candidate for whatever he
might have in mind." Boston Globe, July 29, 1985, at 9, col. 4.
327. See supra notes 325-26; see also Malamuth, Haver & Feshbach, Testing Hypotheses Re-
garding Rape: Exposure to Sexual Violence, Sex Differences, and the "Normality" of Rapists, 14 J.
RESEARCH IN PERSONALITY 121, 134 (1980); Eisenberg, Enter Arab Princes, Seductions and Water
Buffalos, T.V. GUIDE, May 4-10, 1985, at 16, 20:
Boy, trying to find people around here to even consider Abdullah a villain for raping Judy is
hard. Even on the shooting schedule it says, "Abdullah seduces Judy." The other day I said to
Deborah, "Do you realize you get raped four times in this thing?" She asked what the fourth
one was and I said, "When you're in the jungle." And she said, "No, that's seduction." And I
said, "You're being held at gunpoint and they're trying to extort a million dollars. You call
that a seduction?"
328. See, e.g., Kaye, Was I Raped? GLAMOUR, Aug. 1985, at 258; McBain, I Was Raped: A
Movie Star's Nightmare, COSMOPOLITAN, July 1985.
329. See Ruble, supra note 325, at 400.
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sexual responses as automatic and uncontrollable,3 30 but some of the
newer ones no longer see men as machines and even advocate sensitivity as
seductive.33 1
We live, in short, in a time of changing sexual mores-and we are
likely to for some time to come. In such times, the law can cling to the
past or help move us into the future. We can continue to enforce the most
traditional views of male aggressiveness and female passivity, continue to
adhere to the "no means yes" philosophy and to the broadest understand-
ing of seduction, until and unless change overwhelms us. That is not a
neutral course, however; in taking it, the law (judges, legislators, or prose-
cutors) not only reflects (a part of) society, but legitimates and reenforces
those views.
Or we can use the law to move forward. It may be impossible-and
even unwise-to try to use the criminal law to change the way people
think, to push progress to the ideal. But recognition of the limits of the
criminal sanction need not be taken as a justification for the status quo.
Faced with a choice between reenforcing the old and fueling the new in a
world of changing norms, it is not necessarily more legitimate or neutral
to choose the old.3 3 2 There are lines to be drawn short of the ideal: The
challenge we face in thinking about rape is to use the power and legiti-
macy of law to reenforce what is best, not what is worst, in our changing
sexual mores.
In the late eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries, the judges of Eng-
land waged a successful campaign against duelling. While "the attitude of
the law" was clear that killing in a duel was murder, the problem was
that for some, accepting a challenge remained a matter of "honour," and
juries would therefore not convict. "Some change in the public attitude
toward duelling, coupled with the energy of judges in directing juries in
strong terms, eventually brought about convictions, and it was not neces-
sary to hang many gentlemen of quality before the understanding became
general that duelling was not required by the code of honour.) 33 3
There has been "some change in the public attitude" about the de-
mands of manhood in heterosexual relations, as in duelling. If the "atti-
tude of the law" is made clearer-and that is, in essence, what this Article
is about-then it may not be necessary to prosecute too many "gentlemen
330. See THE JOY OF SEX: A GOURMET GUIDE TO LOVE MAKING (A. Comfort ed. 1972).
331. See Radlove, Sexual Responses and Gender Roles, in CHANGING BOUNDARIES, supra note
261, at 87, 102; see also M. MORGENSTERN, How TO MAE LOVE TO A WOMAN (1982).
332. The constitutional mandate of fair warning in the criminal law requires that people be
told-or be capable of ascertaining-their obligations. It does not mean that new obligations cannot be
imposed to prevent newly-understood injuries.
333. Williams, supra note 100, at 77.
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of quality" before the understanding becomes general that manly honor
need not be inconsistent with female autonomy.
In a better world, I believe that men and women would not presume
either consent or nonconsent. They would ask, and be certain. There is
nothing unromantic about showing the kind of respect for another person
that demands that you know for sure before engaging in intimate contact.
In a better world, women who said yes would be saying so from a position
of equality, or at least sufficient power to say no. In a better world, fewer
women would bargain with sex because they had nothing else to bargain
with; they would be in at least as good a position to reject demands for
sexual access as men are to reject demands for money.
If we are not at the point where it is appropriate for the law to pre-
sume nonconsent from silence, and the reactions I have received to this
Article suggest that we are not, then at least we should be at the point
where it is legitimate to punish the man who ignores a woman's explicit
words of protestations. I am quite certain that many women who say
yes-whether on dates or on the job-would say no if they could; I have
no doubt that women's silence is sometimes the product not of passion and
desire but of pressure and pain. But at the very least the criminal law
ought to say clearly that women who actually say no must be respected as
meaning it; that nonconsent means saying no; that men who proceed
nonetheless, claiming that they thought no meant yes, have acted unrea-
sonably and unlawfully.
So, too, for threats of harm short of physical injury, and for deception
and false pretenses as methods of seduction. The powerlessness of women
and the value of bodily integrity are great enough to argue that women
deserve more comprehensive protection for their bodies than the laws of
extortion or fraud provide for money. But if going so far seems too com-
plicated and fraught with difficulty, as it does to many, then we need not.
For the present, it would be a significant improvement if the law of rape
in any state prohibited exactly the same threats as that state's law of ex-
tortion and exactly the same deceptions as that state's law of false pre-
tenses or fraud.33 4
In short, I am arguing that "consent" should be defined so that "no
means no." And the "force" or "coercion" that negates consent ought be
defined to include extortionate threats and deceptions of material fact. As
for mens rea, unreasonableness as to consent, understood to mean ignor-
334. To the difficult hypothetical, there is thus an easy answer:, resolve it as if money were in-
volved, and I will gladly apply that resolution in the context of rape. Drawing lines between bargains
and threats is not always easy. Deciding which misstatements are material is not always automatic.
But I have never heard either problem offered as a reason for the repeal of the laws against blackmail,
extortion, deception or false pretenses. And in practice, there are likely to be more than enough easy
cases for victims, prosecutors and judges who are so inclined.
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ing a woman's words, should be sufficient for liability: Reasonable men
should be held to know that no means no, and unreasonable mistakes, no
matter how honestly claimed, should not exculpate. Thus, the threshold of
liability-whether phrased in terms of "consent," "force" or "coercion,"
or some combination of the three, should be understood to include at least
those non-traditional rapes where the woman says no or submits only in
response to lies or threats which would be prohibited were money sought
instead. 3 5 The crime I have described would be a lesser offense than the
aggravated rape in which life is threatened or bodily injury inflicted, but
it is, in my judgment, "rape." One could, I suppose, claim that as we
move from such violent rapes to "just" coerced or nonconsensual sex, we
are moving away from a crime of violence toward something else. But
what makes the violent rape different-and more serious-than an aggra-
vated assault is the injury to personal integrity involved in forced sex.
That same injury is the reason that forced sex should be a crime even
when there is no weapon or no beating. In a very real sense, what does
make rape different from other crimes, at every level of the offense, is that
rape is about sex and sexual violation. Were the essence of the crime the
use of the gun or the knife or the threat, we wouldn't need-and wouldn't
have-a separate crime.
Conduct is labeled as criminal "to announce to society that these actions
are not to be done and to secure that fewer of them are done." ' As a
matter of principle, we should be ready to announce to society our con-
demnation of coerced and nonconsensual sex and to secure that we have
less of it. The message of the substantive law to men, and to women,
should be made clear.
That does not mean that this crime will, or should, be easy to prove.
The constitutional requirement of proof beyond a reasonable doubt may
335. That the problem is more one of understanding than of draftsmanship is amply demon-
strated by the statute in the state of Washington. In Washington, rape in the third degree, a felony
punishable by up to five years imprisonment, occurs where a persons engage in sexual intercourse:
(a) Where the victim did not consent. to sexual intercourse with the perpretator and such
lack of consent was dearly expressed by the victim's words or conduct, or (b) Where there is a
threat of substantial unlawful harm to property rights of the victim.
WASH. REv. CODE ANN. § 9A.44.060 (West. Supp. 1986). The provision as to threats, limited as it is
to unlawful action and to property rights, is potentially narrower than the Model Penal Code's crime
of gross sexual imposition, and certainly narrower than traditional prohibitions of extortion. The
provision as to consent, on the other hand, is potentially quite broad; it could be read to criminalize all
those cases where force is difficult to prove in traditional terms but the woman said no. That is how I
would read it. Others read it differently. Professor Loh of the University of Washington, perhaps the
key commentator on the Washington rape statute, and certainly the expert on its practical impact, see
supra Section III(C), reads this provision as adding absolutely nothing to a statute which, in the first
two degrees of the offense, explicitly requires force and does not mention consent: "The definitions of
the first two degrees preempt the content of rape 3 and render its prosecution difficult." Loh, supra
note 200, at 552.
336. H.L.A. HART, supra note 39, at 6.
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well be difficult to meet in cases where guilt turns on whose account is
credited as to what was said. If the jury is in doubt, it should acquit. If
the judge is uncertain, he should dismiss.
The message of the substantive law must be distinguished from the con-
stitutional standards of proof. In this as in every criminal case, a jury
must be told to acquit if it is in doubt. The requirement of proof beyond a
reasonable doubt rests on the premise that it is better that ten guilty
should go free than that one innocent man should be punished. But if we
should acquit ten, let us be clear that the we are acquitting them not
because they have an entitlement to ignore a woman's words, not because
what they allegedly did was right or macho or manly, but because we live
in a system that errs on the side of freeing the guilty.
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